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A speaker of (1) implies that she is uncertain whether (2), making this use of might 
“epistemic.” On the received view, the implication is semantic, but in this dissertation 
I argue that this implication is no more semantic than is the implication that a speaker 
of (2) believes John to be contagious.  
  
(1) John might be contagious. 
(2) John is contagious. 
 
This follows from a new observation: unlike claims with explicitly epistemic 
locutions, those made with “epistemic” uses of might can be explained only with 
reference to non-epistemic facts. I conclude that they express a relation, not to 
relevant information, but instead to relevant circumstances, and that uncertainty is 
implied only because of how informed speakers contribute to conversations. This 
conclusion dissolves old puzzles about disagreements and reported beliefs involving 
propositions expressed with might, puzzles that have been hard for the received view 
to accommodate. The cost of these advantages is to explain why the circumstantial 
modality expressed by might is not inherently oriented towards the future, as has been 
claimed for other circumstantial modalities. But this claim turns out to be false. The 
correct characterization of the temporal differences reveals that the modality 
expressed by might relates to propositions whereas other modalities relate to events. 
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 1 
Chapter One: Introduction 
 
 
[I]t is precisely [the] confusion between the inappropriateness of saying certain things 
… and the possible truth of such things which is a main source of subjectivist views 
about probability, certainty, morality, etc.  
~ White (1975, 172) 
 
 
This dissertation is about what are traditionally called epistemic uses of modals. 
These are uses of modals like might and must with which a speaker implies relative 
(un)certainty. With (1), for example, a speaker typically implies that she is relatively 
uncertain whether John is contagious, while with (2) she typically implies that she is 
relatively certain that he is. 
 
(1) John might be contagious.  
(2) John must be contagious. 
 
It is standardly assumed that such (un)certainty is implied directly. Either the modals 
modify the force of the speaker’s commitment to the proposition that John is 
contagious, or they express a relation between that proposition and the speaker’s own 
information state. In this dissertation I am going to argue that this is not the case. I am 
going to argue that with so-called epistemic uses of might and must (un)certainty is 
implied only indirectly. Recognizing that this (un)certainty is implied indirectly is 
required, I argue, to make sense of how we explain the truth of the claims made with 
epistemic uses of might and must. It also makes sense of various properties of these 
uses which have both seemed anomalous and have been analyzed as such, often with 
far-reaching philosophical implications. The anomaly is only apparent, I argue, and 
depends on the assumption that a speaker who implies (un)certainty with the use of a 
modal must be doing so directly. But epistemic uses of might and must do not require 
far-reaching innovations to standard philosophical and semantic theory. All they 
require is for us to recognize that (un)certainty can sometimes be implied indirectly. 
 
1.1 Epistemic uses of modals 
With some uses of modals, a speaker implies that she is relatively (un)certain about a 
matter. But not all uses of modals are like this. While with (2) a speaker implies that 
she is relatively certain that John is contagious, with (3) her relative certainty about 
whether contagious people are quarantined is neither here nor there.  
 
(3) Contagious people must be quarantined. 
 
Instead, the speaker simply expresses the requirement for contagious people to be 
quarantined, a so-called deontic use of a modal. My focus in this dissertation is on the 
uses of modals with which speakers do imply relative (un)certainty, uses that have 
traditionally been called epistemic (cf. Lyons 1977; Palmer 2001; Portner 2009). 
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There are two standard views about how speakers manage to imply relative 
(un)certainty with epistemic uses of modals. The first is that they do so because the 
modal directly modifies the force of their commitment to the proposition in question: 
that is, the proposition expressed by the modal’s complement (cf. Halliday 1970; 
Palmer 2001; Schnieder 2010). On this view, the modal claims made with (1) and (2) 
express exactly the same proposition as the non-modal claim made with (4). They 
differ not with regard to their content but instead with regard to the force with which 
that content is put forth. 
 
(4) John is contagious. 
 
With must, this content is put forth with strong, albeit less than fully assertoric, 
commitment (cf. Lyons 1977, 808–9; Westmoreland 1998). With might, it is put forth 
with very weak commitment. With the former sort of commitment, a speaker implies 
that she is highly, though not fully, certain that John is contagious. With the latter, she 
often implies that she is not at all certain whether he is. 
The alternative view is that epistemic uses of modals make the content of the 
speaker’s claim depend truth conditionally on an information state. They do so by 
expressing a relation between that state and the content of the modal’s complement, 
commonly called the prejacent (cf. Kratzer 1981; DeRose 1991; Hacquard 2010; 
Bach 2011; von Fintel and Gillies 2011; MacFarlane 2014).1 In its simplest version, 
this view would hold that that information state is the speaker’s own, so that, relative 
to a given context, the truth conditions of the claims made with (1) and (2) would be, 
respectively, the same as those of the claims made with attitude reports more or less 
like (5) and (6). 
 
(5) I am uncertain whether John is contagious. 
(6) I am highly certain that John is contagious.  
 
Of these two views, the truth-conditional one seems to fare better when we turn 
from modal sentences in main clauses to modal sentences in embedded ones, as in (7) 
and (8), where the modal sentence is embedded beneath a propositional attitude verb. 
 
(7) Mary thinks that John might be contagious. 
(8) Mary thinks that John must be contagious. 
 
With the epistemic uses of might and must in (7) and (8) a speaker still implies 
relative (un)certainty. However, the (un)certainty is no longer her own but instead 
that of Mary, the reported attitude-holder. With (7) and (8), a speaker thus reports 
different attitudes from what she reports with (9). 
 
1 The relevant state had standardly been assumed to be one of knowledge, that is, a state comprising 
the propositions that were known, whence the name epistemic. Recently, it has been argued that this 
assumption is too strong: that propositions other than those that are known may also form part of the 
relevant information state (cf. Yalcin 2007; Tancredi 2007; Hacquard 2010; Kratzer 2012). However, 
the term epistemic has been retained, now used in a broader sense in the truth-conditional literature to 
refer to a modal’s introducing truth-conditional dependency onto any sort of information state. I follow 
this practice throughout the dissertation. 




(9) Mary thinks that John is contagious.  
 
She does not report the same attitude while simply introducing her own side comment 
on its content, as is possible for the epithet dummy in (10) and (11), and as we might 
expect to also be possible for might and must in (7)-(9) on a force-modifier view of 
those terms. 
 
(10) Mary thinks that that dummy John is contagious. 
(11) Mary thinks that John is contagious. 
 
Embedded occurrences of might and must have played a prominent role in debates 
about whether to adopt force-modifier or truth-conditional views of their epistemic 
uses (cf. Papafragou 2006; cf. also Hacquard and Wellwood 2012, and the references 
cited therein). While I cannot summarize that debate here, I think it is safe to say that 
it favors the truth-conditional view (cf. Swanson 2011, 257–60; Anand and Hacquard 
2013, 7–14; MacFarlane 2014, 248–53). It is easier on a truth-conditional view to 
explain cases where epistemic might and must do not embed, which are relatively 
fewer anyway, than to explain, on a force-modifier view, those many cases where 
they do. 
If a truth-conditional view seems to be required, the simplest epistemic version of 
it presented above is nonetheless subject to some very well-known difficulties. These 
have become central explananda in the development of alternative, increasingly more 
complicated truth-conditional views that have recently proliferated in the literature 
(cf., among others, Yalcin 2007; 2011; Anand and Hacquard 2009; 2013; Hacquard 
2010; MacFarlane 2011; 2014). 
One problem relates to embedding phenomena. While (7) and (8) are not used to 
report the same attitude as (9), they are also not used, respectively, to report the same 
attitudes as (12) and (13) (cf. Yalcin 2007; Hacquard 2010). 
 
(12) Mary thinks that she is uncertain whether John is contagious.  
(13) Mary thinks that she is highly certain that John is contagious. 
 
With (12) and (13), Mary’s reported attitudes are about herself; with (7) and (8), they 
are about John. This difference is unexpected on a simple, truth-conditional view in 
which a speaker can express more or less the same contents with (1) and (2) as she 
does, respectively, with (5) and (6). In that case, we would expect the contents of the 
reported attitudes in (7) and (8) to be able to be the same as the contents of the 
reported attitudes in (12) and (13) too. 
A second problem relates to disagreement phenomena. The speaker who responds 
to (1) or (2) with (14) or (15) seems to indicate disagreement with what has been said 
(cf. Stephenson 2007). 
 
(14) John can’t be contagious.  
(15) John doesn’t have to be contagious. 
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However, if she responded to (5) or (6) in this same way, she would not seem to 
indicate disagreement, or at least not of the same sort. In the first case, she seems to 
deny what her interlocutor asserted; in the second, to accept it, but also to encourage 
her interlocutor to reconsider the attitude she has asserted herself as having. 
These two problems do not depend on the choice of the attitude verb used to gloss 
the state of relative (un)certainty that a speaker implies with epistemic uses of might 
and must. Nor do they depend on the identification of the relevant information state as 
the speaker’s either. Speakers who utter (7) or (8) do not seem to report attitudes 
about any particular information state. And hearers who utter (14) or (15) do not seem 
to deny that speakers who have uttered (1) or (2) are in any particular information 
state either. The problem is not what information state speakers imply with epistemic 
uses of might and must but instead how that state is implied. 
The standard response to these and other problems has been to provide epistemic 
truth conditional theories that (i) are increasingly complicated; (ii) have far-reaching 
philosophical ramifications; (iii) make epistemic uses of modals anomalous; and (iv) 
do not provide full and principled empirical coverage of the relevant data anyway. 
Examples of such responses can be found in MacFarlane (2011; 2014) and Yalcin 
(2007; 2011). 
MacFarlane (2014), for example, proposes to make sense of the disagreement 
phenomena by removing information states from content and then relativizing the 
truth of the claims made with epistemic uses of modals to contexts of assessment 
individuated by such states. The result is to make the content that is the object of 
disagreement to still be truth-conditionally dependent on information states without 
having the disagreement itself be about those states. The price is the introduction of a 
philosophically significant relativism about select modal claims. No one denies that a 
single modal sentence like (16) can be used in different contexts to make different 
claims with potentially different contents or truth values. 
 
(16) John can jump 10 feet.  
 
However, MacFarlane now proposes that, in an epistemic use of a modal, the truth 
value of a single claim, with a single content, can differ from one person and context 
of assessment to another. Nor does this relativism buy us everything we might want. 
For to make sense of certain responses to disagreement, MacFarlane is forced to 
concede that the claims made with epistemic uses of modals can sometimes have 
enriched contents that include information states, making the claims invariant in truth 
value relative to different information states and assessment contexts (2014, 258–60). 
This may not vitiate the proposal, but it does weaken its explanatory force. 
Yalcin (2007), in turn, proposes to make sense of the embedding phenomena by 
having the information state already provided by the attitude verb be the state relative 
to which embedded epistemics express their epistemic modality. The result is to have 
an attitude report like (7), repeated here as (17), not report an attitude about any 
information state but instead a sui generis attitude toward the proposition that John is 
contagious. Yalcin (2011) proposes that this sui generis attitude is the state of mind 
reported by (18). 
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(17) Mary thinks that John might be contagious. 
(18) Mary’s belief state is compatible with John’s being contagious.  
(And Mary is also sensitive to the question of whether John is contagious.) 
 
The price of denying modal contents is a significant asymmetry between embedded 
epistemics and other modals. Embedded epistemics change the character, or strength, 
of the reported attitude: for example, from something like full belief to something 
more like mere suspicion. Other embedded modals, in contrast, change the content of 
the reported attitude. But the price we pay in positing such an asymmetry again does 
not buy us everything we might want. For to make sense of the fact that (19) and (20) 
are clearly not used to report the same state of mind, Yalcin is forced to concede that 
sometimes the relevant information state for embedded epistemics can be provided by 
context, rather than by the attitude verb, so that (19) is used to report the same 
attitude—with the same modal content—as (21) (2007, 1012–13). 
 
(19) Mary doesn’t know whether John might be contagious. 
(20) Mary’s knowledge state is not compatible with John’s being contagious. 
(And Mary is also sensitive to the question of whether John is contagious.) 
(21) Mary doesn’t know whether some contextually relevant information state is 
compatible with John’s being contagious.  
 
Again, this may not vitiate the proposal, but it does weaken its explanatory force. 
In this dissertation, I argue that there is a simple, attractive alternative to these (and 
other) increasingly complicated epistemic truth conditions. It is to adopt the view that 
the claims made with epistemic uses of might and must have modal truth conditions 
that are non-epistemic, and that the (un)certainty that is implied with these uses is 
implied only indirectly.  
Of course, I do not think that (un)certainty can only ever be implied indirectly, or 
that we can never make modal claims with epistemic truth conditions. In fact, I think 
we routinely do make such claims: for example, with modal adjectives like plausible. 
Rather, it is just that I think we never make such claims with epistemic uses of might 
and must. From a semantic standpoint, these modals, and the claims made with them, 
are systematically non-epistemic. 
I argue for this conclusion about might and must on the basis of new data about 
how we explain the truth of modal claims. These data give us independent reason to 
abandon what I will call the epistemic assumption: the assumption that the claims 
made with epistemic uses of modals must have epistemic truth conditions. I show 
how rejecting this assumption dissolves the problems for epistemic truth conditional 
views in a principled way that makes epistemic uses of modals continuous with other 
uses and does not require significant innovations to standard philosophical and 
semantic theories either. And I show how we can make sense of (un)certainty being 
implied with the use of a modal without that modal’s either altering the force of a 
speech act or making its content depend truth-conditionally on an information state. I 
preview these main points below, before outlining the structure of the dissertation as a 
whole. 
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Independent Motivation: Modal facts are often contingent, allowing us to explain 
what makes the content of a given modal claim true by appeal to relevant contingent 
features of the world. To explain what makes the content of a deontic claim true, for 
example, we can appeal to the contingent nature of the law, as in (22). 
 
(22) a.   Wisconsinites can shoot pigeons during hunting season. 
b.  You’re right. But the only reason they can is that their legislature is still 
controlled by the gun lobby.  
 
And to explain what makes the content of an epistemic claim true, we can appeal to 
the contingent nature of a speaker and her interlocutors’ current information state, as 
in (23). 
 
(23) a.   It’s plausible that John is contagious. 
b. You’re right. But perhaps the only reason it’s plausible is that we still 
don’t know about his test results. 
 
However, we cannot make this same appeal with all apparently epistemic uses of 
modals, as (24) demonstrates. Not knowing John’s diagnosis may explain why it is 
plausible that he is contagious, but it apparently cannot explain why he might be so.  
 
(24) a.   John might be contagious. 
b.  You’re right. #But perhaps the only reason he might be is that we still 
don’t know about his test results. 
 
The best explanation of this fact, I argue, is that, unlike the content of the claim 
made with plausible in (23), the content of the claim made with might in (24) does 
not turn out to have epistemic truth conditions. Instead, it has circumstantial ones. Its 
truth depends on how John’s being contagious stands with regard to circumstances, 
rather than on how his being so stands with regard to an information state (for the 
circumstantial-epistemic distinction, cf. Kratzer 1981; 1991). As such, it is to the 
contingent nature of the circumstances, rather than of any information state, that we 
must appeal to explain its truth, as in (25). 
 
(25) a.   John might be contagious. 
b.  You’re right. But the only reason he might be is that he still works in 
that old hospital ward. 
 
Dissolution of Outstanding Problems: If the truth of the claim made with ((25)a) 
does depend on how John’s being contagious stands with regard to the circumstances, 
then it follows automatically that disagreement with that claim is not disagreement 
about an information state. Similarly, it follows automatically that to believe the 
content of that claim to be true is not to have a belief about an information state. At 
the same time, if believing this content to be true is believing that the circumstances 
bear a particular modal relation to the proposition that John is contagious, this will be 
distinct both from believing that they bear other modal relations to that proposition 
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and from believing that proposition itself. So we also readily make sense, as force-
modifier views cannot, of why (7)-(9) report different attitudes on the part of the 
reported attitude-holder. 
Implied (Un)certainty: Circumstances can affect the objective probability of a 
proposition. John’s working in the worst hospital ward, for example, increases the 
objective probability that he is contagious. His having a powerful autoimmune system 
decreases it. And so on. Say for the sake of illustration that the claims we make with 
so-called epistemic uses of modals are about how circumstances affect the objective 
probability of a proposition.2 A speaker who makes such a claim can often reasonably 
be assumed to be interested in the actual truth value of that proposition, and to have 
made the claim she did only because she was less than completely certain about it. 
With certain uses of modals, speakers could thus imply relative (un)certainty even 
without those modals modifying the force of a speech act or making its content truth-
conditionally dependent on an information state. Relative (un)certainty would be 
implied in virtue of the fact (i) that these modals make the content of a speech act 
depend truth-conditionally on how circumstances affect the objective probability of a 
proposition; and (ii) that speakers can generally be assumed to have a purely extrinsic 
interest in this matter, one that depends solely on their unsatisfied interest in the 
actual truth value of that proposition.  
 
1.2 Outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation is composed of three distinct parts, of two chapters each. The first 
part deals with fundamentals: with the argument against epistemic analyses of might 
and must from the data about how we explain the truth of modal claims, and with the 
development of a framework for a non-epistemic analysis. The second part deals with 
applications of this analysis to the disagreement and embedding phenomena that have 
proven so difficult for epistemic analyses to accommodate. The third part deals with 
objections that arise within the standard Kratzerian framework for modal semantics: 
specifically, from its use of the epistemic/circumstantial distinction to differentiate 
might from can (cf. Kratzer 1981; 1991), and also to account for the different 
temporal properties of the two (cf. Thomas 2014; Rullmann and Matthewson 2018). 
 
Part One: Fundamentals 
In Chapter Two, I present data about how we explain the truth of modal claims. I 
show that with so-called epistemic uses of modals there is a robust divide between 
those uses that license subsequent epistemic explanations and those that do not. This 
divide cross-cuts a number of important distinctions, including distinctions in modal 
force (possibility vs. necessity), in modal polarity (negated vs. non-negated), and in 
the grammatical category of a modal expression (auxiliary vs. adjective). This divide 
does not seem to persist when apparently epistemic uses of modals are restricted by 
epistemic modifiers, like given what we know. (These modifiers have been alleged to 
make explicit the otherwise implicit information state relevant for the epistemic use.) 
However, I show that such modifiers license epistemic explanations independently of 
whether the use they restrict is alleged to be epistemic. I also show that there is no 
 
2 This is not the view I ultimately adopt, but I will often use it for illustrative purposes. 
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similar divide for other uses of modals in the sorts of explanations licensed by their 
allegedly implicit and explicit counterparts.  
Having presented these data, and having shown that they cannot be attributed to 
anything about the particular modal concepts allegedly expressed by might and must, 
I critically review existing theories. I argue that we cannot make sense of the data by 
assuming that the relevant uses of these modals function either (solely) to modify the 
force of a speech act or to make its content truth-conditionally dependent on an 
information state. Truth-conditional views incorrectly predict epistemic explanations 
to be available for might- and must-claims, even after the role of information states is 
fundamentally re-envisioned, as with the removal of such states from content to the 
evaluation matrix (cf. MacFarlane 2014). Force-modifier views, in contrast, correctly 
predict such explanations to be unavailable, but also incorrectly predict non-epistemic 
explanations to be unavailable too. Neither of these standard views for how speakers 
imply (un)certainty with the relevant epistemic uses of modals makes good sense of 
our data then. 
In Chapter Three, I propose we adopt a non-epistemic analysis for those epistemic 
uses of modals that do not license epistemic explanations. I focus primarily on might 
and on the idea that it could express circumstantial possibility. Without committing to 
any particular analysis of circumstantial possibility (though I allude to one in Chapter 
Seven), I show how we can make ready sense of the data from the previous chapter 
whatever circumstantial analysis we adopt. For if circumstances leave open (or close 
off) certain possibilities, then different ones could have been left open (or closed off) 
if circumstances had been different. This allows us to appeal to contingencies of the 
circumstances to explain what makes claims about these sorts of possibilities true, 
though understandably not to contingencies of information states.  
Our data provide good reason to think that the contents of possibility judgments 
are truth-conditionally independent of the states of those who make them. However, 
the analytical difficulty is to effect this separation. I show how we can do so, just as 
we have learned to do for actuality judgments, if we allow the contents of possibility 
judgments to be general, or independent of specific sets of circumstances. This is 
something I argue we should do for the claims made with uncontested circumstantial 
modals anyway, so nothing is required to make sense of so-called epistemic uses of 
modals, on my view, that is not also already required for other modals. I show how to 
formalize this view within an adapted version of a standard Kratzerian framework for 
modal semantics (cf. Kratzer 1981; 1991). And I also respond to objections intended 
to show that any non-epistemic analysis cannot make sense of the non-triviality of 
might-claims, or of a general requirement for speaker uncertainty when making them. 
In both cases, I argue, a non-epistemic analysis in fact fares better in accounting for 
the relevant data than epistemic analyses do, thereby independently reinforcing the 
argument against such analyses from Chapter Two. 
 
Part Two: Applications 
In Chapter Four, I apply a non-epistemic analysis to the disagreement phenomena. 
The basic problem for epistemic analyses is that genuine and warranted disagreement 
about what might be the case seems to be possible, even between complete strangers. 
Yet it is not clear how this could be so if that disagreement were about an information 
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state. For complete strangers could not engage in warranted disagreement about each 
other’s information states. And if their claims were exclusively about their own states, 
then the disagreement would not be genuine. I argue that responses to this problem 
intended to show that the disagreement is not genuine do not succeed (cf. von Fintel 
and Gillies 2008; Schaffer 2011). Something similar holds for the response that the 
disagreement is genuine, of a sort, but that it does not involve assertion and denial of 
the same content (cf. Huvenes 2015; Khoo 2015). Alternative responses focus on the 
warrant for epistemic disagreement, either denying that a special problem of warrant 
arises (cf. Yanovich 2014) or adopting custom-made theories of that warrant (cf. von 
Fintel and Gillies 2011; MacFarlane 2014). Neither response is compelling, I argue. I 
conclude there is no good epistemic solution to the problem of apparently genuine 
and warranted disagreement between strangers about what might be the case. 
Yet such disagreement, I show, turns out to be analogous to disagreement about 
what can happen. For the latter, there is no problem in explaining how genuine and 
warranted disagreement between strangers is possible. This is because disagreement 
here is about the potentials that the circumstances leave open. And while speakers’ 
different information may lead them to make different claims, that information does 
not enter into either the content of, or the intended truth conditions for, those claims. 
Different information thus does not threaten the possibility of genuine disagreement, 
and so also does not require custom-made accounts of warrant for that disagreement. 
As such, if we analyze might, like can, as expressing circumstantial modality, we can 
make straightforward sense of the disagreement phenomena.  
In Chapter Five, I apply the non-epistemic analysis to the embedding phenomena, 
where the basic problem is more or less the same. The attitudes reported when modals 
like might are embedded do not seem to be about information states (cf. Yalcin 2007). 
This has led some researchers to propose that the relevant information state for an 
embedded epistemic is provided directly by the attitude verb, the embedded modal 
simply expressing the compatibility of its prejacent with the content of this state 
(Yalcin 2007; 2011; Hacquard 2010; Anand and Hacquard 2009; 2013). The proposal 
works best for belief reports, for which the prejacent often is compatible with the 
content of a reported belief-holder’s belief state. However, I show that not all attitude 
verbs, nor even all epistemics, could interact in this specialized, idiosyncratic way. 
Further, even for belief verbs, there are exceptional cases in which compatibility is 
not required. And accounting for these cases undermines the explanatory force of the 
proposal. A new explanation of these attitudes reports is in order. 
On a non-epistemic analysis of might, we would never have expected the relevant 
attitudes reported to be about information states in the first place. As such, we are free 
to maintain a standard view of the interaction of attitude verbs and embedded modals. 
For both epistemic and non-epistemic modals alike, and across all attitude verbs, we 
can take embedded modals to uniformly contribute to the content of the reported 
attitude, as opposed to changing its character. As for those exceptional belief reports, 
which undermine the explanatory force of epistemic analyses, these turn out to be a 
special case of a broader phenomenon involving all circumstantial modals. Generally, 
circumstantial modal beliefs are formed and reported on the basis of all one’s beliefs 
about the circumstances. Yet for pragmatic reasons modal beliefs formed on the basis 
of a subset of the presumed circumstances may sometimes be reported too. This latter 
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sort of belief, while continuous with the former, does not require the compatibility of 
the belief state with the prejacent. Hence, both the standard cases and the exceptional 
ones can be accommodated without requiring anything special from the attitude verb 
itself, unlike on the epistemic analysis. 
 
Part Three: Objections 
In Chapter Six, I respond to an objection that arises from the standard, Kratzerian 
analysis of the meaning difference between (26) and (27) (cf. Kratzer 1981; 1991). 
 
(26) John might easily be a military man. 
(27) John can easily be a military man. 
 
On this analysis, (26) and (27) differ in how they characterize the facts relative to 
which the prejacent is said to be a possibility. For might the facts are characterized 
epistemically, for can non-epistemically, a difference that would be eliminated on my 
non-epistemic account of might.  
Yet I show that Kratzer’s analysis is problematic independently of this account. Its 
intuitive motivation comes from so-called epistemic contradictions (cf. Yalcin 2007), 
which occur when a prejacent is denied in conjunction with a might-claim, as in (28), 
but not when it is denied in conjunction with a can-claim, as in (29). 
 
(28) Hydrangeas aren’t growing here, #but they might be growing here. 
(29) Hydrangeas aren’t growing here, but they can grow here. 
 
And its theoretical motivation comes from the Kratzerian attempt to account for the 
phenomenon of modal flexibility (or the ability of a single modal to be used to express 
multiple “flavors” of modality: epistemic, deontic, etc.) without having to posit modal 
ambiguity (or multiple lexical entries for that modal) (cf. Kratzer 1977). However, I 
show that both motivations are ultimately ill-served by Kratzer’s analysis. So-called 
epistemic contradictions arise not just with allegedly epistemic uses of might but also 
metaphysical ones, undermining the Kratzerian explanation of might’s difference with 
can in this regard. Further, for a Kratzerian non-ambiguity project to succeed, modal 
flavors must be differentiated by something other than the intensional characterization 
of facts and norms (cf. Nauze 2008).  
I thus propose an alternative, developed more fully in Chapter Seven: while might 
is used to attribute relative modal properties to propositions, can is used to attribute 
them to individuals, situations, locations, etc. The crucial meaning difference is thus 
not in the facts that these modals express relations to, but instead in the relations they 
express to these facts (for inspiration for this account, cf. Palmer 2001). 
In Chapter Seven, I respond to a second objection related to a difference between 
might and can, this time in apparent temporal properties. While might freely accepts 
complements in the progressive and perfect forms, as in (30), can does not do so, as 
(31) shows. 
 
(30) John might {speak/be speaking/have spoken} French. 
(31) John can {speak/#be speaking/#have spoken} French. 




A fairly standard explanation for this difference relates it to the difference between 
epistemic and circumstantial modality (Werner 2006; Thomas 2014). Circumstantial 
possibility, expressed by can, is supposed to be inherently oriented toward the future. 
Since the progressive and the perfect orient a possibility toward the present and the 
past, respectively, they are thus incompatible with can. As for their compatibility with 
might, this is evidence that might expresses epistemic possibility, the only flavor of 
possibility able to be oriented toward either the present or the past. 
I argue that this explanation for the contrast between (30) and (31) is inadequate. 
Can sometimes does accept complements in the progressive and perfect forms. And 
sometimes the clearly non-epistemic possibilities it expresses can only be analyzed as 
being oriented toward the present. Additionally, for the future-oriented possibilities it 
expresses, this orientation could not be attributed to anything about the circumstances 
to which those possibilities are relativized. Temporal orientation does not depend on 
the epistemic/circumstantial distinction.  
A better distinction to help make sense of the contrast in (30) and (31) is the one 
proposed in Chapter Six. The progressive and the perfect help to denote propositions, 
by relating event descriptions to particular reference times in particular ways. And 
might is just used to attribute modal properties to propositions, which explains why it 
freely accepts perfect and progressive complements. Yet when it comes to the event 
descriptions used to specify the modal properties of individuals, etc., often nothing 
turns out to be gained by imposing the particular relations to particular reference 
times that that the progressive and the perfect would. This explanatory difference in 
the sorts of entities to which modal properties are attributed is something that I show 
how to formalize in this chapter.  
In addition to its main argument, Chapter Seven also concludes the dissertation as 
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Chapter Two: A Problem for Epistemic Analyses 
 
 
[M]odal statements of the sort we have considered so far are contingent, they are 
neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. That Jockl must have been the murderer 
(in view of what we know) is a fact of our world, but it is not a necessary truth. Had 
our knowledge been different, it might not have implied anymore that Jockl is the 
murderer. 
~ Kratzer (1991, 641) 
 
2.1 The basic problem 
The truth of claims about our information should be contingent, as Kratzer suggests, 
dependent on the contingent nature of our information itself. Yet the truth of the 
claims made with some apparently epistemic uses of modals does not seem to be 
contingent in this way. The truth of the claims made with ((32)a) and ((33)a), for 
example, cannot be explained in terms of the contingent nature of the speaker and her 
interlocutor’s current information state, whether appeal is made to the absence of a 
particular piece of information, as in ((32)b), or to its presence, as in ((33)b). 
 
(32) a.   John might be contagious. 
b. You’re right. #But {perhaps} the only reason he might be is that we still 
don’t know about his test results. 
 
(33) a.   John might speak French. 
b. You’re right. #But the only reason he might is that we know about his 
semester in Paris. 
 
Not all epistemic uses of modal predicates are like this. The claims made with ((34)a) 
and ((35)a), for example, support the epistemic explanations that the claims made 
with ((32)a) and ((33)a) did not.  
 
(34) a.   It’s plausible that John is contagious.  
b. You’re right. But {perhaps} the only reason it’s plausible is that we still 
don’t know about his test results. 
 
(35) a.   It’s plausible that John speaks French. 
b. You’re right. But the only reason it’s plausible is that we know about 
his semester in Paris. 
 
As we might expect, claims made with propositional attitude vocabulary also support 
the same sort of epistemic explanations. 
 
(36) a.   We suspect that John is contagious.  
b. You’re right. But {perhaps} the only reason we suspect as much is that 
we still don’t know about his test results. 
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(37) a.  We suspect that John speaks French. 
b. You’re right. But the only reason we suspect as much is that we know 
about his semester in Paris. 
 
It is thus both unexpected and puzzling that claims made with some apparently 
epistemic uses of modals should not support epistemic explanations.  
In this chapter, I will argue that we cannot resolve this puzzle given the traditional 
assumptions about apparently epistemic uses of modals. We cannot make sense of the 
fact that some apparently epistemic uses of modals do not license epistemic 
explanations, that is, if we assume that those uses must either modify the force of a 
speaker’s commitment to her speech act or make the content of that speech act truth-
conditionally dependent on an information state. In Section 2.2 of this chapter, I first 
expand and clarify the scope of the relevant data (though my focus afterwards will 
primarily be on might and plausible as paradigmatic of this data set). In Sections 2.3 
and 2.4, I argue against attempted force-modifier and truth-conditional explanations 
of the data. And in Section 2.5, I conclude by showing how the data point to a non-
epistemic analysis for those apparently epistemic uses of modals that do not license 
epistemic explanations. I develop the general outline of a non-epistemic analysis in 
the following chapter. 
Before anything else, however, a simplifying note on the data. The examples used 
so far have made explicit that what is being explained is also being endorsed. 
However, other continuations less explicit in this regard do not differ in their relative 
acceptability as responses to the claims made with apparently epistemic uses of 
modals. (38) and (39) are marked in response to the might-claim made with ((33)a), 
for example, but not in response to the plausible-claim made with ((35)a). Similarly, 
((40)a) is marked while ((40)a′) is not.  
 
(38) Only because we know about his semester in Paris. 
(39) That’s {only} because we know about his semester in Paris. 
(40) It’s only because we know about his semester in Paris that … 
a.  … #John might speak French. 
a′.  … it’s plausible that John speaks French. 
 
The same holds for continuations that do not aim to provide actual explanations but 
only to speculate on possible ones, as in (41), (42), and (43). 
 
(41) Could that be because we know about his semester in Paris? 
(42) Perhaps that’s because we know about his semester in Paris. 
(43) That’s probably because we know about his semester in Paris. 
 
It also holds for continuations that explicitly do not endorse what is being explained, 
as in (44), but instead provide only hypothetical explanations. 
 
(44) I’m not so sure I agree.  
a.  #But if John might speak French, it’s only because we know about his 
semester in Paris. 
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a′. But if it’s plausible that John speaks French, it’s only because we know 
about his semester in Paris. 
 
Finally, the relative acceptability of a continuation is independent of its use of 
anaphora, and so independent of any potential anaphoric targeting of the prejacent, or 
the content of the modal’s complement.3 
The uniformity of the contrast between these continuations suggests that what is at 
stake is what would constitute even a potential explanation for the content of the 
claims that could be made with modals like might and plausible. Note that the 
problem is not the former sort of claims do not support any sort of explanations at all. 
(45) and (46) clearly show the contrary. 
 
(45) a.   John might be contagious. 
b. You’re right. But the only reason he might be is that he still works in 
that old hospital ward. 
 
(46) a.   John might speak French. 
b. You’re right. But the only reason he might is that he spent his semester 
abroad in Paris. 
 
Instead, the problem is that even though the appropriateness of epistemic uses of 
modals like might can depend on the contingencies of an information state, as (47) 
shows,4 the truth of claims made with such uses does not seem to (be able to be 
explained in terms of such contingencies), as (48) shows.  
 
(47) John might be contagious. We can’t rule out that the test results aren’t 
positive. 
(48) John might be contagious. #But the only reason he might be is that we can’t 
rule out that the test results aren’t positive. 
 
In this regard, apparently epistemic modal claims are analogous to non-modal claims, 
as (49) and (50) show, something that is unexpected on epistemic truth-conditional 
analyses. 
 
(49) John is contagious. We can establish that much. 
(50) John is contagious. #But the only reason he is is that we can establish that 
much. 
 
3 The availability of the prejacent as a target for anaphora is a recurring theme in the literature (cf. 
von Fintel and Gillies 2008; Portner 2009; Dowell 2011; Braun 2012; Huvenes 2015). It tends to be 
raised in contexts in which the aim is to explain away the availability of certain responses to might-
claims that appear to provide counterexamples to one’s own theory of epistemic uses of modals. Yet it 
is never shown that these same responses, including ascriptions of falsity, are not also available in 
response to claims made with might’s polar opposite, cannot. Insofar as they are, prejacent-targeting 
hypotheses are not to be taken seriously. In responding to John might be contagious by saying That’s 
false, I could perhaps be construed as denying the prejacent. In responding to John can’t be contagious 
by saying That’s false, there is no way I can (Alexander Williams, p.c.). 
4 The example is due to an anonymous reviewer for Semantics and Pragmatics. 





Given the uniformity of the contrast that illustrates this basic problem, I thus move 
freely between continuations that aim to provide actual, possible, or instead merely 
hypothetical explanations. 
 
2.2 The full scope of the problem 
2.2.1 Expanding the data set 
The data from Section 2.1 may make it seem that the divide between apparently 
epistemic uses of modals is a grammatical one.5 Only modal adjectives like plausible 
license epistemic explanations; modal auxiliaries like might do not. However, as (51) 
and (52) show, the divide is not grammatical. Some apparently epistemic uses of 
modal adjectives, just like some apparently epistemic uses of modal auxiliaries, also 
do not license epistemic explanations, even though they do license non-epistemic 
ones. 
 
(51) a.   It’s possible that John is contagious. 
b. #Is the reason it’s possible that he hasn’t told us about his test results? 
b¢. Is the reason it’s possible that he works in that old hospital ward? 
 
(52) a.   It’s possible that John speaks French. 
b. #Is the reason it’s possible that he told us about his semester in Paris? 
b¢ Is the reason it’s possible that he spent his semester abroad in Paris? 
 
The divide is also not limited to modals that express possibility (or possibility-
related) concepts. Necessity (and necessity-related) concepts show the same divide, as 
(53)-(54) show. (Imagine that John is known to be silent on a matter only when he 
has bad news.) 
 
(53) a.   John must be contagious. 
b. #Is that because it’s been two weeks and we still haven’t heard from 
him about his test results? 
 
(54) a.   It’s obvious that John is contagious. 
b. Is that because it’s been two weeks and we still haven’t heard from him 
about his test results?6 
 
This divide persists with negated possibility modals, as (55)-(57) show. 
 
(55) a.   John can’t be the only hospital worker to be contagious. 
b. #You’re right. And the rumors of a general outbreak there are the reason 
he can’t be. 
 
5 For an account of when grammatical differences could matter, cf. Hacquard (2013; 2016). 
6 Unfortunately, the dual of possible—necessary—is generally thought not to have (what have been 
analyzed as) epistemic readings (cf. Palmer 1986, 58). Thus, it is necessary to rely on possibility 
modals to show that the general divide does not seem to be a grammatical one. 




(56) a.   It’s not possible that John is the only hospital worker to be contagious. 
b.  #You’re right. And the rumors of a general outbreak there are the reason 
it’s not possible. 
 
(57) a.   It’s not plausible that John is the only hospital worker to be contagious. 
b. You’re right. And the rumors of a general outbreak there are the reason 
it’s not plausible. 
 
And the divide persists with negated necessity modals too, as (58)-(59) show. 
 
(58) a.   Antonio doesn’t have to be dead. 
b. #Is the rumor about the boss’s feeling merciful the reason he doesn’t 
have to be dead? 
 
(59) a.   It’s not obvious that Antonio is dead. 
b. Is the rumor about the boss’s feeling merciful the reason it’s not obvious 
that he’s dead? 
 
In all these cases, uses of modals that do not license epistemic explanations do 
license non-epistemic ones. Thus, (60) is fine as a continuation to ((53)a), (61) as a 
continuation to ((55)a), and (62) as a continuation to ((58)a). 
 
(60) Is that because he works in that old hospital ward? 
(61) That’s because of the general outbreak there. 
(62) Is the boss’s feeling merciful today the reason he doesn’t have to be dead?7 
 
Hence, the problem of epistemic uses of modals not licensing epistemic explanations 
is not limited in scope to non-negated modals, to possibility modals, or to modal 
auxiliaries, though I will focus almost exclusively on such modals going forward. 
 
2.2.2 Clarifying what is at stake 
A common first response to the data from Section 2.1 is to assume that it is something 
about the particular epistemic concept expressed by might—epistemic possibility—
that makes attempted epistemic explanations bad. This assumption of the uniqueness 
of epistemic possibility seems to be implicit in MacFarlane (2011)’s response to the 
badness of examples like (63).  
 
 
7 These sorts of non-epistemic explanations are also available in response to those epistemic uses of 
modals that do license epistemic explanations. This is not an issue. Propositions are plausible, obvious, 
etc., to individuals because of the other propositions that they believe to be true. However, if a speaker 
believes a proposition to be true, and also believes that its being true stands in some sort of causal 
relation to her believing it to be so, then she can also attribute one proposition’s being plausible, 
obvious, etc., to some other proposition’s being true. Epistemic relations are parasitic on non-epistemic 
ones and can be explained in both sorts of terms. Non-epistemic relations are not. Thus, the issue is not 
whether an allegedly epistemic claim supports a non-epistemic explanation but instead whether it fails 
to support an epistemic one. 
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(63) #It isn’t possible that John is the murderer, but if no one had looked in this 
desk, it would have been. 
 
On the basis of such examples, MacFarlane concluded that “counterfactual changes in 
what we know do not induce counterfactual changes in what is epistemically 
possible” (2011, 169). This was not an explanandum for MacFarlane, but rather a 
brute fact. And yet MacFarlane’s conclusion was premature, as (63)’s contrast in 
acceptability with (64) and (65) shows.  
 
(64) It isn’t epistemically possible that John is the murderer, but if no one had 
looked in this desk, it would have been. 
(65) It isn’t a live possibility {for us} that John is the murderer, but if no one had 
looked in this desk, it would have been. 
 
Provided that we are explicit that it is epistemic possibility that we are talking about, 
then counterfactual changes in what we know can induce counterfactual changes in 
what is epistemically possible. It does not seem to me a very promising project, then, 
to assume that something about the particular epistemic concept allegedly expressed 
by might accounts for its failing to license epistemic explanations.8 That said, let me 
respond to four potential conceptually-based reasons for why might might not license 
epistemic explanations. 
First, it could be that an individual or group for whom something is an epistemic 
possibility is not in a position to reasonably speculate—much less explain—why this 
is so. But this is clearly false. Say that I know that conclusive tests have been run to 
determine whether John is contagious but have not yet been told their results. Then I 
know, and can also explain, why it is epistemically possible for me that he is so (cf. 
Teller 1972; DeRose 1991). (66) and (67) also demonstrate that explanations of 
epistemic possibilities, or of uncertainties, are perfectly conversationally appropriate. 
 
(66) It’s an {epistemic/live} possibility for us that John is contagious. But 
{perhaps} that’s only because we haven’t asked him his diagnosis. 
(67) We don’t know whether John is contagious. But {perhaps} that’s only 
because we haven’t asked him his diagnosis.  
 
Second, actuality entails possibility, and yet the explanations we have considered 
could appear to implicitly deny that this is so. Say that we grant that the only reason it 
is possible that John is contagious is that we have not heard his test results. If we did 
hear them, and found out that he was contagious, surely there would not cease to be 
the possibility of his being so. So perhaps epistemic explanations are bad in response 
to might-claims because they appear to suggest otherwise. But this possibility is also 
clearly false. For when we are explaining why something is an epistemic possibility 
for us, we are explaining why it is a mere epistemic possibility. This is what accounts 
for the standalone acceptability of (66), and also for the acceptability of (68) as a 
continuation to it. 
 
8 Unless we are also to assume that might expresses a sui generis epistemic concept for which there 
is neither good paraphrase nor good analysis. 




(68) If we had, we would know for sure one way or the other. 
 
Third, many factors often contribute to something’s being an epistemic possibility, 
and so it could be that epistemic explanations are bad for their suggestion that only a 
single factor does. Yet many factors contribute to something’s being plausible too, 
and epistemic explanations are not bad in response to plausible-claims for that reason. 
Additionally, this response could not make sense of the acceptability of (66), nor 
could it make sense of the fact that replacing only with mainly or partially in any of 
the examples above leaves their relative acceptability unchanged. 
Finally, it has sometimes been suggested that epistemic possibility can involve a 
subjective element (cf. Lyons 1977; Palmer 2001). A subjective/objective distinction 
for uses of might was first tentatively introduced by Lyons (1977) and has since 
subsequently been enlisted to explain might’s distribution and/or interpretation in 
conditionals (Papafragou 2006), with regard to quantified subjects (Tancredi 2007), 
and beneath so-called attitudes of acceptance like believe (a doxastic attitude of 
acceptance) and claim (a proffering one) (Anand and Hacquard 2009). The distinction 
has not always been very well understood: sometimes it seems almost to correlate 
with an epistemic/non-epistemic distinction, other times to crosscut it (cf. Lyons 
1977; Papafragou 2006).9 Yet however the distinction is to be understood, if the 
subjective does not admit of explanation, or at least not in conversation, then perhaps 
this distinction can be enlisted to explain why might-claims do not support epistemic 
explanations (cf. Papafragou 2006 for an argument that subjectivity places restrictions 
on acceptable discourse moves). 
In response, I would note that while subjectivity may have a role to play in 
explaining our data, it cannot explain that data by itself. Say that the subjective 
correlates with the epistemic. Then no epistemic possibility claim, however 
expressed, should support an epistemic explanation. Yet some do, as (66) shows. 
Now there may be something about the different ways in which subjectivity is 
expressed in these different cases that explains the difference in admissible 
explanations (cf. Section 2.3). But then it is not any subjective element to epistemic 
possibility that explains our data but instead how that subjective element is expressed.  
Say instead that the subjective/objective distinction crosscuts the epistemic/non-
epistemic one. It would then seem that this distinction could be drawn not just for 
epistemic possibility but also for other epistemic concepts too, including plausibility. 
Yet while marking this distinction may constrain the range of explanations that 
plausible-claims support, as in (69) and (70), it does not eliminate them altogether.  
 
(69) a.   It’s {subjectively} plausible that John has lung cancer. 
b. Only because you haven’t seen his x-rays. 
 
9 Lyons writes, in introducing the distinction, that it “is not a distinction that can be drawn sharply 
in the everyday use of language; and its epistemological justification is, to say the least, uncertain. It is 
also difficult to draw a sharp distinction between what we are calling objective epistemic modality and 
alethic modality” (1977, 797). Gagnon and Wellwood (2011) also seem to express skepticism about 
the distinction, writing about the “absence of an explicit theory of subjective versus objective 
modality” and claiming that “adequate tests for subjective versus objective modality are difficult to 
assess” (2011, 41). 




(70) a.   It’s {objectively} plausible that John has lung cancer. 
b. Only because his x-rays are indecipherable. 
 
In particular, while unmarked plausible-sentences license explanations appealing 
either to what we might call subjective epistemic facts, as in (69), or to objective 
ones, as in (70), sentences marked for subjectivity do continue to license the former 
even though they do not license the latter (and vice versa for sentences marked for 
objectivity). So subjectivity does not seem to eliminate the possibility of acceptable 
epistemic explanations, not even in conversation. Unmarked might-sentences, in 
contrast, license neither explanations that appeal to subjective epistemic facts nor 
explanations that appeal to objective ones, as (71) shows.  
 
(71) a.   John might have lung cancer. 
b. #Only because you haven’t seen his x-rays. 
b′. #Only because his x-rays are indecipherable. 
 
Hence, a subjective/objective distinction, insofar as it is well-founded, does not seem 
to explain our data, or at least not by itself. 
To conclude: nothing about the concept of epistemic possibility per se explains the 
badness of the epistemic explanations considered so far. What is at stake is thus not 
the concept of epistemic possibility but instead how that concept is expressed in 
epistemic uses of might. I now turn to the two main types of proposals in the 
literature, both of which assume that it is expressed directly, and argue that neither 
can provide a solution to the problem of epistemic uses of might not licensing 
epistemic explanations. 
 
2.3 Potential force-modifier solutions 
2.3.1 Traditional force-modifier accounts 
Of the two standard views of epistemic uses of modals, the force-modifier one seems 
to provide the more immediately promising solution to our problem. Proponents of 
force-modifier views, recall, propose that some epistemic uses of modals function 
solely to modify the force of a speech act (cf. Halliday 1970; Palmer 2001; Schnieder 
2010). They do not introduce any truth-conditional dependency on an information 
state into the content of a speech act but instead indicate a non-assertoric commitment 
to that content, the prejacent, on the part of a speaker. Given such a view, we can 
readily make sense of why certain epistemic uses of modals do not license epistemic 
explanations, provided we assume those explanations target speech act content. 
First, the prejacents considered so far have had non-epistemic truth conditions, yet 
the explanations have assumed epistemic ones, thereby committing a sort of category 
error. Second, even apart from a category error, the prejacents have explicitly not 
been asserted. They have not been (proposed to be) incorporated into the common 
ground but are rather still at issue (cf. Stalnaker 1978). As such, any non-hypothetical 
explanation would be out of place. 
As for the assumption that the relevant explanations target the content of a speech 
act, this is entirely reasonable and explains why ((72)b) is odd in response to ((72)a). 




(72) a.   John is contagious. 
b. #Only because you haven’t read today’s newspaper. 
 
The speaker’s believing that John is contagious is not part of the content of her claim 
(cf. Frege 1956; Moore 1962), even though this attitude (or commitment) is implied 
by the assertoric force with which that content was put forth. This lends support to the 
force-modifier view that the attitude of (un)certainty implied with the epistemic use 
of a modal is not part of the content of a modal claim either. 
Attractive as it initially is, however, a force-modifier analysis of our data faces an 
immediate problem. For some apparently non-hypothetical explanations do not seem 
out of place in response to might-claims, as (73) shows, though force-modifier 
analyses would seem initially to predict that they should. 
 
(73) a.   John might be contagious. 
b. Only because he still works in that old hospital ward. 
 
To make sense of examples like (73), proponents of force-modifier views would have 
to hold that the explanation is implicitly hypothetical, explaining what would make 
the prejacent true, assuming that it is. However, in some cases the prejacent can also 
be contrasted with the target of an explicitly hypothetical explanation, as in (74), 
suggesting that the two, in fact, are not always the same.  
 
(74) I seriously doubt that John is contagious. Still, if he even might be, it’s only 
because he works in that old hospital ward. 
 
How could the proponent of a force-modifier view make sense of this contrast? 
She could not take the target of explanation to be some modal content of the 
antecedent over and above the prejacent, for she denies that there is any such content. 
Instead, she must presumably take it to be something like the first speaker’s non-
assertoric commitment to the prejacent, or the appropriateness of such a commitment. 
However, if something like speaker commitment is available as a target of the 
hypothetical explanation in (74), then the force-modifier account of our data comes 
undone. For speaker commitment could just as well be explained in epistemic terms 
as in non-epistemic ones, as (75) and (76) show. 
 
(75) You only say that because we still don’t know about his test results. 
(76) You only say that because he still works in that old hospital ward. 
 
And yet as we already know, and as (77) once more demonstrates, when it comes to 
might-claims, epistemic and non-epistemic explanations are generally not on par. 
 
(77) I seriously doubt that John is contagious. #Still, if he even might be, it’s 
only because we don’t know about his test results. 
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Yet the proponent of a force-modifier view could no longer provide a reason why, 
having granted that a speaker’s commitment, just as well as the prejacent, is available 
as a target of the hypothetical explanation. 
Perhaps force-modifier theorists could deny that the target of explanation is 
contrasted with the prejacent in (74) and (77). In (78), for example—insofar as it is 
acceptable—it is plausible to interpret perhaps as making the hypothetical more 
remote, rather than as changing the target of the explanation from the prejacent to 
something else. 
 
(78) I seriously doubt that John is contagious. Still, if he even perhaps is, it’s 
only because he works in that old hospital ward. 
 
This is relevant because adverbs like perhaps are commonly viewed as force 
modifiers, even when it is contested whether auxiliaries like might are to be analyzed 
as such.10 Yet this interpretation of perhaps in (78) does not seem to me to be any 
more available for might in (74) than it does for chance in (79).  
 
(79) I seriously doubt that John is contagious. Still, if there’s even a chance he is, 
it’s only because he works in that old hospital ward. 
 
In both these cases, the modal seems to change the target of the explanation rather 
than (merely) reinforcing its hypothetical nature. Yet once we grant that the modal 
does this, we have to find some suitable target of explanation other than the prejacent. 
And here, as we have seen, the proponent of the force modifier view who denies a 
distinctive modal content to the conditional antecedents of (74) and (79) would seem 
to be in a bind.11 
 
2.3.2 Revised force-modifier accounts 
Apart from its inability to make sense of our data, I think there is a general problem 
for force-modifier accounts that should lead us to turn our attention elsewhere. This 
problem, alluded to in Chapter 1, is that force-modifiers view in their traditional form 
do not readily account for the effect of epistemic uses of modals in embedded 
contexts (cf. Papafragou 2006; MacFarlane 2011; Swanson 2011; Hacquard and 
Wellwood 2012; Anand and Hacquard 2013). One way to see this is to consider (80)-




10 Bach (2011), for example, does not even consider a force-modifier analysis for might while 
taking it for granted that perhaps sometimes serves to modify force, not content (2011, 26, fn. 12). 
11 Related to the view of epistemic uses of modals as force-modifiers is the view of them as 
evidential markers. In the simplest form, modals as evidentials would mark the nature of the evidence 
for the speech act content without contributing to it (cf. Westmoreland 1998; Drubig 2001). But this 
view is subject to the same difficulties in any attempted explanation of our data that the force-modifier 
view is. In alternative forms, epistemics encode an evidential component of meaning over and above 
their modal one (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2010; Matthewson 2015), or evidentials themselves have a 
modal semantics (cf. Matthewson et al. 2008). But these views are subject to the same difficulties that 
other truth-conditional views will be shown to be subject to in attempting to explain our data.  
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(80) I’m going home since my son is coming to visit. 
(81) I’m going home since my son might be coming to visit. 
(82) I’m going home since I’m so excited that my son is coming to visit. 
(83) I’m going home since, {yay! / yech!}, my son is coming to visit. 
 
With (80)-(82) a speaker expresses different reasons for going home; with (83), 
however, she expresses not a different reason for going home but instead a different 
attitude toward her reason for going home. The latter is what we expect in these 
embedded contexts from terms that merely express the speaker’s commitment or 
attitude toward the content of a speech act, without also contributing to that content 
itself. Yet this is not what we see from the embedded might. Instead, in (81), might 
contributes, somehow, to the content of the reason given for going home. On standard 
force-modifier views, it is not clear how to account for this contribution. 
In recent years, force-modifier views have been revised to do just this. The results 
are compositional views that account for the effect of embedded-context occurrences 
of might while also maintaining the core commitment to matrix-context occurrences 
not contributing to the content of an assertoric speech act (Swanson 2006; 2011). 
Some of these accounts are even truth-conditional (Yalcin 2007; 2011). A number of 
authors have raised problems for these accounts, however, including their doing away 
with distinctive modal contents (cf. MacFarlane 2014, 277–79). I will not consider 
these problems here. Instead, I want to show that such revised accounts cannot make 
sense of our data, and that there is no good reason to adopt a force-modifier view 
anyway once we have had to make it compositional. 
First, the potential application to our data. Yalcin (2007) has argued that a might-
sentence could have a compositional effect as the antecedent of a conditional even 
without expressing a distinctive modal content. This holds out the hope of avoiding 
the problem for traditional force-modifier views from the previous section, for Yalcin 
will assign a different compositional semantics to (84) and (85). 
 
(84) If John is contagious, then there’s been a general outbreak at the hospital. 
(85) If John {even} might be contagious, then there’s been a general outbreak at 
the hospital. 
 
Given this difference, Yalcin could hope to explain why the target of explanation in 
(85) could be contrasted with the prejacent, without being either a modal content or 
the speaker’s commitment to that prejacent. 
The hope is short-lived. On Yalcin’s view, conditionals are interpreted relative to 
information states, modeled as sets of worlds compatible with the content of that state 
(2007, 998–1000). A conditional is true (or to be accepted) at an information state if 
and only if the non-empty subset of worlds compatible with that state in which the 
antecedent is true is also a subset of the worlds in which the consequent is. Thus, (84) 
is true (or to be accepted) at an information state if and only if restricting that state to 
those worlds in which it is true that John is contagious leaves only worlds in which 
there has been a general outbreak at the hospital.  
Now, on Yalcin’s view, epistemic uses of modals serve as a global test on an 
information state, and the test that possibility modals perform is to ensure that the 
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prejacent is true in at least one of the worlds compatible with that state (2007, 1004). 
But if this condition is met, then the modal leaves that stage unchanged. Assume this 
condition is met: then (85) is true (or to be accepted) at an information state if and 
only if every world compatible with the content of that state is one in which there has 
been a general outbreak at the hospital. But surely this is too strong. I can accept (85) 
without thinking that there has been such an outbreak. I can do so, for example, if I 
think that the only way there could be a certain possibility (which I am still unsure 
about) is if some specific condition has obtained (which I am also still unsure about). 
Abstracting away from conditionals momentarily, it is not clear how epistemic 
uses of modals could have the sort of informational effect they do on any force-
modifier view, whether traditional or revised. The problem with conditionals just 
considered is just a specific instance of this more general problem. For example, you 
tell me that John might be contagious. I accept your claim and respond that there’s 
been a general outbreak at the hospital then. But how, on a force-modifier view, could 
my accepting your claim justify this response? Surely your weakened commitment to 
the prejacent does not by itself allow me to infer that there has been a general 
outbreak. The same holds for the compatibility of your and my information state with 
John’s being contagious. On learning that our information states are so compatible, 
how could I be justified in adding some proposition about the state of the world to 
those information states? Surely the process should be reversed, so that on adding 
some proposition to my information state I recognize that other propositions are now 
compatible with or entailed by that state. 
Perhaps there are ways that revised force-modifier accounts could interpret 
conditionals to make sense of the informational effect of epistemic uses of modals, 
and to account for the contrast in (74) between the prejacent and the target of the 
hypothetical explanation. I will not attempt to consider them here. For over and above 
any problems with its application to our data, I do not see any reason to adopt a 
revised force-modifier view. That is, I do not see any reason why might’s apparent 
contribution to the content of the reason given for going home in (81) could not also 
be its contribution to the content of an assertoric speech act. To hold that matrix-
context occurrences of might are used assertorically is not to hold that they could not 
also be used to perform another speech act along expressivist lines (cf. Portner 2009, 
172–77, and the references cited therein). Hence, if we have to develop a 
compositional account anyway, then we need some positive reason to think that 
matrix-context occurrences are never used assertorically. I do not know what this 
reason is.12 
In fact, some proponents of force-modifier views even grant that what is part of 
modal force for one expression may be “objectified” and become, more or less, part 
of modal content for another (Halliday 1970, 336–37). This objectification process, 
for Halliday, would seem to be exemplified in (86)-(88). 
 
 
12 Lyons (1977), you may recall, distinguished between objective and subjective uses of might. In 
doing so, he also proposed that the former embed but the latter do not. Reasons to think that might did 
not embed would ipso facto be reasons to think that it was being used non-assertorically. However, the 
question here is whether we have reason to think that might is being used non-assertorically despite 
being embeddable. 
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(86) John might be contagious. 
(87) It is possible that John is contagious. 
(88) There is a possibility that John is contagious.  
 
Yet if (88) can be used to assert the existence of a possibility, then I am unsure why 
(86) should not also be able to be so used.13  
Deep-seated philosophical discomfort with the existence of possibilities, which 
some authors seem to evince (cf. Yalcin 2011), provides no reason to deny that (86) 
can be used assertorically once we have granted that (88) can. And such discomfort 
provides no more reason to deny that (88) can be used assertorically than deep-seated 
discomfort about the existence of pain would provide reason to doubt that (89) can.  
 
(89) There is a pain in my left foot.  
 
There is a clear assertoric/non-assertoric distinction to be drawn between (89) and 




It is not clear that there is any such distinction to be drawn between (86) and (88). 
(86), unlike (90), has all the hallmarks, including embeddability, that suggest 
association with a distinctive content that could be the object of an assertion. Thus, 
even apart from its inability to explain our data, I do not think we should adopt the 
force-modifier view. We should take apparently epistemic uses of modals like might 
to contribute to the truth-conditional content of a speech act. We should just not take 
this contribution to be an information state, as I will now argue. 
 
2.4 Potential epistemic truth conditional solutions 
For proponents of epistemic truth-conditional views, there are three different ways in 
which the content of a speech act could depend truth-conditionally on an information 
state.14 First, that state could be part of the proposition expressed in the speech act (cf. 
DeRose 1991; von Fintel and Gillies 2008; 2011; Hacquard 2010; Bach 2011; Dowell 
2011; von Fintel and Heim 2011; Braun 2012; Yanovich 2014; a.o.). Second, that 
state could be used to help determine the proposition expressed, without itself being 
part of it (cf. Silk 2017). Third, that state could be part of an expanded evaluation 
matrix against which the proposition expressed was evaluated for truth or falsity (cf. 
Egan et al. 2005; Egan 2007; Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane 2011; 2014; Beddor and 
Egan 2018). The first view is by far the most commonly held, though the third has 
gained in popularity in recent years. Yet neither can make sense of why claims made 
with apparently epistemic uses of might do not support epistemic explanations. And 
while the second view can, it does so only by incorrectly predicting that might-claims 
 
13 Again, this is not to say that (86) could not also be used performatively in a way that (88) is not. 
14 In talking of the truth-conditional content of a speech act, I intend my claims to be compatible 
with views that maintain that (either some or all) sentences-in-contexts lack truth conditions, while still 
maintaining that sentences can be used in contexts to make claims that have truth conditions (cf., 
respectively, Bach 1994a; 2005; Pietroski 2005; 2018). 
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will not support any non-trivial explanations at all, epistemic or non-epistemic. I 
elaborate on these points below, starting with the view that takes information states to 
be part of content. 
 
2.4.1 Information states as an implicit part of content 
2.4.1.1 A pragmatic effect of implicitness? 
If an information state is part of the content of the claim made with (91), it would 
have to be an implicit part of content, something that is not explicitly linguistically 
referenced but instead supplied by the extra-linguistic context (Kratzer 1977; 1981; 
1991). 
 
(91) John might be contagious. 
 
On one important view in the literature, that implicit part of content can be made 
explicit through the use of restrictor phrases specifying whose information state is at 
stake (cf. Kratzer 1977; 1981; 1991; cf. also Bach 2011; von Fintel and Gillies 2011; 
Schaffer 2011). Some candidate phrases include those listed in (92) and (93) (cf. also 
Braun 2013). 
 
(92) {Given/According to/In view of} what x knows 
(93) {As far as/For all that} x knows  
 
And, as it turns out, allegedly explicit counterparts of the claims that could be made 
with (91) do in fact support epistemic explanations, as (94) shows. 
 
(94) a.   Given what we know, John might be contagious. 
b.  That’s only because we still don’t know about his test results. 
 
It might thus be thought that leaving an information state implicit serves some sort of 
pragmatic function that restricts the explanations that a claim supports. 
Alleged implicitness, it should be noted from the start, does not in general have 
this effect, neither for modal claims nor for non-modal ones. Without their restrictor 
phrases, for example, the claims made with ((95)a) and ((96)a) could be either deontic 
or ability ones. And, without those restrictors, the deontic and ability claims support 
exactly the same sort of explanations that they do with them. 
 
(95) a.   {Given their laws,} Wisconsinites can shoot pigeons in hunting season. 
b.  That’s only because their legislature is still controlled by the gun lobby. 
 
(96) a.   {Given their training,} Wisconsinites can shoot pigeons in hunting 
  season. 
b.  That’s only because they start learning marksmanship in grade school. 
 
When it comes to non-modal claims, something similar holds. They also support 
explanations that target part of the content of the claim that has not been made 
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explicit. (97) and (98) show as much with examples of non-explicit meaning that 
Bach (1994a) calls implicitures.15  
 
(97) a.   John started his own business and put himself through school. 
b. That’s only because his parents refused to pay his tuition and there was 
no other way he could afford it. 
 
(98) a.   Ron won. 
b. That’s only because the Yahtzee board was rigged. 
 
In (97), the explanation only makes sense if there is taken to be a temporal component 
to the speaker’s claim, indicating the sequence in which the conjuncts became true. 
Yet this temporal component is not made explicit, nor does it need to be for the 
explanation to be acceptable. And in (98), the explanation only makes sense if the 
speaker’s claim is taken to be about a specific contest. Yet again, this component does 
not need to be made explicit for the explanation to be acceptable. Hence, being 
explicit does not generally seem to matter for the explanations that a speaker’s claim 
supports.  
In fact, in some cases leaving a part of content implicit seems not to restrict but 
instead to expand the range of explanations than a claim supports. Take (99), which 
can be used to make a claim about a particular location. (Imagine a worried mother is 
speaking on the phone to her vacationing son.) 
 
(99) Hey, be careful when you go out. It’s raining acid.  
 
The location the mother’s claim is about could have been specified either indexically, 
as in (100), or descriptively, as in (101). 
 
(100) Hey, be careful when you go out. It’s raining acid there. 
(101) Hey, be careful when you go out. It’s raining acid where you’re at. 
 
With the location left implicit, the mother’s claim can more readily support not only 
explanations that trade on an indexical specification of that location, as in (102), but 
also explanations that trade on a descriptive one, as in (103). 
 
 
15 These implicitures are supposed to be generated, respectively, by what Bach calls the non-literal 
use of a sentence (as opposed to any of its constituents) and by what he calls the semantic 
incompleteness of a sentence (or its failure to determine a complete proposition). Especially in the case 
of semantic incompleteness, there is little debate that the meanings that Bach calls implicitures can be 
the content of a speaker’s claim—that is, of her direct illocutionary speech act (cf. Fillmore 1986; 
Partee 1989; Condoravdi and Gawron 1996; Williams 2012). There is debate, however, about whether 
(and, if not, why not) these meanings should also be taken to be the content of the sentence-in-context 
that the speaker has uttered (Sperber and Wilson 1986; Bach 1994b; 2001; 2005; Carston 1988; 2002; 
2004; Stanley 2000; Recanati 2001; 2002; Cappelen and Lepore 2002; 2005; 2007; Borg 2007). Since 
my concern in this dissertation is primarily with speech act content, and since theorists agree that the 
content of a sentence-in-context constrains, even if it does not determine, this content, I will not 
engage with this debate here.  
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(102) Ugh! That’s because the Czechs have never made the environment a 
priority. 
(103) Ugh! That’s because we’re vacationing in the Czech Republic and not in 
Spain. 
 
Even if (103) sounds somewhat worse than (102) as a response to (99), nonetheless it 
seems to sound better as a response to (99) than as a response to (100). If this is 
correct, then not making a part of content explicit can in fact have the opposite effect 
that it is alleged to with apparently epistemic uses of modals. Hence, if implicitness is 
to restrict the sort of explanations that epistemic claims support, it must presumably 
be due to some pragmatic function that is served by leaving an information state 
implicit. 
Several authors have proposed that leaving an information state implicit does, in 
fact, serve such a function. Bach (2011), for example, has claimed that when you 
mention a particular information state, or in his terms a perspective, “you make it the 
focus.” “Not mentioning a perspective,” he continues, 
 
is a way of keeping the question of the possibility in focus and, moreover, of 
hedging the question as to whose/which perspective is at issue (2011, 57–58). 
 
The sort of proposal that Bach makes is the centerpiece of von Fintel and Gillies 
(2011)’s cloudy contextualism. These authors propose that the discourse context, or 
the speech situation, often does not determine a unique context of evaluation. In the 
relevant case, for example, it does not determine a unique assignment of values to 
(covert) variables ranging over information states. This point about discourse contexts 
not metaphysically determining evaluation contexts has been made before, usually in 
conjunction with the point that a speaker’s (reasonable) communicative intentions 
help to epistemically determine the intended evaluation context (cf. Bach 2005). In 
this case, however, von Fintel and Gillies suggest that speakers may themselves not 
have any intended evaluation context. Instead, they exploit the indeterminacy of the 
discourse context, and the “cloud of admissible [evaluation] contexts” it leaves open, 
to “put into play” a set of propositions individuated by information states (2011, 118–
19).  
Putting a set of epistemic propositions into play is supposed to change 
conversational dynamics. While typically a speaker is in a unique position to assert 
one of these propositions (the one involving her own information state), her 
interlocutors are in a unique position to take up and respond to another (the one 
involving their own state).16 And a cooperative interlocutor in fact should respond to a 
speaker’s utterance on the basis of the epistemic proposition that she herself is in a 
unique position to assert or deny. Accepting or rejecting the utterance on the basis of 
this proposition is more appropriate because more informative: it lets a speaker know 
whether the prejacent is also compatible with that interlocutor’s information (2011, 
121–22). And putting a set of epistemic propositions into play, as opposed to 
asserting any single one, is just supposed to be a way of probing for such information 
and attempting to redress a relevant information asymmetry (2011, 123).  
 
16 For non-epistemic implicit content, this sort of mismatch could not generally be expected. 
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On these views in which the implicitness of an information state serves an 
important pragmatic function, the problem with an example like (104), and the reason 
for its contrast with an example like (105), would be that the attempted explanation 
engages the wrong epistemic proposition.  
 
(104) a.   John might be contagious. 
b. #That’s only because you haven’t asked him his diagnosis. 
 
(105) a.   Given what I know, John might be contagious. 
b. That’s only because you haven’t asked him his diagnosis. 
 
The response purports to explain the truth of a proposition that the speaker chose not 
to assert, meanwhile maintaining silence on the proposition the speaker would really 
like to have confirmed or denied. 
There are two general problems for these and other potential pragmatic views for 
why implicitness should constrain the explanations that a might-claim supports. One 
problem is that they do not account for contexts in which the implicitness of an 
information state could serve no pragmatic function, including in embedded contexts 
and also in discourse contexts in which there is no relevant information asymmetry 
between a speaker and her interlocutors. 
Start with the second sort of context. With the agreement in (106), the relevant 
information asymmetry has just been ruled out. 
 
(106) a.   John might be contagious. 
b. You’re right. #But {perhaps} that’s because we haven’t asked him his 
diagnosis. 
 
And with the monologue in (107), an information asymmetry is impossible. 
 
(107) John might be contagious. #But {perhaps} that’s because I haven’t asked 
him his diagnosis. 
 
In both these cases, an epistemic explanation is still bad. Yet in the latter case, failure 
to reference an information state could not function as a way to probe for information. 
And in the former case, the epistemic proposition being explained—the one involving 
the interlocutors’ joint information state—would be one that had been added to the 
common ground as a result of a successful probe (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2011, 
122–23). In neither case, then, would the epistemic explanation be engaging the 
“wrong” proposition. Yet still these explanations are bad. 
Turn now from discourse contexts to embedded ones, as with the final might-
sentence in ((108)b). 
 
(108) a.   Given what we know, John might be contagious. 
b. You’re right. Given what we know, John might be contagious. #But it’s 
only because we haven’t asked him his diagnosis that John might be 
contagious. 




In ((108)b), the embedded might-sentence could not be used to assert any proposition, 
and so presumably could not be used to float any set of propositions either. Further, 
given the resolution of the contextually relevant information state up to that point, it 
should be clear that the particular epistemic proposition it is used to express is the 
group proposition asserted with ((108)a) and agreed to with ((108)b). And yet, despite 
all this, the explanation in ((108)b) is bad even though the explanation in (109) is 
perfectly fine. 
 
(109) But it’s only because we haven’t asked him his diagnosis that John might be 
contagious, given what we know. 
 
This contrast suggests that restrictor phrases like given what we know do not serve to 
make explicit an otherwise implicit part of the content of a bare might-sentence, i.e., a 
sentence unrestricted by such phrases.  
The second general problem for pragmatic views is that they cannot explain why 
the implicitness of an information state should not matter in the same way for other 
epistemic claims as it is alleged to for might-claims. No particular information state is 
referenced in ((110)a), for example, any more than in ((104)a). 
 
(110) a.   It’s plausible that John is contagious. 
b. That’s only because you haven’t asked him his diagnosis. 
 
Yet what is plausible varies with the information state just as what is epistemically 
possible does. ((104)a) and ((110)a) should thus be equally able to be used to probe 
for information via putting a set of epistemic propositions into play. That they do not 
license the same responses suggests that it is thus not any probing function that an 
information state’s implicitness might serve that matters for an epistemic 
explanation’s acceptability. Acceptability would instead have to be correlated with 
some arbitrary lexical property of modals. 
One property that might seem relevant is flexibility, or the ability of a modal to be 
used to express multiple flavors of modality (both epistemic and non-epistemic, for 
example). Might, in contrast to plausible, is often assumed to be flexible: to have not 
only epistemic readings, as allegedly in (111), but also non-epistemic ones, as in 
(112), which seems to express a metaphysical possibility about the open future (cf. 
Klecha 2016; Condoravdi 2002). 
 
(111) John might now be contagious. 
(112) John might be contagious in two months. 
 
That said, the temporal modifier in (111) is alleged to force an epistemic reading of 
might, eliminating modal flexibility (Condoravdi 2002). Yet epistemic explanations 
are no more acceptable in response to (111) than in response to any of the previous 
might sentences. Hence, flexibility does not seem to matter in a way that could make 
sense of our data either. 
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To summarize: there does not seem to be any pragmatic function that leaving an 
information state implicit could serve that could make sense of the fact that bare 
might-sentences (or BMSs) do not license epistemic explanations, not even when 
embedded. This suggests that if such states are an implicit part of content, then they 
are not a part of content that can be made explicit by restrictor phrases like given what 
we know. For the difference in the explanations that are supported with and without 
these restrictors cannot be attributed to any pragmatic effect of leaving an information 
state implicit, and so must presumably instead be attributed to a semantic difference 
in the content of the claims made with and without such phrases.  
 
2.4.1.2 A semantic effect of implicitness? 
I am not the first to suggest that restrictor phrases like given what we know do not 
function in the way that they are standardly assumed to. Braun (2013), for example, 
notes that such modifiers can also restrict non-modal sentences, as in (113), and avers 
that “it would be hard to justify the claim that these [phrases] perform different 
semantic functions [in the two cases]” (2013, 503). 
 
(113) Given what we know, John speaks French.  
 
On Braun’s view, such phrases do not supply a missing part of an incomplete 
proposition but instead uniformly attribute a property to the complete proposition 
expressed by the sentence they restrict (2013, 502). This is the property, it can easily 
be inferred, of that proposition’s being compatible with the relevant information state. 
Braun’s position makes ready sense of why sentences like (113) license epistemic 
explanations like (115) even when their non-restricted counterparts like (114) do not. 
 
(114) John speaks French. 
(115) That’s only because we know about his semester in Paris.  
 
It could readily make sense of the same contrast between restricted might-sentences 
and BMSs too. However, Braun still takes sentence like (116) to be able to be used to 
make epistemic claims, even though he obviously does not take sentences like (114) 
to be so used. Hence, something needs to be said about these particular epistemic 
claims that could make sense of their not supporting epistemic explanations. 
 
(116) John might speak French. 
 
Braun’s challenges are instructive in this regard. He proposes that might 
semantically expresses a property of propositions that he calls weak possibility (2012, 
469–72), a generic property entailed by more specific properties such as epistemic, 
metaphysical, or nomological possibility (2012, 470). On Braun’s account, a speaker 
who utters a BMS thus says something that is almost certainly (and trivially) true, 
namely, that the prejacent is a weak possibility.17 However, what she says is likely not 
what she means. Instead, the contents of her locutionary and illocutionary speech acts 
 
17 “Obviously, many propositions possess … weak possibility. Perhaps all do” (Braun 2012, 471). 
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come apart, the speaker likely asserting that the prejacent is an epistemic possibility 
for herself (2012, 470; cf. Austin 1962). But this, it turns out, is similar to, or perhaps 
even the same as, what a speaker asserts in uttering a sentence like (117). 
 
(117) Given what I know, John might speak French. 
 
For the apparent semantic content of (117), for Braun, is that the prejacent’s being 
weakly possible is an epistemic possibility for the speaker (cf. Braun 2012, 475; 
2013, 502). This is not what a speaker is likely to mean in uttering (117), however.18 
Instead, a speaker is likely to have meant the far simpler proposition that the prejacent 
itself is an epistemic possibility for her. In this case, in uttering (116) and (117) she 
will have said different things but meant the same. 
Once Braun grants that both bare might-sentences and restricted ones can alike be 
used to assert epistemic possibility propositions, how does he account for the fact that 
only the latter license epistemic explanations? Presumably he has to say that it is 
because only the latter are also used to say (or, in his terms, to locute) epistemic 
propositions. But this response carries no conviction. For the non-epistemic 
explanations that BMSs license must clearly be explanations of asserted content, not 
locuted content. (Presumably, there can be no interesting explanation of what makes a 
weak possibility proposition true.) So if BMSs can be used to assert epistemic 
contents, and if the explanations that they license seem to target asserted contents too, 
then it is unclear why some of the contents they can be used to assert—namely, 
epistemic ones—cannot be explained in terms appropriate to them.  
The only potential solution to this problem that I can see is to define the 
information state that is supposed to be an implicit part of content expansively, as do 
several authors in the literature. Yanovich (2014), for example, has proposed that a 
speaker’s claim in uttering a BMS is that the prejacent is compatible with the relevant 
and readily available information, where this may be more expansive than the 
information of any individual or group within the conversation (2014, 76–78). 
DeRose (1991) makes a similar proposal: the speaker’s claim is that the prejacent is 
compatible with what is known by the relevant community, or could come to be 
known by them in the relevant ways, relevance in both cases depending on the 
context (1991, 594). 
Assume that the information that our epistemic explanations have appealed to so 
far—John’s test results, his diagnosis, etc.—is in all cases readily available. The 
problem with these explanations, then, would be their appeal to the status of that 
information as not yet known as being what grounds the truth of the speaker’s claim. 
For whether the prejacent is compatible with the readily available information is 
clearly independent of whether that information is known. As a result, for Yanovich 
and DeRose, the attempted explanations of the speakers’ claims we have considered 
so far would all be misplaced. 
The problem for this suggestion is that epistemic explanations in terms of 
information not being available, as in (118), are just as bad as any of the explanations 
considered so far in terms of information not being known. 
 
 
18 And if it is, then she will have still asserted an epistemic possibility proposition all the same. 
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(118) John might be contagious. #But that’s only because you didn’t ask his 
doctors his diagnosis the one chance you had.  
 
It is not clear how Yanovich and DeRose could account for this fact. For with (118) a 
perfectly fine explanation is provided of why the prejacent might be compatible with 
the readily available information, as (119) shows. 
 
(119) We don’t know whether John is contagious, and we can’t know for certain 
anytime soon. But that’s only because you didn’t ask his doctors his 
diagnosis the one chance you had.  
 
Additionally, if we appealed to expansive information states for BMSs, we should 
also do so when no particular information state has been explicitly referenced for 
terms like epistemically possible and plausible either. For what motivates DeRose’s 
and Yanovich’s accounts of might—truth value judgments about the claims made 
with BMSs—would motivate similar accounts for these terms. Consider a speaker’s 
retrospective truth value judgment, as in (120), for example. 
 
(120) a.   [S1] Have you seen John’s rash? It’s quite plausible he’s contagious. 
b.  [S2] You can’t have known this but, as John’s physician, I can tell you 
categorically: there’s no way his rash is symptomatic of a contagious 
disease. 
c. [S1] Oh. I guess I was wrong then. 
 
Accounting for the reasonableness of such retrospective judgments is one 
phenomenon motivating the appeal to expansive information states (cf. Yanovich 
2014, 69–94). For such retrospective judgments often do not seem reasonable when a 
particular information state has been explicitly referenced: ((120)c), for example, 
would not seem reasonable if S1’s first utterance had been (121) instead of ((120)a). 
 
(121) Have you seen John’s rash? It’s quite plausible to me that he’s contagious. 
 
That said, if we appealed to expansive information states for epistemically possible 
and plausible, then they should no more license epistemic explanations in terms of 
information not being known than do BMSs. Yet with such terms appeal to the status 
of information as not being known is just as fine as is the appeal in (122) to the status 
of information as not being available. 
 
(122) The only reason it’s {epistemically possible/plausible} that John is 
contagious is that you didn’t ask his doctors his diagnosis the one chance 
you had. 
 
The data cross-cut predictions then. When information can be appealed to to 
explain the truth of a claim, the status of that information as merely not yet possessed, 
or instead as also not being readily available, does not matter. The same holds for 
when information cannot be appealed to. The availability of information does not 
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explain the acceptability of an epistemic explanation. Nor do I see any better way to 
make sense of might-claims not supporting epistemic explanations if we take 
information states to be an implicit part of the content of those claims. If we are to 
maintain a truth-conditional dependency on information states, while still explaining 
our data, it seems that information states must be removed from content.  
 
2.4.2 Removing information states from content 
2.4.2.1 From content to character 
Some theorists have proposed that the truth-conditional role of an information state is 
merely to determine, without itself being part of, the content of the claim made with a 
BMS (Silk 2017). Reference to information states plays the role of a Kaplanian 
character on this account: that is, it provides a function from speech contexts to 
speech contents (Kaplan 1989). For modals like might, the content determined by 
their character is the set of propositions that some particular, contextually relevant 
information state comprises. And the content of the claim made with a BMS is that 
the prejacent is compatible with this set (Silk 2017, 1783). 
The promise of this response is that the content-character distinction is itself a way 
of separating out the contingent determinants of truth conditions that can be appealed 
to in explanations of the truth of a claim (i.e., contingencies of content) from those 
that cannot (i.e., contingencies of character) (Kaplan 1989). The relevant 
contingencies are not those determining what content is expressed in a given context, 
that is, but instead those determining whether the content that is expressed is true. 
And if the contingent nature of an information state only determined what content 
was expressed in a given context, then we would not expect such contingencies to be 
able to be appealed to in an explanation of the truth of that claim. 
The problem with this response is that the claims made with BMSs seem to have 
contingent contents, as we have seen from Section 2.1, while logical relations 
between sets of propositions are non-contingent (cf. Kratzer 1991). (123), for 
example, is a perfectly coherent and reasonable thing to say. 
 
(123) The only reason that John might be the killer is that he never learned to 
control his temper. If he had, there wouldn’t even be this possibility.  
 
Yet it would not be reasonable if the possibility the speaker claims to be contingent 
on John’s temper were a non-contingent relation between sets of propositions. To 
secure the contingency of the contents of modal claims, we need the descriptions that 
contingently characterize sets of propositions—descriptions like our information, for 
example—to not play the role of a Kaplanian character. And yet if we secure 
contingency by taking descriptions like our information to be part of content, then it 
is not clear why we cannot explain what makes a claim true in terms of the 
contingencies of that information. 
 
2.4.2.2 From content to the evaluation matrix 
Perhaps we should remove information states, as well as the sets of propositions they 
comprise, from content altogether. Relativists hold that information states matter 
truth-conditionally, for example, but they regard them as contextually given aspects, 
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not of the proposition expressed, but instead of the evaluation matrix relative to which 
it is true or false (Egan et al. 2005; Egan 2007; Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane 2011; 
2014). The same proposition may thus be true relative to one information state but 
false relative to another. The truth of a speaker’s assertion of that proposition is 
likewise supposed to be relative, varying with the information states determined by 
the contexts in which that assertion is assessed.19  
On this view, it is plausible that explaining what makes an assertion true would 
require explaining what makes it true relative to the explainer’s context. This, after 
all, is the context that grounds the judgment of truth in the first place. We could thus 
make sense on this view of the badness of any examples in which we could plausibly 
assume that a speaker was explaining why the prejacent was an epistemic possibility 
only for an interlocutor. Problematically, however, we could not make sense of the 
examples in which a speaker was explaining why it was an epistemic possibility for 
herself (potentially as well as for others).  
Perhaps the relativist should hold, then, that even the information state determined 
by the assessment context cannot always be appealed to. In many cases, an assessor 
should recognize, after all, that she could later occupy an assessment context at which 
an assertion true relative to her current context would be false (cf. MacFarlane 2014, 
255, fn. 12). And perhaps you should not attempt to explain the truth of a claim 
whose truth you recognize is potentially variable in this way. With this stricture in 
place, the relativist could thus make sense of the badness of examples in which a 
speaker recognizes that she could gain information which could make the prejacent 
cease to be an epistemic possibility for her. However, it is not clear how she would 
make sense of the badness of an example like (124) in which two specialists have 
determined that the prejacent’s truth value is unknowable. 
 
(124) a.   John might be contagious. 
b. #But {that’s} only because we’ve just determined that there are no tests 
that anyone could run to establish whether he is. 
 
Perhaps someone might respond that the prejacent’s truth value is not strictly 
speaking unknowable, given the possibility of an omniscient being. But this 
possibility is irrelevant. It would make explanations of the truth of epistemic 
possibility claims viable only when (and in terms of the fact that) the prejacent itself 
was true. Yet even this absurd result is not consistent with the data. (125) is an 
admittedly odd sort of dialogue for anyone to have, and yet, even still, it is coherent 
in a way that (126) is not.  
 
(125) a.   It’s plausible that John is contagious. 
b. Only because we know that he is. 
 
 
19 Often these will be the information states of single individuals, but relativists could also hold that 
they can sometimes be joint information states (cf. Egan et al. 2005, 153). It should also be noted that 
Stephenson departs from the other theorists listed in only taking the content of the assertion, and not 
the assertion itself, to be relative. 
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(126) a.   John might be contagious. 
b. #Only because we know that he is. 
 
MacFarlane himself also points out the absurdity of appealing to the information 
states of omniscient beings when he writes, in a different context, that: 
 
[I]t is not incoherent for a relativist to aspire to have more information, while 
recognizing her current information state as the information state that 
determines whether she can correctly say that something is “possible”.… 
[N]obody would say that, because information states can be better or worse, all 
epistemic modals should be interpreted relative to the best possible information 
state—full omniscience (2014, 148, fn. 6). 
 
Just as a possibility claim should be evaluated relative to the current information state 
for a relativist, so, we might think, its truth should be explained in terms of that state 
too, and not in terms of the information state of an omniscient being. 
Anyhow, even if relativists could somehow make sense of (124), they would still 
leave unaccounted for might’s contrast with epistemically possible and plausible, both 
of which behave on important diagnostics like presumed relativist terms, including 
being acceptable under subjective attitude verbs like find. Both also display the same 
perspectival restriction under find that presumed relativist terms like tasty do: namely, 
that to find something to be a certain way is to find it to be that way for oneself. These 
facts are shown by (127) and (128) (Alexander Williams, p.c.; cf. Lasersohn 2017; 
Kennedy and Willer 2016). 
 
(127) I find Joe’s flan tasty {#for Sue}. 
(128) I find Joe’s moon-landing theory {epistemically possible/plausible} {#for 
Sue}. 
 
So the relativist no more than any other theorist is in a position to explain our initial 
contrast between plausible and might in their licensing of epistemic explanations.20 
 
2.5 Toward a non-epistemic solution 
Apparently epistemic uses of modals like might license explanations that seem to 
target a content other than the prejacent. This suggests, contra force-modifiers views, 
that such uses contribute to the truth-conditional content of a speaker’s claim. 
However, such uses do not license epistemic explanations, something that truth-
conditional views struggle to explain, even if they remove the relevant information 
state from content to character or even to the evaluation matrix.  
 
20 Stephenson (2007) does argue for a difference between predicates of personal taste (PPTs) and 
epistemic modals based on their behavior under doxastic attitude verbs like think. What Stephenson 
proposes is that PPTs can be used non-relativistically in some cases. As for plausible and epistemically 
possible, their behavior under think would group them with Stephenson’s PPTs. This could seem to—
but in fact does not—provide a basis for differentiating might from plausible and epistemically 
possible. For none of the cases considered so far would be non-relativistic by Stephenson’s lights. 
Indeed, the fact that any epistemic modals pattern with PPTs complicates Stephenson’s proposed 
distinction and suggests that it might rest on a misanalysis of might as an epistemic modal. 
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Proponents of epistemic truth-conditional views might have hoped to find some 
support for their position in the fact that (129), an allegedly explicit counterpart of 
(130), licensed epistemic explanations even though the latter did not. 
 
(129) Given what I know, John might be contagious. 
(130) John might be contagious. 
 
Perhaps however, as suggested by our discussion of Braun, this fact is best explained 
in the same way in which we explain the fact that ((131)a), but not ((132)a), licenses 
an epistemic explanation.  
 
(131) a.   Given what I know, Wisconsinites can shoot pigeons during hunting 
season. 
b. That’s only because you haven’t read their state laws. 
 
(132) a.   Wisconsinites can shoot pigeons during hunting season. 
b. #That’s only because you haven’t read their state laws. 
 
The contrast between (131) and (132) is explained by the epistemic modifier 
making explicit the grounds the speaker would have for making the unmodified, non-
epistemic claim. In doing so, the modifier restricts the deontic quantification to 
worlds in which the known laws obtain. The modified claim thus has an epistemic 
component to its truth conditions, the unmodified one none. Hence, only the modified 
claim supports epistemic explanations. There is no epistemic part of truth conditions 
left implicit in ((132)a), and so no epistemic part of truth conditions to be made 
explicit by the modifier in ((131)a) either, and so ultimately also no puzzle about the 
contrast in the explanations supported either. The exact same could hold for might. 
The problem may not be the alleged implicitness of an epistemic contributor to truth 
conditions but instead the assumption of epistemic truth conditions itself. 
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The philosophically popular name of ‘epistemic possibility’ is a misnomer and the 
ideas based on it are mistaken. 
~ White (1975, 86) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I argue that we can make sense of our data about the (in)admissible 
explanations for the truth of modal claims if we assume, as White suggests, that not 
all modal claims that appear to be epistemic are in fact so. Instead, with some 
apparently epistemic uses of modals we make modal claims that are, in fact, non-
epistemic. Take the claim made with (133). 
 
(133) John might be contagious. 
 
With (133), I propose, we make a claim about how John’s being contagious stands 
with regards to the circumstances. Specifically, we are claiming that circumstances 
leave open the possibility that he is contagious: that John’s being contagious is a 
circumstantial possibility. 
In Section 3.2, I show that we can give a simple and straightforward account of the 
data from the previous chapter if I am correct about the content of our might-claims. 
For whether something is a circumstantial possibility depends on contingencies of the 
circumstances, not information states. The truth of claims about such possibilities 
should thus be explicable in these terms too. In Section 3.3, I develop the framework 
of a semantics and a pragmatics for circumstantial possibility claims. This framework 
is independent of any particular analysis of the circumstantial possibility relation, and 
instead focuses on the non-epistemic nature of that relation. In Section 3.4, I respond 
to objections intended to show that we cannot give truth conditions for the claim 
made with (133) in terms of any non-epistemic possibility relation, but instead must 
appeal to an epistemic relation overlying it. The question here is not whether there is 
a relevant non-epistemic relation—even proponents of epistemic truth conditions will 
need to grant as much.21 Instead, the question is whether we need the epistemic 
overlay of this relation for analysis of the claim made with (133). I argue that we do 
not. I conclude in Section 3.5 by pointing forward to the following chapters in which 
the framework I develop is deployed to make sense of phenomena about modal 
discourse and beliefs. 
Before anything else, however, an important terminological note. In the literature, 
the sort of modality expressed in a non-deontic use of (134) is often referred to as a 
circumstantial possibility (Kratzer 1981; 1991). 
 
(134) John can win tomorrow’s race. 
 
 
21 If the content of an information state ever leaves open the possibility that John is contagious, this 
can only be because what is represented by that content does so. 
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Obviously, I do not think this sort of modality is the same sort expressed by might. 
However, the standard terminology to some extent prejudges the difference between 
the two sorts of modalities. To avoid prejudging the issue, I will thus reserve the term 
possibility for the sort of modality expressed by might and use the term potential to 
refer to the sort of modality expressed by non-deontic uses of can. This leaves open 
the analytical possibility that both might and can could express modal relations to (or 
involving) sets of circumstances, albeit different ones. Hence, it also leaves it as an 
empirical question whether might is better analyzed as expressing circumstantial or 
epistemic possibility. If the latter, as I argue, a question does arise as to the difference 
between the circumstantial modalities expressed by might and can. But this question 
does not require an immediate answer, and so I defer my response till Chapter 6. 
 
3.2 Contingent claims on a non-epistemic analysis 
On a non-epistemic interpretation of (133), the explanation of the data from the 
previous chapter is simple and straightforward. The contents of the claims made with 
might have non-epistemic truth conditions, but the explanations have assumed 
epistemic ones. The badness of these explanations is the result of a category error. 
And the same holds for epistemic explanations of the truth of the claims made with 
must. 
The only role for information on a non-epistemic interpretation of might and must 
is as the grounds for making or accepting a modal claim. But information plays this 
same role for making or accepting any claim, modal or non-modal. To assume that 
the information state that is implied in making a modal assertion has to be part of the 
content of that assertion is to make exactly the sort of mistake that Frege and Moore 
have taught us not to make in the case of non-modal assertions (cf. Moore 1962). 
Because information’s only role for the claims made with might and must is as the 
grounds for those claims, and not as a truth-maker for them, it is only in the former 
role that contingencies of information can be appealed to in response to these claims. 
And this is precisely what we find. In contrast to the previous chapter’s appeals to the 
contingent nature of an information state as making a might- or must-claim true, 
appeals to the contingent nature of an information state as the grounds for making or 
accepting such claims are perfectly fine, as in (135) and (136). 
 
(135) The only reason you say that John {might/must} be contagious is that he 
still hasn’t told you about his test results. You wouldn’t say that if he had. 
(136) The only reason I agree that John {might/must} be contagious is that I still 
haven’t heard from him about his test results. I wouldn’t agree if I had. 
 
When we do want to explain what makes the content of a might- or must-claim 
true—and not just why someone would make or accept it—it is to non-epistemic facts 
that we must appeal. Such appeals are made in (137)-(140), and are perfectly fine, 
just as a non-epistemic analysis of might and must would predict. 
 
(137) The reason John might be contagious is that he works in a hospital ward.  
(138) The reason John must be contagious is that he works in a daycare center. 
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(139) The reason the coin might be heads is that the toss was fair. 
(140) The reason the coin must be tails is that the coin was weighted. 
 
With (137) and (138), for example, we suggest that certain circumstances make 
John’s being contagious either a possibility or a necessity. Insofar as he works in a 
hospital ward, we suggest that it is possible that John has contracted a contagious 
disease. In an alternative scenario in which John did not work in a hospital ward, his 
interactions with others might not have left open this possibility. And insofar as he 
works in a daycare center, we suggest that it is impossible that John has not 
contracted a contagious disease. In any scenario in which John works in a daycare 
center, he will have contracted one.22 
These non-epistemic explanations of why John might or must be contagious, even 
if in practice they are rejected, are in principle the right sort of explanation to be 
giving. There is nothing anomalous about suggesting that the reason that John might 
be contagious is that he works in the worst hospital ward, even if we ultimately 
conclude otherwise. Yet there is something anomalous about suggesting the reason he 
might be so is that our information is incomplete. The source of this anomaly, if I am 
correct, is that might and must function to make the content of a speech act truth-
conditionally dependent on the prejacent’s relation to the circumstances, rather than 
on its relation to the content of some information state. Epistemic explanations of 
what makes might- or must-claims true are thus always misguided. They always 
commit a sort of category error that non-epistemic explanations do not.23 
Let me emphasize that there is nothing untoward in the idea that might and must 
could make a non-epistemic contribution to meaning even though certain epistemic 
states will typically be implied when they are used. For with many terms that make 
non-attitudinal contributions to meaning, we can nonetheless imply specific attitudes 
when we use them. All else being equal, this is probably what we should assume 
happens whenever the truth of a speaker’s claim cannot be explained with regard to 
the contingent etiology of whatever attitude(s) she may have implied in making it. 
Hence, this is probably what we should assume happens in the case of might and must 
too. 
In fact, in the default case of uttering a declarative sentence, a speaker will imply 
an attitude—namely, belief—that is not itself part of the content of that utterance 
(whence Moore’s Paradox). This implication without assertion of an attitude explains 
why ((141)b′) is fine as a response to ((141)a) even though ((141)b)—which purports 
to explain what makes the asserted content of that utterance true—is not.  
 
(141) a.   John is contagious. 
b.  #Only because you haven’t asked him his diagnosis. 
b′. You only believe that because you haven’t asked him his diagnosis.  
 
But if it is standard for the attitude of belief to be implied without being asserted, it 
should not surprise us if specific lexical items enabled other attitudes to be implied 
 
22 And something similar holds for (139) and (140), where we suggest that certain circumstances of 
the coin toss make it either possible or necessary that the coin has landed in a certain way. 
23 Again, this is not to say that non-epistemic explanations may never be rejected for other reasons. 
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without being asserted either. This especially should not surprise us in the case of 
modals. For it is natural to think of sentences like p, might-p, and must-p as part of a 
single system with which we assert, respectively, (142)-(144). 
 
(142) p is actually true. 
(143) p is possibly true. 
(144) p is necessarily true. 
 
We have learned to separate the attitudinal state one must be in to make the first sort 
of judgment from the content of that judgment, and the truth conditions for that 
content (cf. Frege 1956). We can, and should, do so for the second and third sorts of 
judgments about the truth value status of a proposition as well. 
 
3.3 The framework for a non-epistemic analysis 
In this section, I am going to show how we can separate the state that one is generally 
in when one makes a possibility judgment with a sentence like might-p from both the 
content of that judgment and the truth conditions for that content. To effect the 
separation, I propose we do four things. The first is to recognize that circumstantial 
possibility is relational. The second is to remove one of the relata of this possibility 
relation—namely, sets of circumstances—from content to the evaluation matrix for 
content. The third is to allow that discourse contexts may not always antecedently 
determine unique values for all the parameters of the evaluation matrix. And the 
fourth is to allow that speaker intentions may not always do so either.  
These four points are not novel. The second is analogous to one of the two key 
components of epistemic relativist proposals (cf. Egan et al. 2005; MacFarlane 2011; 
2014). And the other points are more or less standard fare in the Kratzerian analysis 
of circumstantial modalities, or are adaptations of that standard fare to the removal of 
the modal base from content to the evaluation matrix (cf. Kratzer 1977, especially 
342-343; 1981, 294–95). What is novel is their combination and their application to 
modalities that have been analyzed as epistemic.24 Combined, the fundamental effect 
of these four points is to allow the contents of possibility judgments to be independent 
of specific sets of circumstances. And this opens up the analytical possibility that 
speakers could typically make such judgments only when in a certain state—for 
example, the state of not being aware of circumstances that close off the possibility of 
the prejacent’s being true—without the content of those judgments being about or 
truth-conditionally dependent on that state. 
I expand upon these four points below, and then develop them within an adapted 




24 I will also argue, here and in the following chapter, that the four points should be combined for 
all circumstantial modalities, not just those currently analyzed as epistemic. That is, the modal base 
should be removed from content to the evaluation matrix for circumstantial modals in general, and the 
Kratzerian points about the relation of discourse contexts and speaker intentions to modal bases should 
be adapted to this removal. This makes my treatment of so-called epistemic uses of modals 
conservative, in the sense that I do not appeal to machinery that is not also required for other modals.  
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3.3.1 The conceptual framework 
First, relationality. We have long been comfortable with the relationality, or relativity, 
of modal concepts, including circumstantial ones (cf. Kratzer 1977; White 1975, 175–
79). Relationality does not generally lead us to adopt an epistemic analysis of a 
particular modal concept either. So I think there should be no obstacle to recognizing 
that might could express a sort of circumstantial possibility that is also relational. 
John’s being contagious would not be a circumstantial possibility from any absolute 
standpoint, then, but instead relative to sets of circumstances that are compatible—in 
some sense—with his actually being so.25 
The sense of compatibility relevant to possibility is often left undefined, even for 
epistemic possibility. A reason for this, as Bach (2011) notes, is that if compatibility 
is understood strictly in terms of logical consistency, then many things will count as 
possibilities that in most contexts we do not want to count as such. Authors often talk 
of compatibility in terms of “not being ruled out”, but what it is for something to not 
be ruled out is also left undefined (cf. Bach 2011, 24–25; MacFarlane 2011, 145).  
In this chapter, I thus remain agnostic on the sense of compatibility that is relevant 
to circumstantial possibility. While I allude to an analysis of circumstantial possibility 
in Chapter 7, for now I simply assume it is some sort of relation that holds between 
sets of circumstances and propositions, and one that is paralleled in a relation of those 
same propositions to information states that represent those circumstances. What is at 
stake in this chapter is whether the relevant possibility relation for analysis of might is 
epistemic or circumstantial, and not what the relevant notion of compatibility for the 
analysis of any possibility relation will be. When I need to denote the circumstantial 
possibility relation, I use ℛ to do so. 
Second, content and the evaluation matrix. The reason for removing the 
circumstantial relata of the possibility relation from content to the evaluation matrix 
is two-fold (cf. analogous proposals in Egan et al. 2005; Egan 2007; Beddor and Egan 
2018; Lasersohn 2005; 2017; Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane 2011; 2014; Richard 
2015). First, it respects the appearances. In order to have made the same claim with 
(145), speakers need to have in mind the same task for which John is ready.  
 
(145) John is ready. 
 
However, in order to have made the same claim with (146), it does not seem that 
speakers need to have in mind the same set of circumstances relative to which there is 
a possibility that John is contagious (cf. Braun 2013, 501–2). 
 
(146) John might be contagious. 
 
Similarly, a person who utters (145) will often seem to have said that John is ready 
for such-and-such a task. But the person who utters (146) will rarely seem to have 
 
25 Failure to recognize this relativity, if I am correct, leads Yalcin (2011) to his non-factualism 
about what he calls epistemic modality (and what I would call circumstantial modality). When I tell 
you that it might be raining, he asks skeptically, “am I … to be understood as describing a way the 
world is?” (2011, 295). No, he thinks, and of course he is right, to an extent. But you are describing a 
way that a part of the world is. 
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said that John might be contagious relative to such-and-such circumstances.26 And it 
turns out that might is not distinct from other circumstantial modal terms in this 
regard. For example, a sports analyst and a layperson can be judged to have made the 
same claim with (147), even though the set of circumstances relative to (and in virtue 
of) which they think that John can win will obviously not be the same. 
 
(147) John can win tomorrow’s race. 
 
Removing circumstances from content to the evaluation matrix also opens up a 
certain desirable under-specificity. We can make attributions of content without 
having to find specific sets of circumstances to be part of that content. In some cases, 
of course, specific sets of circumstances may be part of content, as when they are 
made explicit with phrases like given John’s symptoms or with respect to John’s 
medical history. These phrases, I assume, act as intensional operators, taking contents 
which have truth values at worlds only relative to sets of circumstances within them 
and yielding contents which have absolute truth values at those worlds. Apart from 
phrases like these, however, I assume that the circumstantial relatum is always part of 
the evaluation matrix, never part of content. 
Third, discourse contexts. Discourse contexts provide specific worlds, times, and 
locations for the contents of the claims made in those contexts to be evaluated 
against: namely, the worlds, times, and locations of those contexts. Yet it is not clear 
that there is any good candidate for “the circumstance-set” of a context (cf. von Fintel 
and Gillies 2011 for an analogous proposal about information states). Perhaps the 
only plausible candidate for the presumed circumstance-set of a context is the 
common ground (cf. Stalnaker 1978), supplemented by the physically salient 
circumstances. However, while this will certainly constrain what sets of 
circumstances the content of a possibility claim may be evaluated against, it seems 
not to antecedently determine any specific, unique set. This for two reasons.  
One, the contents of the possibility claims themselves seem to have a role to play 
in determining what sets of circumstances are relevant to their evaluation. Within a 
given discourse context, for example, the different contents of the different claims 
made with (148) will naturally be evaluated against different sets of circumstances. 
 
(148) John might be {contagious/a serial killer/at home/etc.}. 
 
In this regard, locations provide an instructive contrast. Independently of the different 
contents of the different claims made with (149), these claims will naturally initially 
be evaluated against the location of the discourse context (apart from extra-contextual 
cues to evaluate them otherwise). 
 
(149) It’s {raining/cloudy/breezy/etc.}. 
 
26 In the literature, speakers are sometimes glossed as having said some such thing, but with 
information states replaced for circumstances (cf. Braun 2012, 461). This seems to me tendentious. 
The content of this gloss is certainly typically inferable from a speaker’s claim. And we may be led for 
theoretical reasons to posit it as the content of that claim too. However, this is not obviously the 
intuitive content of that claim (cf. Yablo 2011, 271–72). Instead, it seems to involve an attribution of 
overly determinate content.  




Two, discourse contexts are often compatible with multiple interpretations of a 
circumstantial modal claim, even of a given flavor (cf. Kratzer 1977; 1981, 294–95). 
As Kratzer writes, “the kind of facts we take into account for circumstantial modality 
are a rather slippery matter [which] may give rise to misunderstandings and jokes” 
(1981, 303). This seems correct, and it suggests that the common ground does not 
antecedently determine a specific, unique set of circumstances for the contents of 
those claims to be evaluated against. The phenomena of disagreement with modal 
claims also suggests as much (cf. Chapter 4). Disagreement does not typically center 
around a set of circumstances antecedently determined—somehow—by the discourse 
context, and on whether that set bears a particular modal relation to the prejacent. 
Instead, disagreement often seems to arise insofar as interlocutors are taking into 
account different sets of circumstances as they evaluate the content of the modal 
claim. 
Finally, speaker intentions. These may sometimes override the features of a 
discourse context in determining a value for a parameter of an evaluation matrix, as in 
free indirect discourse (cf. Eckardt 2015). However, in the case of circumstance-sets, 
I see no reason to think that the speaker’s intentions, any more than the discourse 
context, need determine a specific set of circumstances for the content of her 
possibility claim to be evaluated against. Speakers may have certain negative 
intentions that constrain how their claims are to be understood. But I see no reason to 
think that the lack of a determinate positive intention is any more an obstacle to 
understanding than the lack of a determinate positive intention for the interpretation 
of people is an obstacle to understanding the claim made with (150). 
 
(150) People are contracting contagious diseases.  
 
Which people are contracting contagious diseases? Does it have to be people in 
general, people at random, people of a specific type, people x, y, and z? I do not think 
speakers need have answers to these questions in advance of uttering (150). Similarly, 
I do not think speakers need to have answers in advance of uttering (146) or (151) as 
to the question of what circumstances are compatible with John’s being contagious. 
 
(151) Circumstances are compatible with John’s being contagious. 
 
Perhaps it will be suggested that the speaker does have a specific set in mind, 
namely, the relevant circumstances. In a sense this is correct, of course, but not in any 
sense that is relevant. For decisions of relevance are made on the fly. If the phrase is 
used to pick out the specific set of circumstances that a speaker has determined so far 
to be relevant, I see no reason to think that the speaker intends the content of her 
possibility claim to be evaluated against only this set. And if the phrase is used to 
pick out the set the speaker would determine to be relevant, we create a justificatory 
problem. For often a speaker could not know in advance what (sort of) circumstances 
she would take to be so. Appeal to relevance seems to be more the tool of a 
theoretician than the content of a speaker’s intentions. Better to hold that speakers can 
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have general, indeterminate intentions that are guided by considerations of relevance 
than to hold that they have specific, determinate ones about relevance.  
Sometimes it is suggested that the relevant set of circumstances for evaluating the 
content of a possibility claim are the known ones (cf. Kratzer 1981; 1991). In a sense 
this is also correct, in that speakers cannot evaluate the content of possibility claims 
on the basis of circumstances unknown to them (though they can withhold evaluation 
on that basis). Yet there are problems with attributing as the content of a speaker’s 
intentions what happens de facto, one of which again is justificatory. For the 
considerations that lead us to assume that a speaker intends the content of her 
possibility claim to be evaluated against the known circumstances lead us to extend 
the group of knowers indefinitely (cf. MacFarlane 2011), and even sometimes to 
include unknown circumstances, supposedly on the basis of their knowability (cf. 
Hacking 1967; Teller 1972; DeRose 1991). But surely it is the antecedent relevance 
of circumstances that makes their subsequent knowability matter, and not their 
antecedent knowability that makes them subsequently relevant. We again do better to 
simply assign general, indeterminate intentions to speakers than to assign specific, 
determinate ones.  
We should avoid the trap for theorists of thinking that just because the content of a 
possibility claim has a truth value assigned only relative to an extended evaluation 
matrix, then either a discourse context or a speaker’s intentions must determine a 
unique evaluation matrix for that content to be evaluated against. Sometimes neither 
may do so.  
These four points I have made allow us to separate the content of a possibility 
judgment, and the truth conditions for that content, from the state that a speaker is 
typically in when she makes such a judgment. Speakers may typically entertain the 
content of a possibility judgment only when they are uncertain whether its prejacent 
is true. But this can be attributed to interest in possibility typically being ancillary to 
unsatisfied interest in actuality (or to interest in the compatibility of a proposition 
with the circumstances typically being ancillary to interest in its truth). It need not—
and if the argument of this dissertation is correct, should not—be attributed to a truth-
conditional dependency on that uncertainty. 
These points I have made are in some ways not novel. Instead, they combine select 
features of several epistemic analyses, including relativism (for the point about 
evaluation matrices), cloudy contextualism (for the point about discourse contexts), 
and Yalcin’s expressivism (for the point about speaker intentions). Several of them 
are also already standard fare in the Kratzerian analysis of circumstantial modalities.  
The novelty of these points—and also, I would argue, their success—derives from 
their combination in a non-epistemic analysis of might. For it is natural to think that 
discourse contexts could provide determinate information states for contents to be 
evaluated against: for example, the joint information state of the interlocutors in that 
context. It is also natural to think that speakers’ intentions about information states 
would be determinate too. That said, if unaccompanied by these indeterminacy 
proposals, the proposal to remove information states from content to the evaluation 
matrix leads to a number of incorrect predictions, as will be shown in the following 
chapter. The proposals thus need to be combined, and it is by replacing an epistemic 
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analysis with a non-epistemic one that we can do so, finally effectively severing the 
contents of possibility judgments from the states of those who make them. 
 
3.3.2 The formal framework 
The proposals I have advocated can be developed formally within the standard 
Kratzerian framework for modal semantics (cf. Kratzer 1977; 1981; 1991), albeit with 
some adaptations. Formalization can allow for greater precision, it can be hoped. 
Argumentatively, nothing should depend upon it. Alternative formalizations could be 
chosen, and in the final chapter I allude to one such alternative. 
To model modal relativity, I follow Kratzer in adding what I will call a fact-
parameter to the evaluation matrix for the contents of modal sentences (Kratzer also 
adds a norm-parameter, relevant only in the final chapters). This parameter will range 
over functions from world-time pairs to sets of facts, or circumstances. The reason for 
the parameter to range over functions, instead of over sets of facts directly, is to 
formally ensure contingency for modal contents (cf. Kratzer 1991). If the world-
parameter shifted independently of the fact-parameter, we could not do so.27  
The functions the fact-parameter ranges over are subject to two constraints. First, 
the set of facts a function assigns to a world-time pair must be a (potentially proper) 
subset of the facts of that world up till that time. That is, there is no assignment of 
“future facts”. Second, the set of facts assigned must exclude purely logically 
constructed ones. There may well be primitive conjunctive, disjunctive, and 
conditional facts: that is, facts that are best represented by conjunctions, disjunctions, 
and conditionals. Just as well, there are conjunctions, disjunctions, conditionals, etc., 
that do not represent primitive facts at all: for example, disjunctions formed randomly 
by iteratively adding disjuncts to true propositions. These purely logically constructed 
facts, I assume, do not play any real role in circumstantial modal relations and so 
should be excluded from artificially doing so either by being categorically excluded 
from assignments of facts to world-time pairs.  
So much by way of preface. The contents of modal sentences will now be assigned 
truth values—“1” for true, “0” for false—relative not simply to possible worlds (or 
world-time pairs) but also to sets of facts. To represent the assignment, we enclose 
sentences in double brackets superscripted with the relevant parameters of the 
evaluation matrix, followed by an indication of the conditions for truth at those 
parameters. To represent the content itself, defined in terms of its truth conditions, we 
use double brackets subscripted with the cent sign. Given these conventions, we use 
(152) to begin to formalize the proposal from the previous section. 
 
(152) ⟦might-p⟧w,t,f = 1 iff ℛ(f(w,t), ⟦p⟧¢) 
 
In (152), what ℛ denotes is the circumstantial possibility relation, however this 
relation is ultimately to be analyzed.  
 
27 Yalcin (2007) proposes a world-independent parameter to capture the apparent world-
independence of allegedly epistemic modals under attitude verbs. But, first, what is key to Yalcin’s 
proposal is not the world-independence of the parameter but instead the attitude verb’s shifting of its 
value (cf. Harr 2014; Ninan 2018). And, second, the apparent world-independence is an illusion that 
arises from the assumption of epistemicity anyway (cf. Chapter 5 of this dissertation).  
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While I will not attempt to provide an analysis of the circumstantial possibility 
relation here, I do want to make two comments about it vis-à-vis the entry in (152). 
First, the entry in (152) implicitly assumes that this relation holds between sets of 
circumstances and eternal propositions, or propositions that do not vary in truth-value 
across times. This is a simplifying assumption that is standard in the philosophical 
literature but that will also be revisited in Chapter 7. For within the linguistics 
literature, there is significant debate whether modals like might combine with tensed 
complements or instead untensed ones (Condoravdi 2002; Hacquard 2010; Rullmann 
and Matthewson 2018).  
Second, the entry in (152) does not assume that the possibility relation must be 
analyzed in terms of truth at some possible world. Braun (2013) has argued that what 
he calls the epistemic possibility relation (and what I would call a circumstantial one) 
cannot be analyzed in this way (2013, 489–90). While I will not enter into this debate 
here, it is worth noting that my entry is compatible with Braun’s argument. There is 
no reference in (152) to the prejacent’s being true at some world accessible from the 
evaluation world (though nothing precludes this analysis of the ℛ relation either). 
This, then, is my first major adaptation to the Kratzerian framework.28 
But set aside questions about the correct analysis of the circumstantial possibility 
relation. With (152), we have a semantic entry: the conditions for the content of a 
might-sentence to be true at a given evaluation matrix. We do not, however, have 
what is sometimes called a post-semantic entry (cf. MacFarlane 2003): the conditions 
for a claim with that content to be true in a given discourse context. I have argued that 
discourse contexts do not antecedently determine specific sets of facts (or functions to 
them) in the way that they determine specific worlds, times, and locations. However, 
this does not mean that a specific set cannot be settled upon as relevant as a result of 
discourse. The value of the fact-parameter can be resolved through conversational 
negotiation, that is, in much the same way that relevant standards of taste, precision, 
etc., can also be resolved through such negotiation. Once this has been done in a 
discourse context, we can assign a truth-value to the possibility claim’s content in that 
context and so can also assign a truth value to the claim itself.29 
 
28 I am grateful to Paul Pietroski for questions that encouraged me to make this point explicit. One 
argument for thinking that the relevant possibility relation is not to be analyzed in terms of truth at a 
possible world comes from claims like Hesperus might not be Phosphorus (Paul Pietroski, p.c.). 
Intuitively, this claim seems as though it could be true if made by some astronomer of the past (cf. 
Frege 1948; Kripke 1980). However, if Kripke is right that Hesperus and Phosphorus pick out one and 
the same object across all possible worlds, then at no world is the prejacent true, a problem if we are 
analyzing possibility in terms of truth at possible worlds. That said, I am not entirely sure that this 
argument shows anything about the relevant possibility relation itself, as opposed to about the function 
of proper names in the relevant possibility claim. If metaphysical claims like Hesperus didn’t have to 
be Phosphorus are necessarily false, while so-called epistemic claims like Hesperus might not be 
Phosphorus are possibly true, this could be due to proper names somehow functioning semantically or 
pragmatically differently in the two cases: as Kripkean rigid designators in the former case, for 
example, but crucially not the latter. How this would work, and the theory of proper names in general, 
is not my concern here (cf., among others, the two-dimensionalist proposal of Chalmers 2006). My 
point is simply that the relevant case could lead us to revisit either our theory of the relevant possibility 
relation or our theory of proper names.  
29 Note that I keep the assignment of truth values to contents distinct from the assignment of truth 
values to claims with those contents. Relativists do not, unhappily so as we will see in Chapter 4, 
Section 4.5. 
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The set of facts settled upon as relevant in a given discourse context may be a 
subset of the known facts. Then again, it may not be. For sometimes we are unwilling 
to accept a might-claim as true until some unknown fact has been established, as in 
(153) (cf. also the examples in DeRose 1991; Yanovich 2014). 
 
(153) If John’s been working at the hospital this week, then he might be 
contagious. But he may also still be on retreat in isolation at the hermitage.  
 
Yanovich (2014) has some nice suggestions for how we settle on a set of facts as 
relevant in a given discourse context, as well as for how we set the bounds of a 
discourse context. These matters are not my concern here. For now, I would simply 
note that, once a given evaluation matrix has been settled on as relevant, we can 
reason about the contingent facts that would make the content of a claim true at that 
evaluation matrix. We can reason about how the facts, our information state, the laws, 
etc., could have been different. (This is crucially not the same as reasoning about how 
different facts, information states, laws, etc., could have been relevant.) And this 
allows us to reason about what makes a claim true, namely, by reasoning about what 
makes its content true at this matrix. 
Before closing this section, I should note that, in recent work, Kratzer has rejected 
the use of the sort of parameter that I am here depending on (cf. Kratzer 2012; 2013). 
Let me briefly explain why she has done so and why I do not follow her lead.30 
 
3.3.3 The formal framework revisited 
Kratzer had hoped to intensionally characterize the functions her parameter ranged 
over as being either epistemic or circumstantial, and to use this intensional difference 
to characterize the meaning difference between sentences like (154) and (155).  
 
(154) John might easily be a military man. 
(155) John can easily be a military man. 
 
By characterizing the meaning difference in this way—that is, as a difference in the 
intensional characterization of the value of a contextual parameter—Kratzer was able 
to avoid having to lexicalize the difference between the different flavors of modality 
expressed (cf. Kratzer 1977). While individual lexical items like might and can place 
idiosyncratic selectional restrictions on admissible values of the contextual parameter 
(cf. Kratzer 1991, 649–50), it would be possible in principle for a single lexical item 
to express both flavors without having to posit an ambiguity. Yet Nauze (2008) 
convinced Kratzer that the values of her parameter were not able to be intensionally 
 
30 I should also note that, while Kratzer had used a parameter to represent modal relativity, she 
seems to have viewed its value as part of content (Kratzer 1991, 640–41). As far as I can tell, this is 
because parameters may be used not only to represent that some truth-conditional contributor is part of 
the evaluation matrix, rather than of content, but also to represent that a truth-conditional contributor is 
not syntactically represented (cf. Hacquard 2010, 84–85; von Fintel and Heim 2011, 110), a view that 
Kratzer herself seems to hold (cf. Schaffer 2011, 202). I will not consider questions of syntactic 
representation here but will continue to use parameters exclusively to represent the content/evaluation 
matrix distinction.  
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characterized in the way she required for her non-ambiguity project to succeed (cf. 
Kratzer 2012, 24). Hence, Kratzer rejected the use of this parameter altogether. 
Nauze’ basic argument was this. The functions that Kratzer’s parameter ranges 
over are all of them functions from possible worlds to sets of propositions. But no set 
of propositions is inherently epistemic or circumstantial, and so no function from 
possible worlds to sets of propositions in inherently such either. That is, no set of 
propositions construed as the content of a knowledge state could not also, in 
principle, be construed as the circumstances, and vice versa. Hence, Kratzer 
concludes, nothing allows us “to single out some . . . functions as epistemic, but not 
circumstantial, or the other way around” (2012, 24). Nothing about a given function 
itself allows us to characterize it as either epistemic or circumstantial: a function is 
“epistemic” or “circumstantial” insofar as we use it to represent an epistemic or 
circumstantial meaning, not vice versa. As a result, the differences between the modal 
flavors expressed by might and can cannot be attributed to any contextual variation in 
the value of the fact-parameter.31 The values of the fact-parameter cannot themselves 
be distinguished in the way necessary for this to happen. Kratzer thus abandoned the 
use of her fact-parameter, and looked elsewhere to generate the meaning difference 
between sentences like (154) and (155), which she still took to be a difference in “the 
kinds of facts [the two modals] depend on” (2012, 24). 
Neither of Kratzer’s hopes for her fact-parameter are mine. I thus do not see any 
reason, in the light of Nauze’ arguments, to abandon its use. Obviously, I do not think 
that we should intensionally characterize the values of her parameter for might as 
epistemic ones, or as functions to the known facts. However, I also do not think that 
the difference between (154) and (155) is best analyzed as a difference in intensional 
characterization of facts either. I think the difference is not in the kind of facts the 
modal relates the prejacent to, but instead in the kind of relation to those facts. This is 
suggested by the persistence of that meaning difference even when the relevant facts 
appear to be specified, and to be the same, as in (156) and (157). 
 
(156) Given only his psychiatric profile, John might easily be a military man. 
(157) Given only his psychiatric profile, John can easily be a military man. 
 
Sharing neither of Kratzer’s hopes, I thus see no objection to continuing to use her 
fact-parameter. 
That said, if we are to do so, it is important to understand Nauze’ criticism well. 
This criticism is not of the use of intensionally characterized functions to represent 
meaning per se. Rather, it is a criticism of the attempt to do so via context rather than 
the lexicon. Any intensional characterization intended to distinguish between modal 
flavors, Nauze argues, belongs there (Nauze 2008, 154–58).  
Understanding this point is important, for it allows us to recognize that phrases 
like given John’s symptoms can also be used to intensionally characterize the relevant 
function for a might-claim. However, the intensional characterization of this function 
does not determine a modal flavor, as Kratzer would have it do, but instead a specific 
modality of an antecedently given flavor. Adapting terminology from Kratzer (1981), 
 
31 Though such variation can be held responsible for differences between claims of the same flavor 
(cf. Viebahn and Vetter 2016). 
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such an intensionally characterized function may usefully be described as providing a 
specific modal background for a modal claim of a given flavor to be made against. 
Speaker intentions may sometimes do the same: for example, when it is clear, without 
being explicitly stated, that the content of a modal claim is to be evaluated against a 
specific type of facts. When there is no specific modal background, we may say that 
there is a general, or generic, one.  
Say we refer to the set of facts against which the content of a modal claim is to be 
evaluated as the modal base, again adapting terminology from Kratzer (1981). Then 
we can say that in a discourse context with a specific modal background, the modal 
base is determined by the modal background. However, in a discourse context with a 
generic modal background, the modal base is constrained, but underdetermined, and it 
has to be resolved as the result of conversational negotiation. 
At this point, it should be abundantly clear that I have made significant, further 
adaptations to Kratzer’s framework. In particular, I am not deploying it as a way of 
avoiding ambiguity when accounting for modal flexibility, or the ability of a single 
modal to be used to express multiple flavors of modality. I am also not assuming that 
the meaning differences between modal flavors are always such as to be susceptible 
to a non-ambiguity account anyway. If might and can differ in the kind of modal 
relation that they express, and not in the kind of facts that they express that relation 
to, then it is not immediately clear that they could meaningfully be given the same 
semantic entry. 
That said, it is important to be clear that these adaptations, like the previous one, 
are tangential, both to my argument that might is non-epistemic and to the conceptual 
framework developed in Section 3.3.1 for explaining how might could express a non-
epistemic meaning. I do think, and will argue in Chapter 6, that very likely we will 
have to substantively rethink the project of attempting to account for modal flexibility 
without having to posit modal ambiguity. But this is due to Nauze’ argument about 
the intensional characterization of functions, not to my argument about might being 
non-epistemic. If Kratzer (2012; 2013)’s attempt to account for modal flexibility via 
syntax rather than context could be made to work (cf. Hacquard 2006; 2010), then all 
my argument would require is that the alleged minimal difference between might and 
can in the kind of facts they depend on not be an epistemic/non-epistemic one. In her 
recent work, Kratzer herself sometimes even seems to concede this point, arguing on 
the basis of new data for locating a contentful/factual distinction within the traditional 
class of epistemics (cf. Kratzer 2012; 2013; Matthewson 2016).32 What is important in 
all this, and what I continue to use Kratzer’s standard fact-parameter to represent, is 
only that might, like can, can be used in different contexts to make claims that depend 
for their truth on the potentially different circumstances that are settled upon as 
relevant in those contexts. 
 
3.4 Do we need an epistemic overlay for the analysis? 
The analysis of might developed so far has been entirely in terms of circumstantial 
possibility. Even proponents of epistemic analyses should recognize such a possibility 
 
32 I say seems because the support rests on a distinction between evidence and content that I am not 
sure does the work it is required to (Kratzer 2012, 34–36; 2013). For further discussion, cf. Chapter 6, 
Section 6.2.2.2. 
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relation, I believe. For say that people judge that John might be contagious. 
Invariably, they do so on the basis of their judgments about the circumstances and 
how they stand with regard to the proposition that John is contagious.  
Yet it may be wondered whether might-claims can be analyzed entirely in terms of 
the circumstantial possibility relation, or whether we also need to appeal to what I 
will call the epistemic overlay of this relation. That is, it may be wondered whether at 
some point we must appeal to the known circumstances. I consider two common 
reasons for thinking that an epistemic analysis of might-claims is required below and 
argue that neither forces us to such an analysis. In fact, in both cases, a non-epistemic 
analysis fares just as well, if not better, in accounting for the relevant phenomena. 
 
3.4.1 Non-epistemic truth conditions and triviality 
The speaker who utters (158) does not typically make a trivial claim. 
 
(158) John might be contagious. 
 
But say that the content of that claim had circumstantial truth conditions. That is, say 
that its truth depended on how John’s being contagious stood with regard to the 
circumstances. Well, the circumstances in fact settle whether John is contagious. In 
the circumstances, that is, John either is contagious, or he is not. Hence, his being 
contagious could be a possibility with regard to the circumstances if and only it was 
an actualized possibility: that is, if and only if John actually was contagious. But then 
our modal claim would describe a trivial possibility, and would turn out to be truth-
conditionally equivalent to the non-modal claim made with (159). 
 
(159) John is contagious. 
 
However, the addition of might is not trivial in this way. Therefore, so the objection 
goes, the content of our claim could not have circumstantial truth conditions but must 
instead have epistemic ones. For John’s being contagious could be a non-trivial 
possibility with regard to our state of knowledge even if it could not be so with regard 
to the state of the world (cf. Condoravdi 2002, a.o.).33 
This objection assumes an absolute view of circumstantial possibility. It assumes 
that whether a proposition counts as a circumstantial possibility depends on how it 
stands with regard to the total circumstances. Hence, it assumes that only propositions 
whose truth values have not yet been metaphysically settled (or determined) can 
count as non-trivial circumstantial possibilities. However, I see no reason to assume 
that circumstantial possibility must be absolute. Why not think a settled proposition 
could count as a non-trivial possibility relative to a subset of the total circumstances, 
provided they excluded the relevant fact of the matter about that proposition? 
 
33 Condoravdi writes of sentences like (158), “where reference is to the present, [that] the modals 
have only an epistemic reading: [John’s being contagious] is compatible with what the speaker takes 
the actual world to be now. The issue itself of his [being contagious] is settled by the course of events 
in the actual world though it may not be known which way it is settled. He either [is contagious] now 
or [is] not, and nothing that happens from now on can change whatever is in fact the case” 
(Condoravdi 2002, 21). 
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Here is an example. Say that circumstantial possibility claims are claims that a set 
of circumstances increases the objective probability of a prejacent above a certain low 
(but contextually variable) threshold. While the total circumstances of course trivially 
increase or decrease the objective probability of a settled proposition, subsets of the 
circumstances could non-trivially do so, provided they excluded the relevant fact of 
the matter. That John works in the worst hospital ward, for example, non-trivially 
increases the objective probability that he is contagious. That he has a powerful 
autoimmune system non-trivially decreases it. And so on. Relative to any of these 
relevant subsets of the total circumstances, we could say that John’s being contagious 
was a non-trivial possibility, provided they had sufficiently increased the objective 
probability of his being so. 
Say that a settled proposition could count as a possibility relative to a subset of the 
total circumstances. Then all we require in order to interpret a speaker’s claim as non-
trivial is to assume that she intends its modal base—or the set of circumstances 
relative to which its prejacent is to be evaluated as a possibility—to exclude the 
relevant fact of the matter.34 All we require, that is, is the assumption that the speaker 
has a certain negative intention to not be talking about a trivial possibility, even if her 
positive intentions are general and indeterminate (cf. Section 3.3.1). 
Is this cheating? Can the one fact that would make a might-claim trivial simply be 
excluded from the modal base? Do we not instead need to appeal to a specific modal 
background that could ensure this exclusion—for example, an epistemic background 
that references the known facts? 
It is not cheating.35 For it is safe to assume that speakers are generally unlikely to 
be interested in trivial instances of possibility relations. Take the objective probability 
example. Speakers are generally more likely to be interested in—hence more likely to 
be making claims about—the non-trivial effects of subsets of the circumstances on 
the objective probability of John’s being contagious than in the trivial effect of the 
total circumstances on the objective probability of his being so. In fact, whatever the 
correct analysis of circumstantial possibility, whether in terms of probability or in 
terms of something else, the point remains the same. If the relations circumstances 
bear to settled propositions have both trivial and non-trivial instances, speakers are 
more likely to be interested in the latter than in the former. Hence, they are more 
likely to be making general, non-trivial claims like (160) than to be making trivial 
claims like (161). 
 
(160) There’s a non-trivial possibility that John is contagious. 
(161) There’s a trivial possibility that John is contagious. 
 
The assumption that speakers are not only more likely to be interested in, but also 
more likely to be making claims about, non-trivial instances of circumstantial 
relations is one we have the latitude to make. For, in most cases, the modal base for a 
 
34 The same sort of principle holds for necessity claims, as will become significant later on. 
35 And even if it were, an epistemic background would not help. For as we will see from the 
following chapter, the considerations that could lead us to embrace an epistemic background would 
lead us to embrace one that referenced the facts known by potentially anyone. This would result in 
triviality in any case in which we did not think that the prejacent itself was inherently unknowable—
that is, in almost every case! 
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claim is not explicitly specified. There are exceptions, to be sure, as when we delimit 
a modal base by using a modifier, as in (162), thereby providing a specific modal 
background. We can also constrain a modal base, without delimiting it, by adding a 
proposition to the common ground, as in (163). 
 
(162) Given his {work environment/medical history}, John might be contagious. 
(163) John works in the worst hospital ward. He might be contagious. 
 
In most cases, however, the modal base will at best be underspecified. And given 
an underspecified claim with competing trivial and non-trivial interpretations, it 
makes sense to prefer the latter (cf. Condoravdi 2002). People do make trivial claims, 
but generally only to indirectly make non-trivial points. But if an underspecified 
claim could be used directly to make a non-trivial point, there is no reason to think it 
is being used indirectly to do so, unless a speaker has reason to be coy.36 The relevant 
fact of the matter is thus excluded from a circumstantial modal base by general 
pragmatic principles and not, as it may have seemed, by fiat. 
There is an important connection to be made here to an attempt to ensure non-
triviality via a semantic constraint on modal bases, the Diversity Condition of 
Condoravdi (2002). On my account, what is required for non-triviality is that the 
modal base exclude the relevant fact of the matter. On Condoravdi’s account, what is 
required is that the set of worlds determined by the modal base—the worlds in which 
all the circumstances of the modal base obtain—not settle it (2002, 25–26).37 (This is 
the constraint imposed by the Diversity Condition.) Condoravdi’s requirement entails 
mine, but not vice versa. It is possible, after all, that circumstances excluding the 
relevant fact of the matter nonetheless settle it. A claim could thus be non-trivial on 
my account without satisfying the Diversity Condition. This is a good thing, for a 
limitation of the Diversity Condition is that it does not apply naturally to necessity 
claims, which do require the set of worlds they quantify over to settle the relevant fact 
of the matter (cf. Klecha 2016; Werner 2006), whereas my requirement applies 
naturally to necessity and possibility claims alike. To be non-trivial, both simply need 
the relevant fact of the matter to be excluded from the modal base, even if ultimately 
settled by the other circumstances in it. My approach to the triviality problem may 
thus be preferable to the standard approach independently of the argument against 
epistemic truth conditions from Chapter 2.38 
 
36 In some cases, a speaker does have reason to be coy, as when she is prohibited from making a 
public commitment about the relevant fact of the matter. In such a case, an underspecified possibility 
claim that could be interpreted as trivially true but defended as non-trivially so could allow a 
sympathetic speaker to communicate information she otherwise could not.  
37 Condoravdi uses the term modal base to refer to what I call the set of possible worlds determined 
by the modal base. For related ways in which the term is used, cf. von Fintel and Heim (2011, 42). 
38 It may also help explain why felicitous necessity claims generally require the speaker’s evidence 
for the prejacent to be indirect (von Fintel and Gillies 2010; Matthewson 2015). Say direct evidence 
for circumstances that non-trivially settle the prejacent is indirect evidence for the prejacent itself. And 
say that direct evidence is stronger than indirect evidence, and that speakers are generally expected to 
make claims that their strongest evidence about the prejacent supports (Faller 2012; Mandelkern 2017, 
120–21). A speaker making a necessity claim can thus often be expected not to have direct evidence 
for the prejacent itself, but only for circumstances that non-trivially settle it. Yet this expectation is 
waived in contexts in which a speaker’s explicit concern is to show how certain circumstances settle 




3.4.2 Non-epistemic truth conditions and speaker uncertainty 
Say that a speaker knows whether John is contagious. It will then generally seem 
inappropriate for her to utter (158), repeated here as (164). 
 
(164) John might be contagious. 
 
This is predicted on an epistemic analysis of (164), for the speaker will have implied 
with her claim that she does not know whether John is contagious, which is false. 
However, it might be objected, there should be no such misleading implication on a 
non-epistemic analysis. For a speaker, the objection goes, should be able to claim that 
a prejacent bears some non-trivial relation to the circumstances without implying, 
misleadingly or not, that she is uncertain about it. If this is correct, then, to make 
sense of uncertainty generally being a condition for appropriate utterances of (164), 
we should take these utterances to have epistemic truth conditions, not circumstantial 
ones (cf. DeRose 1991).39 
A problem with this objection is that it overlooks the exceptions to the uncertainty 
generalization. These are difficult to make sense of given epistemic truth conditions. 
And they also help to characterize the unexceptional cases in a way that makes sense 
of how uncertainty implications could be pragmatically generated from circumstantial 
possibility claims, in essentially Gricean ways.  
The first sort of exception involves evasion. Even if it is common knowledge that 
the prejacent is false, a speaker may appropriately make a might-claim, as in (165), if 
her concern is to avoid public commitment on whether it is true (cf. Yablo 2011).  
 
[Context: S1 has been caught looking without permission at medical records 
indicating that John is not contagious. He tries to take control of the situation.] 
 
(165) a.   [S1] Do you know whether John is contagious? 
b. [S2] I do. 
c. [S1] Is he? 
d. [S2] He might be. But it’s not my place to say. 
 
The second sort of exception involves instruction. Even if it is common knowledge 
that the prejacent is false, a speaker may again appropriately make a might-claim, as 
in (166), if her concern is with whether it is a possibility relative to some more or less 
well-defined set of circumstances (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2008; Bach 2011). 
 
[Context: Sue knows her cadets have a copy of her legend indicating that the 
practice field about to be charged is not one in which fake landmines are planted.] 
 
the prejacent. And, in these deductive contexts, the requirement for indirect evidence is waived too 
(Goodhue 2017). Goodhue argues that epistemic analyses require a distinctive deductive modal to 
account for these contexts. A circumstantial analysis, however, can account for them pragmatically. 
39 DeRose writes: the “prospects for explaining why [speakers] say what they do seem much 
brighter if we suppose that the content of their . . . modal statements somehow involves something 
about their own epistemic positions with respect to the [prejacent]” (DeRose 1991, 583–84). 




(166) Are you sure you want to charge the enemy? Look at that field. There might 
be landmines. Think of how many troops you could lose if there were. 
 
To explain cases of evasion and instruction, epistemic theorists have usually 
assumed that the speaker’s claim is not about her own knowledge state, but instead an 
interlocutor’s (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2008; Bach 2011; Dowell 2011). However, 
this will not work in cases involving common knowledge, like (165) and (166), since 
a speaker no more takes her interlocutors to be uncertain about the prejacent than she 
takes herself to be. Further, in these cases, there is also no other contextually salient 
individual whose knowledge state the speaker’s claim could plausibly be about. 
Instead of trying to provide epistemic interpretations for the might-claims in (165)-
(166), the epistemic theorist could hold that might has a different type of reading in 
these cases. However, the usual alternative candidates to epistemic readings will not 
work. The claims are not metaphysical ones about ways in which the world could yet 
develop. Nor are they counterfactual ones about ways in which the world could have 
developed. Instead, they seem to be claims about possible ways in which the world 
has developed to this point. But if these claims about the space of present possibilities 
are not epistemic ones, as I have argued they do not seem to be, then presumably they 
must be circumstantial ones. They must be claims about the present possibilities left 
open by the circumstances: not the total circumstances, of course, but instead some 
subset of them.  
Once we have granted circumstantial readings to make sense of the exceptions to 
the uncertainty generalization, can we also make sense of the generalization itself 
with only such readings? We can, given reasonable expectations about speakers 
making underspecified modal claims. Let me explain. 
With underspecified claims, there seems to be a general expectation that a speaker 
is making what we might call an all-things-considered judgment, a judgment that 
takes into account all of the circumstances known to her.40 Speakers can take into 
account fewer circumstances in making a modal judgment, of course, but to do so 
they generally need to make this explicit: to use a modifier that provides a specific 
modal background to delimit the modal base, as in (167). 
 
(167) Given his symptoms, John might be contagious. Given his test results, he 
can’t be. 
 
In cases of instruction, however, a speaker often does not need to use a modifier to 
delimit the modal base. Her evident concern with a specific relative possibility (the 
possibility of landmines relative only to the terrain, for example) allows her claim to 
support the specific interpretation she intends without the use of such a modifier. 
And in cases of evasion, a speaker does not want to commit herself to any specific 
delimitation of the modal base. Her evident concern to avoid public commitment on 
the prejacent’s truth value makes her underspecified claim, which does not support 
any specific interpretation, but is bound to be true on at least one, the perfect vehicle 
 
40 Cf. Mandelkern (2017, 120–21) for the related point that speakers are expected to take into 
account their strongest evidence. 
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for evasion. In both cases, context makes it clear that a speaker may not be making an 
all-things-considered judgment in making her underspecified claim. 
These exceptional cases aside, speakers can generally be expected to be making 
all-things-considered judgments when making underspecified modal claims. That is, 
they can generally be expected to be making their modal judgments—just like their 
non-modal ones—on the basis of all the relevant circumstances known to them. 
Given this expectation, we can explain why it should generally seem inappropriate for 
speakers to make might-claims unless they are uncertain about their prejacents. For 
the all-things-considered judgment of speakers who were certain would be either that 
the prejacent was a trivial possibility or that it was a trivial impossibility. And these 
are judgments that speakers are either unlikely or unable to make with might-claims.  
Perhaps it will be objected that if a speaker is expected to take into account all the 
circumstances known to her in making an underspecified modal claim, then this must 
be because that claim’s truth depends, somehow, on which circumstances are known. 
Yet this objection proves too much. (It also conflates the grounds for making a claim 
with what makes that claim true.) For it is not just with underspecified might-claims 
that speakers are expected to take into account all the circumstances known to them, 
and to make all-things-considered judgments, but with underspecified can-claims too. 
And here there is no serious question of adopting an epistemic overlay for the 
circumstantial analysis. 
Take the ability claim made with (168), for example. 
 
(168) John can speak Finnish.  
 
Say I know that John has the right anatomy to speak Finnish but not the right training 
to do so (cf. Lewis 1976, 150). It would then generally be inappropriate for me to 
utter (168). For while John counts as having the ability to speak Finnish relative to 
some of the circumstances I am aware of, he does not count as such relative to all of 
them. To take into account fewer circumstances, I should generally use a modifier to 
provide a specific modal background that delimits the modal base, as in (169). 
 
(169) Given his anatomy, John can speak Finnish. Given his lack of training, he 
can’t. 
 
Here is another case, this one inspired by Kratzer (1981)’s example of a trombone 
player (cf. Vetter 2013, 6–7). Say I know that John has the right training to swim but 
not the right frame of mind to do. (Imagine he is currently inebriated.) Absent this 
second piece of information, I could have used (170) to express my modal judgment 
about John. Yet given this second piece of information, it would generally be more 
appropriate to use (171) or (172) instead.  
 
(170) John can swim. 
(171) In general, John can swim. Today he can’t.  
(172) Given his training, John can swim. Given his current state of inebriation, he 
can’t. 
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With both underspecified might- and can-claims, then, a speaker is generally 
expected to be making all-things-considered judgments: judgments that take into 
account, or are made on the basis of, all of her information (or all the circumstances 
known to her). This expectation follows from the basic pragmatics of assertion (cf. 
Grice 1989), and is not limited to the modal case. However, making an all-things-
considered modal judgment is crucially not the same as making a judgment about a 
modal relation that involves one’s information (as will become important in Chapter 5 
when we turn to embedded occurrences of might used to report assertions or beliefs). 
Our all-things-considered judgments always reflect the limits of our knowledge. But 
this does not mean, of course, that they are ever in any way about that knowledge.41 
To summarize: circumstantial truth conditions allow us to explain both the 
uncertainty generalization and the exceptions to it, given general expectations about 
speakers making underspecified claims. Epistemic truth conditions do not. Instead, 
we would have to posit epistemic readings to make sense of the generalization and 
circumstantial ones to make sense of the exceptions to it. Hence, my approach to the 
uncertainty problem may again be preferable to the standard approach independently 
of the argument against epistemic truth conditions from Chapter 2.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Given the (in)admissible explanations for might-claims, a non-epistemic 
interpretation of might seems to be necessary. However, it may also have seemed to 
be impossible, given standard objections to any such interpretation. In this chapter, I 
have thus shown not only how a non-epistemic interpretation does indeed make ready 
sense of the data from Chapter 2, but also how the standard objections to it are 
misplaced. In explaining the data and responding to these objections, my focus has 
been on the general form of a non-epistemic analysis, as opposed to on the details of 
any particular analysis of this form. This is appropriate, given that the central 
argument of this dissertation is against epistemic analyses in general rather than in 
favor of any non-epistemic analysis in particular. That said, I will allude to a 
particular non-epistemic analysis of might in the concluding chapter. Before that, 
however, I want to show the promise of non-epistemic analyses in general in making 
sense of some well-known data that have proven troublesome for epistemic analyses. 
 
41 For an example of a non-modal, all-things-considered judgment, consider a moral one. Say that I 
rank one standard of behavior higher than another. And say that I judge some action acceptable relative 
only to one standard. My all-things-considered judgment about the acceptability of that action is then 
based on the standard I rank higher. And an underspecified claim about that action’s acceptability—
one that does not specify the relevant standard of behavior—can also generally be expected to express 
that judgment. For example, it will generally be inappropriate for me to utter (i) if I think that only 
relative to some inferior standard of behavior is it good to care for the quarantined.  
 
(i) It is good to care for the quarantined.  
 
If I judge an action to be acceptable only relative to some lower-ranked standard known to me, then I 
should make this explicit, unless it can be easily inferred. That said, even if an all-things-considered 
judgement is made on the basis of the highest-ranked standard known to me, it is not a judgment about 
that standard qua known. All-things-considered moral judgments reflect the limits of our knowledge 
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Chapter Four: Applying the Analysis to Modal Disagreement 
 
 
[T]wo speakers can disagree about a statement containing an epistemic modal simply 
because they have different knowledge states. 
~ Stephenson (2007, 492) 
 
4.1 A puzzle about disagreement 
A central puzzle of discourse dynamics for epistemic analyses of might is how to 
make sense of apparent disagreement about what might be the case (cf. Stephenson 
2007; MacFarlane 2014; Willer 2015; a.o.). It seems that such disagreement could 
sometimes be both genuine and warranted, even when it occurs between strangers, as 
in (173). 
 
(173) [Context: Two hotel guests have struck up a conversation in the lobby.] 
a. That concierge looks pretty suspicious. He might be a spy. 
b. You’re wrong! He can’t be a spy! This hotel is more rigorous in vetting 
their employees than even the top government agencies! 
 
Yet it is not immediately obvious on an epistemic analysis of might how the 
disagreement in (173) could ever be both genuine and warranted. For say the speakers 
are making claims about their respective information states. Then their disagreement 
would seem to not be genuine. But say instead that they are making claims about the 
same information state: their joint one, for example. Then their claims would seem to 
not be warranted. For, having just met, neither speaker is in a position to make a 
warranted claim about the other’s information state. The disagreement in (173) does 
seem to be legitimate, that is for sure, and yet the basis for this legitimacy is not what 
we would expect for an epistemic claim. Instead of being divergent views about some 
information state, the basis for legitimate disagreement, as Stephenson suggests, 
seems simply to be the speakers’ divergent information states themselves. This is 
puzzling. 
In this chapter, I argue that the best way to solve this apparent puzzle is to dissolve 
it, by adopting a circumstantial analysis of might in place of an epistemic one. On this 
analysis, there is no more puzzle about how the disagreement in (173) could ever be 
both genuine and warranted than there is about how the disagreement in (174) could 
be so.  
 
(174) [Context: Two sports fans have struck up a conversation at the local bar.] 
a. Phelps can win yet another Olympic medal this year. He’s so good. 
b. You’re wrong! He can’t win another medal! He’s got plantar fasciitis! 
 
In both cases, the disagreement is about what possibilities or potentials the 
circumstances leave open. Speakers’ information states will obviously affect what 
possibilities and potentials they think these are. However, their information states do 
not contribute in any way either to the contents of the modal claims made with (173) 
or (174), or to the truth conditions for those contents. Speakers thus do not have to 
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converge on a single information state for their disagreement to be genuine, and so 
also do not have to be in privileged position with regard to each other’s information 
states in order for such disagreement to be warranted. Making sense of disagreement 
between strangers about what might the case is thus no more difficult, if we adopt a 
circumstantial analysis for might, than is making sense of disagreement between 
strangers about what can happen (cf. Willer 2013 for a similar comparison to non-
modal disagreement).42 
The same cannot be said, unfortunately, for an epistemic analysis of might. Faced 
with disagreement that unpredictably appears to be both genuine and warranted, 
proponents of epistemic analyses have had to go to great lengths to deny either the 
appearances or their unpredictability. Support for these lengths is supposed to come 
from data about the range of responses available to apparent disagreement. Yet the 
exact same range is available for apparent disagreement about what can happen, and 
this latter sort of disagreement clearly does not concern a proposition with epistemic 
truth conditions. Without the presupposition that the former does so either, the 
innovations of epistemic analysts seem as unnecessary and undesirable in the one 
case as they clearly are in the other. 
Here is the structure my argument in this chapter will take. In Section 4.2, I 
critically review the arguments of those who would question the genuineness of the 
disagreement in (173), or would redefine what is required for disagreement to be 
genuine. In Section 4.3, I turn to the arguments of those who would maintain that the 
disagreement is genuine, as is standardly defined, but would deny that there is any 
special problem of warrant, or would redefine their semantics and/or pragmatics to 
avoid such a problem. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5, I present the circumstantial analysis of 
disagreement and related phenomena. And in Section 4.6, I conclude by responding 
to an objection. 
Before anything else, I should note that the basic puzzle about disagreement, if not 
carefully formulated, is easily obscured. That is why I have focused on a case in 
which the apparent disagreement occurs between complete strangers who have struck 
up a conversation, rather than on cases in which it occurs between friends or between 
strangers who have butted into one. For in cases like these, it has been argued, the 
conditions could be met for speakers to make warranted claims about others’ 
information states, and so also for there to be warranted and genuine disagreement 
about those information states too (cf. Dowell 2011, 8–9, 12–13). But the puzzle 
about disagreement is not really a puzzle about whether, or how, there could be 
warranted claims about others’ information states, despite passing comments that 
could erroneously suggest otherwise.43 Instead, the puzzle is whether the requirements 
for legitimate disagreement about what might be the case are the same as those for 
legitimate disagreement about an information state. And the puzzle is best brought 
out by cases, like (173), in which they intuitively do not seem to be the same. 
 
42 My proposal is similar to Willer’s in taking there to be a single, non-epistemic content that is the 
object of disagreement. However, Willer takes this content to be dynamic, a context-change potential. 
A consequence of this view is that disagreeing with a might-claim requires believing its prejacent to be 
false (2013, 60–61). This seems too strong. 
43 von Fintel and Gillies (2011), for example, claim of a generic case involving individuals A and B 
that “it is obvious that A has no business making assertions about B’s information state” (2011, 115, fn. 
13). In fact, this is not obvious, as Dowell rightly points out (2011, 8–9, 12–13). 




4.2 Some attempted epistemic solutions to the puzzle 
4.2.1 Denying the genuineness of disagreement 
The first response of many in the literature to cases of apparent disagreement like 
(173) is to try to maintain that the disagreement is only apparent (cf. Braun 2012; 
Bach 2011; Dowell 2011; Schaffer 2011; Portner 2009; Dietz 2008; von Fintel and 
Gillies 2008; Wright 2007). On this line of response, it is assumed that the second 
speaker may have denied a proposition involving his own information state, or 
perhaps even the prejacent, but that neither of these is what the first speaker has 
asserted (if she has asserted anything at all; cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2011). If this 
assumption is correct, then there is no single content that has been both asserted and 
denied in a case like (173). Hence, the apparent disagreement would be only apparent.  
 
4.2.1.1 Evidence from entrenchment to one’s own information state 
Evidence for thinking that disagreement is only apparent is supposed to come from 
the so-called entrenchment data: responses like (175) and (176), which are available 
as continuations of the dialogue in (173), and which are supposed to show that the 
second speaker has misunderstood the first (cf., respectively, Schaffer 2011, 213; von 
Fintel and Gillies 2008, 81). 
  
(175) Well look, I just meant that I thought he might be a spy. I didn’t know about 
this hotel’s vetting process. 
(176) Well look, I wasn’t saying that he was a spy. I was just saying that he might 
be. And he might have been one. 
 
How exactly do (175) and (176) show the first speaker has been misunderstood? 
The thought is that with both of these responses a speaker is asserting an epistemic 
possibility proposition involving her past information state. The details of how she 
does this vary from response to response,44 but the important point is that in making 
such an assertion a speaker is supposed to be re-asserting the truth of the proposition 
she originally committed herself to with ((173)a). Her past information state was 
compatible with the concierge’s being a spy. And her interlocutor, whatever he has 
shown, has not shown the opposite. Instead, he has denied some content other than 
the one the speaker committed herself to, as her responses in (175) and (176) 
signify.45 
The evidence from the so-called entrenchment data, if genuine, would prove too 
much. For entrenchment occurs not just in debates about what might be the case but 
also in debates about what can happen. (177) and (178), for example, are exactly 




44 In (175), this past information state is explicitly referenced with the propositional attitude 
vocabulary, and the interpretation of the embedded modal is presumed to be indexed to it. In (176), this 
past state is not explicitly referenced, but the aspectual morpheme is presumed to induce reference to 
some past information state, for which the speaker’s is the obvious contextual choice.  
45 Or, more cautiously, as they purport to signify (cf. Dowell 2011, 11). 
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(177) Well look, I just meant that I thought he could win. I didn’t know about his 
plantar fasciitis. 
(178) Well look, I wasn’t saying that he would win. I was just saying that he 
could. And he could have won. 
 
What is a speaker doing with (177) or (178)? One thing is clear: she is not 
reasserting some epistemic proposition that she originally asserted with ((174)a). For 
while Phelps can win is used to make an ability claim, I thought Phelps could win is 
used to make a propositional attitude claim and Phelps could have won to make a 
counterfactual one. Responses like (177) and (178) thus give us no reason to think 
that genuine disagreement has not occurred in (174). If anything, they give us reason 
to think the exact opposite. For it seems that with (177) and (178), a speaker has 
already implicitly conceded the falsity of her past claim and is choosing instead to 
defend its warrant, or reasonableness, given the information that was available to her. 
This is clearest with the propositional attitude claim, yet also seems to happen with 
the counterfactual one too. (179), for example, makes explicit how asserting a 
counterfactual can play a role in defending a claim as warranted. 
 
(179) Ok, so Phelps can’t win. But he could have won if he hadn’t had plantar 
fasciitis. And I didn’t know that he did.  
 
If entrenchment is used in the case of (174) to defend a past claim not as true, but 
instead as warranted, can we conclude anything about how it is used in the case of 
(173)? By far the simplest hypothesis is that (175) and (176) are used in the same way 
as (177) and (178), allowing for a uniform analysis both of the examples as a whole 
and of the individual constructions that make them up. However, even if we cannot 
rule out the alternative hypothesis that they are not being used in the same way, we 
also cannot rule out the simpler hypothesis either. And this is all that matters for our 
purposes here. The basic point is that a speaker’s appeal to her past information state 
could be used to defend the warrant of her claim, rather than its truth. The so-called 
entrenchment data showcase the ability to make such an appeal, but this ability by 
itself provides no evidence that genuine disagreement has not occurred (cf. also 
MacFarlane 2014, 258–60). 
 
4.2.1.2 Evidence from dismissal of others’ information states  
Better evidence for whether genuine disagreement has occurred is a speaker’s ability 
to dismiss others’ information states as irrelevant to her claim, as with the response to 
the eavesdropper in ((180)c) (cf. Egan 2007; MacFarlane 2011).  
 
(180) [Context: A guest is addressing his friend in the hotel lobby.] 
a. [S1] Everything we know is compatible with that concierge’s being a 
spy. 
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[An eavesdropping hotel guest interjects.] 
b. [S2] No, it’s not! I happen to know this hotel only hires confirmed 
loyalists! 
c. [S1] Hey now, I wasn’t talking about what you know! I was talking 
about what me and my friend do. 
 
With ((180)c), S1 makes clear that her original claim was not about S2’s information 
state, and so is not contradicted by the facts about that state that S2 has presented. S2 
has misunderstood the topic of S1’s claim, and S1 can appropriately dismiss S2’s 
information state as irrelevant to it. The apparent disagreement between them is only 
apparent.  
When it comes to possibility claims, however, a speaker does not seem to have the 
same ability to dismiss others’ information states as irrelevant. The response to the 
eavesdropper in ((181)c) seems to change the topic of the original claim rather than to 
clarify it. 
 
(181) [Context: A guest is addressing his friend in the hotel lobby.] 
a. [S1] That concierge might be a spy. 
 
[Another hotel guest interjects.] 
b. [S2] No, he can’t be! I happen to know this hotel only hires confirmed 
loyalists! 
c. [S1] #Hey now, I wasn’t talking about what might be the case given 
what you know! I was talking about what might be the case given what 
me and my friend do. 
 
Say that, in attempting to defend her claim, a speaker appears to change its topic. 
This would suggest that her interlocutors have not misunderstood her claim in their 
apparent disagreement with it. Say further that the way in which a speaker appears to 
change the topic is by dismissing others’ information states as irrelevant. This would 
suggest that those other states are relevant, and that her interlocutors have certainly 
not misunderstood her claim in virtue of thinking as much. But if a speaker’s 
interlocutors have not misunderstood her claim in their apparent disagreement with it, 
then this would suggest that that disagreement is in fact genuine. Thus, not only do 
the entrenchment data provide us no reason to think that genuine disagreement has 
not occurred, if I am correct, but the dismissal data also provide us reason to think 
that it has.  
Perhaps the apparent topic-changing effect of ((181)c) may be attributed to the 
speaker’s failure to reference any particular group, or their information state, in 
making her original claim. And perhaps subsequent explicit reference to what was left 
implicit will always appear to change the topic of the original claim. If so, one might 
object, then the apparent topic-changing effect that arises from dismissing others’ 
information states as irrelevant in ((181)c) provides us no reason to think that genuine 
disagreement has occurred in (181). 
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This objection is flawed. For it is not in general true that making explicit material 
that had earlier been left implicit has the effect of apparently changing the topic, as 
(182) shows.  
 
(182) [Context: A make-up artist is reporting to a campaign manager.] 
a. [Artist] Your candidate’s ready. 
 
[A speech-writer interjects.] 
b. [Writer] No, she’s not! She’s still making last-minute tweaks to the 
closing! 
c. [Artist] Hey now, I wasn’t talking about whether she was ready for her 
speech! I was talking about whether she was ready for the cameras. 
 
It may be natural in ((182)b) for the speech-writer to interject as she does, given the 
potentially disastrous consequences of the manager’s misunderstanding the artist. 
Still, there is nothing about ((182)c) to suggest that the artist is changing the topic of 
her claim rather than clarifying it. Making explicit a part of content that had earlier 
been implicit does not in general have a topic-changing effect.  
Indeed, it is not clear that there is always even this effect when what is made 
explicit is an information state, as (183) shows. 
 
(183) [Context: A guest is addressing his friend in the hotel lobby.] 
a. [S1] It’s plausible that that concierge is a spy. 
 
[Another hotel guest interjects.] 
b. [S2] No, it’s not! I happen to know this hotel only hires confirmed 
loyalists! 
c. [S1] Hey now, I wasn’t talking about what’s plausible given what you 
know! I was talking about what’s plausible given what me and my 
friend do.  
 
To my ears, at least, ((183)c) does not have the same topic-changing effect that 
((181)c) does. Matters may not be as clear-cut as with ((182)c), but ((183)c) seems 
closer to clarifying the topic than to changing it.46 
The difference between the topic-changing effect for might of dismissing others’ 
information states, and the topic-clarifying effect for plausible of doing so, is even 
more pronounced in examples like (184) and (185).  
 
(184) [Context: A British politician is addressing his fringe, Eurosceptic caucus.] 
a. [Pol.] The prime minister might be a mole for the EU. 
 
 
46 If matters are not as clear-cut, this may be because the relevant group or information state should 
be taken to be part of the intended evaluation matrix for the claim made with ((183)a) and not, unlike 
in ((180)a), as part of its content (cf. Recanati 2007; MacFarlane 2014; Richard 2015). The thought 
would be that, even in specifying the intended evaluation matrix for your claim, you cannot help but 
change its content. But then if this explains any difference between (180) and (183), what explains the 
further difference with (181)? 
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[A government minister bounds onto the stage.] 
b.  [Min.] Rubbish! The prime minister simply cannot be a mole for the 
EU! 
c. [Pol.] #Hey now, I wasn’t talking about whether she might be a mole 
from your standpoint. I was talking about whether she might be one 
from ours. 
 
(185) [Context: A British politician is addressing his fringe, Eurosceptic caucus.] 
a. [Pol.] It’s plausible that the prime minister is a mole for the EU. 
 
[A government minister bounds onto the stage.] 
b.  [Min.] Rubbish! It’s simply not plausible that the prime minister is a 
mole for the EU! 
c. [Pol.] Hey now, I wasn’t talking about whether it’s plausible that she’s a 
mole from your standpoint. I was talking about whether it’s plausible 
that she’s one from ours.47 
 
In both cases, the intended audience for the speaker’s comments is a fringe group that 
finds certain things plausible and/or epistemically possible that the public at large will 
not. Yet in ((184)a), unlike in ((185)a), the speaker’s claim requires him to engage 
with any who would challenge it, even if clearly not part of his intended audience. In 
defending the former, unlike the latter, he does not get to choose whose information 
state is relevant. 
Might, it seems, is thus more similar to can than to plausible. In defending a can-
claim, as in (186), speakers do not get to choose whose information is relevant to it 
either. 
 
(186) [Context: A guest is addressing his friend in the hotel lobby.] 
a. [S1] Phelps can win yet another Olympic medal this year. He’s so good. 
 
[Another hotel guest interjects.] 
b. [S2] No, he can’t! I happen to know that he’s got plantar fasciitis! 
c. [S1] #Hey now, I wasn’t talking about what can happen given what you 
know! I was talking about what can happen given what me and my 
friend do. 
 
In attempting to dictate whose information is relevant, as in (186), a speaker seems to 
change, rather than to clarify, the topic of her original claim. In this case, this is 
obviously because the speaker’s original claim was not about an information state to 
begin with. Thus, information states are relevant to that claim, not in terms of making 
it true, but instead in terms of providing the grounds for determining whether it is. 
And a speaker does not get to choose whose information states may be used to make 
that determination. 
 
47 Alternatives to from {you /our} standpoint include as far as {your/our} information is concerned, 
given {your/our} knowledge base, given what {you/we} know, etc. 
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Now a simple and compelling conclusion to draw is that the case of might is like 
the case of can—that a speaker does not get to choose whose information states are 
relevant because information does not play a metaphysical role in determining the 
truth of a claim but instead an epistemic one.48 However, there is also no lack of 
ingenuity that has been motivated by the unchallenged presupposition of epistemicity. 
So the more conservative conclusion to be drawn from the dismissal data for the time 
is the following: if a might-claim is about information, a speaker seems not to get to 
decide whose information it is about, given the possibility of genuine disagreement 
with potentially anyone about that claim. And this makes the problem of warrant that 
much more difficult than it was to begin with (cf. MacFarlane 2011, 150–52). 
 
4.2.2 Redefining what is required for genuine disagreement 
Several authors have recently made proposals that would skirt the problem of warrant 
altogether by redefining what is required for genuine disagreement (Montminy 2012; 
Huvenes 2015; Khoo 2015). These authors assume that a speaker performs multiple 
speech acts in making a might-claim (cf. Swanson 2006; von Fintel and Gillies 2007; 
Portner 2009, 172–77), and they suggest that disagreement could center around some 
secondary speech act. In this way, hearers’ information states could be relevant to a 
speaker’s claim even if it has as its asserted content a so-called solipsistic proposition: 
a proposition involving only the speaker’s information state. As a result, no problem 
of warrant in cases of genuine disagreement need ever arise. 
As an example of this sort of proposal, consider Huvenes (2015). Huvenes 
suggests that in making a might-claim, a speaker not only asserts that the prejacent is 
compatible with her own information state but also “conveys the advice not to 
overlook the possibility that [the prejacent] is true, and to have a certain positive 
credence in [it]” (2015, 997).49 Disagreement between this person and the person who 
makes a can’t-claim centers around this second speech act, and, specifically, on the 
different credence that each individual places in the prejacent (2015, 991–95). 
Huvenes is correct that there is a sense in which people disagree if they place 
different levels of credence in the same proposition, as in (187), or even if they give 
different advice about the level of credence to place in that proposition, as in (188).50 
 
(187) a.   For me, it’s plausible that that concierge is a spy. 
b. For me, it’s implausible. 
 
 
48 Cf. Bach (2001, 29–30; 2005). 
49 It is striking, by the way, that Huvenes alludes to the possibility that the prejacent is true in 
developing his analysis. On my analysis, a speaker is asserting that there is such a possibility, not 
merely conveying the advice not to overlook it. But so strong is the unchallenged presupposition of 
epistemicity in the literature that authors like Huvenes—and he is not alone—can freely allude to the 
non-epistemic possibilities that would simplify their analysis without actually using them to do so. 
50 Huvenes focuses only on the former sort of disagreement, oddly enough. Indeed, along with most 
authors who advocate a multiple-speech-act proposal, he does not seem to entertain the possibility that 
a speaker who utters can’t-p also performs a secondary speech act, despite suggesting that it is a 
general feature of epistemic modals that they “can be used to perform two distinct speech acts” (2015, 
997). I am not sure what explains this oversight. 
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(188) a.   I advise that we place some credence in that concierge’s being a spy. 
b. I advise that we place none. 
 
However, neither sort of disagreement licenses the standard markers of disagreement 
that we have seen in the modal cases. Inserting a sentence-initial no or you’re wrong 
in ((187)b) or ((188)b) makes each dialogue marked, sometimes quite noticeably so. 
Recognizing this as a problem for his proposal, Huvenes claims that, in the modal 
cases, the disagreement markers could be “targeting” the prejacent. What he has in 
mind can be illustrated with examples like (189) (cf. Huvenes 2015, 995–96). 
 
(189) a.   That concierge might be a spy. 
b. {No / You’re wrong}, the concierge is not a spy. 
 
In (189), the second speaker has denied the proposition that the first speaker claimed 
to be possible. This denial of the prejacent, not the denial of the asserted modal 
content, is what licenses the disagreement markers in (189). Something similar is at 
work in (190), Huvenes proposes. 
 
(190) {No / You’re wrong}, that concierge can’t be spy.  
 
Here the speaker does deny a modal content, though not for Huvenes the same as the 
one that was asserted. Hence, this denial is not what licenses disagreement markers. 
Instead, they are licensed by the denial of the prejacent that is implied in the denial of 
this content. (If the speaker’s knowledge is incompatible with the concierge’s being a 
spy, then, given that knowledge is veridical, it follows that the concierge is not a spy.) 
In (190), as well as in (189), according to Huvenes, the disagreement markers are thus 
licensed because they “target” the prejacent. 
There are two problems with this explanation for when disagreement markers are 
licensed. The first is that it does not make sense of the contrast between (191) and the 
modal cases we have considered so far. 
 
(191) a.   It’s compatible with what I know that that concierge is a spy. 
b. {#No / #You’re wrong}, it’s incompatible with what I know that that 
concierge is a spy. 
 
With (191), we have what Huvenes would take to be the asserted content of the 
speakers’ modal claims in their apparent disagreement in (173) (cf. Huvenes 2015, 
989–90). Yet unlike in that case, in this case disagreement markers are not licensed. 
The explanation of licensing in terms of prejacent-targeting would predict otherwise. 
For in both cases, the content that is allegedly denied entails that the prejacent is not 
true. The prejacent is thus equally “targeted” in both cases by the speaker’s denial.  
The second problem with Huvenes’ explanation is that it does not make sense of 
modal disagreement that goes in the opposite direction, as in (192). 
 
(192) a.   That concierge can’t be a spy. 
b. {No / You’re wrong}, that concierge might be a spy. 




With ((192)b), the content of the speaker’s claim does not entail that the concierge is 
a spy. Nor, if it is about her own knowledge, does it entail that the previous speaker’s 
knowledge must be compatible with the concierge’s being a spy either, contrary to 
what that speaker is alleged to have claimed.51 Hence, there is no clear way in which 
the disagreement markers could be licensed in this case, unless by disagreement about 
a single, non-epistemic modal content. 
A different problem from Huvenes’ for those who would make his same denial is 
not the identification of a secondary speech act that supports disagreement markers 
but rather the derivation of this act from the content of the primary one. Khoo (2015) 
provides an example of this problem, with his suggestion that the relevant secondary 
speech act in making a might-claim is a proposal that it “not be common ground that 
[its] prejacent is false” (2015, 528). In rejecting this proposal by virtue of asserting 
what is not supposed to be presupposed, as in (193), one does indeed find that 
disagreement markers seem to be licensed.  
 
(193) a.   Let’s not presuppose that that concierge is a spy. 
b. {No / ?You’re wrong}, that concierge is a spy. 
 
Yet there is a problem with the derivation of this proposal from an assertion that 
includes an information state as part of its content. For, depending on the information 
state, either that content itself will not license disagreement markers when the 
prejacent is denied, or it will, but will also be able to be denied. 
The problem is best brought out by Khoo’s preferred identification of the relevant 
information state as a group one, which he identifies using the phrase the best 
available evidence (2015, 529–30). The phrase is ambiguous, as Price (1983) points 
out, and as Khoo also notes, but its most natural interpretation is a distributive one, in 
which the best available evidence includes evidence that is available to anyone in the 
group, even if not to everyone. This is the interpretation I take to be prominent in 
(194), and it seems to license disagreement markers when the prejacent is denied.52 
 
(194) a.   It’s compatible with the best available evidence that that concierge is  
not a spy. 
b. {No / You’re wrong}, that concierge is a spy. 
 
However, on this interpretation the speaker who denies the prejacent is also in a 
position to deny the asserted content of the modal claim. So the disagreement markers 
in the modal case could just as well be licensed by disagreement centering on the 
primary speech act itself, the default hypothesis. The alternative interpretation, which 
 
51 This is the explanation that Huvenes proposes for dialogues like (ii), in which there is no 
disagreement with the prejacent of the first speaker’s claim, but in fact the opposite (2015, 1004–5). 
 
(ii) a.   That concierge can’t be a spy. 
b.  {No / You’re wrong}, he is a spy. 
 
52 If it does not, then the problems facing Khoo are at once more immediate and yet also easily 
inferred from the ones I describe below. 
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Khoo intends, is a collective one, and is made more prominent by phrases like the 
shared evidence or the publicly available facts. On this interpretation, however, 
disagreement markers are not licensed when the prejacent is denied, as (195) shows.  
 
(195) a.   It’s compatible with {our shared evidence / the publicly available facts} 
that that concierge is not a spy. 
b. {#No / #You’re wrong}, that concierge is a spy.53 
 
The point about disagreement markers is even clearer when the proposition asserted is 
a solipsistic one, as in (196). 
 
(196) a.   It’s compatible with my evidence that that concierge is not a spy. 
b. {#No / #You’re wrong}, that concierge is a spy. 
 
The problem facing Khoo is that both might-claims and compatibility claims 
should give rise to the proposal whose rejection—via denial of the prejacent—he 
takes to license disagreement markers (cf. Khoo 2015, 528–31). Yet while denial of 
the prejacent always licenses disagreement markers in the former case, in the latter it 
does so only when the speaker could disagree with the asserted content of the claim 
itself. Why is this? The simplest explanation is that in both cases the disagreement 
markers are licensed by disagreement with the asserted content itself, rather than by 
rejection of the proposal, or secondary speech act. 
There may well be disagreement, as both Khoo and Huvenes propose, that centers 
around a secondary speech act performed in making a might-claim. There is no 
evidence, however, that that sort of disagreement licenses the same disagreement 
markers in all the same cases that disagreement with a might-claim does. In fact, there 
is every evidence to the contrary. Perhaps some proposal can be developed to avoid 
this mismatch. Until then, the simplest explanation for it is the one suggested above. 
To summarize: in the apparent disagreement dialogue in (173), there is no clear 
evidence that genuine disagreement has not occurred, and also no clear evidence that 
it has centered around some secondary speech act. But if genuine disagreement has 
occurred, and if a speaker’s interlocutors have not misunderstood her in thinking their 
information states relevant to her claim, then the speaker’s warrant for making that 
claim is unclear. For any of a speaker’s interlocutors, even her unintended ones, can 
disagree with her claim solely on the basis of their own information state (and without 
having to have any beliefs about hers). Thus, if the speaker’s claim includes some sort 
of information state as part of its content, this gives the speaker’s claim far wider 




53 Perhaps you hear the disagreement markers in ((195)b) as acceptable. If so, be careful that you 
are not interpreting phrases like the shared evidence as everything known to any one of us but instead 
as anything known to every one of us. 
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4.3 Other attempted epistemic solutions to the puzzle 
4.3.1 Denying the problem of warrant 
Some theorists have maintained that—on closer inspection—there is no special 
problem of warrant that arises from taking an information state to be part of the 
content of a might-claim. Yanovich (2014), for example, argues that what is required 
to be warranted in asserting that it might be that p is the same as what is required to 
be warranted in asserting that p: namely, to think that one is “as good an authority” on 
whether p as anyone else (2014, 78–80). However, pace Yanovich, the two cases are 
clearly not the same on an epistemic analysis of might. 
To assert that p, you must assume that you have a reasonably justified opinion 
about a settled matter. To assert that no one’s information rules out that p—which is 
what you are doing if you are making a claim about information to which potentially 
anyone’s information might be relevant (cf. Yanovich 2014, 78–80)—you must 
assume that no one has such an opinion. But often this assumption will not be 
warranted when you are agnostic about a matter, even though asserting that it might 
be that p will be. In the case of the concierge, for example, the first hotel guest need 
not assume that the second guest could have no privileged information in order to be 
justified in asserting that the concierge might be a spy, or even that he is. Yet he 
would need to make such an assumption if he claimed that their joint information did 
not rule out that the concierge was a spy. Asserting that p and asserting that it might 
be that p may indeed be equivalent in their requirements for warrant, as Yanovich 
suggests, but they would not be so if the modal claim were about information. 
I should add, for what it is worth, that Yanovich distinguishes his particular 
epistemic analysis, which he labels practical contextualism, from an analysis that he 
labels group contextualism (2014, 69–82). On the former, the modal claim is 
supposed to be that no relevant piece of information rules out the prejacent; on the 
latter, that no information of anyone in the relevant group does. Yanovich claims that 
only on practical contextualism is the warrant for making a modal claim the same as 
for asserting its prejacent. On group contextualism, the warrant for the modal claim is 
supposed to be assuming that you are as good an authority as anyone else on your 
group’s information state (2014, 78–82). 
As far as I can tell, Yanovich’s reason for thinking practical contextualism escapes 
the problem of warrant facing group contextualism is that it references information 
without referencing whose information it is (cf. the definition of knowledge in 
Yanovich 2014, 77). If this is correct, it is also irrelevant. For if I claim that no 
relevant piece of information rules out that p, and I allow that relevant pieces of 
information are able to be contributed by my interlocutors, then I must assume that 
my interlocutors have no privileged pieces of information just as much as if I had 
made a claim about our group’s information. So the problem of warrant persists no 
matter what epistemic contextualist analysis we adopt.  
 
4.3.2 Redefining what is required for warrant 
4.3.2.1 Cloudy contextualism 
Some authors have proposed that the solution to the problem of warrant is to redefine 
what is required for it. One example of such a proposal can be found in von Fintel and 
Gillies (2011). These authors, you will recall, argue that the discourse context does 
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not typically provide a single, determinate context of evaluation for the interpretation 
of a might-claim. Instead, it leaves open a range of information states that could be 
relevant, and the might-claim is thus made against a “cloud of admissible [evaluation] 
contexts” delineated by these states (von Fintel and Gillies 2011, 117–24). Given this 
indeterminacy about the relevant state, the requirements for warranted might-claims 
are not the same as for claims made against a single, determinate evaluation context. 
Instead, a claim that may permissibly be interpreted as being about an information 
state on which the speaker does not have authority to pronounce can be warranted just 
as long as it may also permissibly be interpreted as being about an information state 
on which she does have the authority to pronounce—for example, her own.  
von Fintel and Gillies’ solution to the problem of warrant does not seem promising 
to me, for three reasons. First, the solution rests upon the assumption that a speaker’s 
claim may permissibly be interpreted as being exclusively about her own information 
state, as the entrenchment data from Section 4.2.1.1 is supposed to have shown. Yet 
that interpretation of the data has been called into question here. Further the dismissal 
data in fact seem to have shown the exact opposite. But then why think that the only 
warrant required for a speaker to make a claim is that she takes some interpretation 
which that claim cannot have to be true? 
Second, what creates the problem of warrant is the combination of an assumption 
and an observation. The assumption is that might-claims are to be interpreted as de re 
claims about information states. The unexpected observation, given this assumption, 
is that hearers systematically and appropriately tend to assess might-claims on the 
basis of their own information states. From this observation comes the problem of 
warrant. How could speakers ever be warranted in making claims about these states? 
In response, von Fintel and Gillies propose that claims that systematically and 
permissibly receive one interpretation are warranted (only) on the basis of another. 
But this is unnecessary. Better to drop the assumption that makes the observation 
unexpected in the first place than to try to accommodate it in this way. 
By way of analogy, consider the case of can-claims, which hearers also tend to 
systematically and appropriately assess on the basis of their own information states, 
or on the basis of the sets of circumstances they believe to obtain. If we took such 
claims to be de re claims about those sets, we would also have a problem, given these 
assessment facts, of how speakers could ever be warranted in making such claims. 
We could, in response, adopt a von Fintel and Gillies style account of warrant. In this 
case, however, it is clear that the problem is only apparent: that it is generated entirely 
by the de re assumption and is best addressed by that assumption’s being abandoned. 
The same holds, if I am correct, in the previous case too. The von Fintel and Gillies 
solution is as needlessly complicated a way to make sense of the warrant for might-
claims as it is for can-claims. 
A third and final issue with von Fintel and Gillies’ solution to the problem of 
warrant is that it implies a level of intentionality on the part of speakers that is 
implausible. To see this, it will help to first consider the case of quantificational 
claims, which von Fintel and Gillies suggest may also be made against a cloud of 
admissible evaluation contexts (2011, 123–24). 
With quantificational claims, there does not seem to be the systematic mismatch 
between hearer-assigned interpretations and speaker-warranted ones that there 
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allegedly is for might-claims.54 Yet sometimes there can be such a mismatch, and it 
can be exploited as a way of gaining information (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2011, 
123–24). For example, consider a professor who knows (i) that every student in good 
standing was at last night’s department party and (ii) that Alex and Billy, who have 
been in bad standing, were not. What this professor does not know is (iii) whether 
Alex and Billy have continued on in the program despite their bad standing. Believing 
it would be impolite to ask directly, this professor utters (197) to the administrative 
assistant, knowing he has all the relevant records and will interpret (197) as (198), 
whereas the professor only has warrant for (199). 
 
(197) Every student was at last night’s department party.  
(198) Every registered student was at last night’s department party. 
(199) Every student in good standing was at last night’s department party. 
 
This mismatch between the hearer-assigned interpretation and the speaker-warranted 
one is just what the professor wants. For she knows that, given this mismatch, she 
will be able to discretely gain the desired information about Alex and Billy, however 
the department assistant responds.55 And she knows too that, if the assistant disagrees 
with her claim, she can defend it by appealing to (199) as her intended interpretation 
for (197). 
If von Fintel and Gillies are correct, then the sort of intentionality on display in the 
above example is on display with almost any might-claim. For there is a systematic 
mismatch, on their view, between the hearer-assigned interpretation of such claims 
and the speaker-warranted ones. Speakers further seem to actively exploit this 
mismatch on their view: they make might-claims “based just on [their] own evidence 
but … [use them] as a probe or test or trial balloon into the hearer’s evidence” (von 
Fintel and Gillies 2011, 123). And this, it seems to me, is just implausible. Speakers 
do not display the same level of intentionality in making might-claims that the 
professor does in uttering (197).  
Even if they did, this level of intentionality would be misplaced. Say my ultimate 
concern is with whether the concierge is a spy. On von Fintel and Gillies’ view, 
uttering (200), and exploiting the fact that it has no determinate interpretation in the 
discourse context, helps me attain my end. For I both express my own information 
state and probe other states on which I have no warrant to pronounce, thereby gaining 
useful information that moves me closer to what I am ultimately concerned to know. 
 
(200) That concierge might be a spy. 
 
 
54 This by itself reinforces the criticism that von Fintel and Gillies have made the wrong choice in 
accounting for the warrant for might-claims. There is nothing problematic with the view that a claim 
may sometimes be warranted on the basis of an interpretation other than the one a hearer permissibly 
and appropriately assigns it. Yet to have to posit this mismatch on a systematic basis suggests that 
something in the analysis has gone awry. 
55 If the assistant agrees with her, then she will know that Alex and Billy have both left the 
program. And if he disagrees, stating that either Alex or Billy, or both, were not there, then she will 
know that either none or only one of them have left. 
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Yet in uttering either (201) or (202), I will also manage in many contexts to do both 
these things. I will make the determinate claim about my own information state that I 
do in (201) as a way of asking the determinate question about your information state 
that I ask with (202), and vice versa.  
 
(201) I don’t know whether that concierge is a spy. 
(202) Do you know whether that concierge is a spy? 
 
Nothing at all seems to be gained by the alleged indeterminacy of (200).56 
To summarize: an obvious objection to von Fintel and Gillies’ solution to the 
problem of warrant is that it assumes that speakers’ might-claims may permissibly be 
interpreted as being exclusively about their own information states. And this 
assumption, I have argued, is undermined by the dismissal data. But even if one does 
not accept this argument, von Fintel and Gillies’ solution faces serious other problems 
which suggest a lack of fit with the data. A different solution to the problem of 
warrant is required. 
 
4.3.2.2 Relativism 
An alternative solution to the problem of warrant—and the final epistemic solution to 
the puzzle about disagreement with which we began—is the relativist one (Egan et al. 
2005; Egan 2007; Stephenson 2007; MacFarlane 2011; 2014). For relativists, you will 
recall, a speaker’s might-claim does not include an information state as part of its 
content but instead has a truth value that is determined relative to assessment contexts 
individuated by information states. Since information states differ, and a prejacent 
will be compatible with the content of some but not others, a single claim may thus 
have different truth values at different assessment contexts for relativists. 
Removing information states from content in the relativist way is supposed to 
explain how a speaker could ever be warranted in making a claim to which potentially 
anyone’s information state could be relevant. Since the claim’s truth value is 
relativized to assessment contexts that are individuated by information states, 
anyone’s information state will naturally be relevant to it. And if a claim is false at 
someone’s context, then she should reject that claim and express her disagreement 
with it.57 However, as long as the claim is true at the speaker’s context, and he 
justifiably believes it to be so, he would seem to be warranted in making it (cf. Egan 
et al. 2005, 153; MacFarlane 2011, 160–61; 2014, 255). For what you justifiably 
believe to be true, you are generally warranted in asserting. And this, in sum, is the 
relativist solution to the problem of warrant. 
On the whole, I think the relativist is closer to the truth than any of the other 
theorists we have considered so far. As relativists suggest, we should not take 
information states to be part of the content of might-claims. Yet we should not take 
such claims to have truth values determined relative to such states either, contrary to 
what relativists suggest. It is one thing to hold that a speaker assesses a claim to be 
 
56 There are exceptions, as when a prejacent is not the potential answer to a polar question but 
instead a wh-one. These exceptions are what von Fintel and Gillies focus on in developing their theory. 
57 For further discussion of relativist disagreement, and why it is important that it center on the 
truth-value of the claim rather than of its content, cf. Richard (2015). 
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true, given his information state, and another altogether to hold that that claim is true 
at a context of assessment individuated by that information state.58 Nothing pushes us 
to the latter in accounting for a speaker’s warrant for a might-claim except the 
unchallenged presupposition of its epistemicity, as is perhaps expressed most clearly 
in MacFarlane (2011)’s statement of the “paradox” facing contextualism: 
 
[A]lthough the truth of a claim made using epistemic modals must depend 
somehow on what is known—that is what makes it “epistemic”—it does not 
seem to depend on any particular body of knowledge (2011, 155).59 
 
Given this unchallenged presupposition, the otherwise promising relativist solution to 
the problem of warrant turns out to be no solution at all. Let me explain. 
In removing some alleged truth-conditional contributor from content to the 
evaluation matrix, relativists are not proposing that speakers are blind to the truth-
conditional dependence of their claims on that contributor. In fact, quite the opposite 
(cf., a.o., Egan et al. 2005, 158; MacFarlane 2014, 255). For relativists, speakers 
recognize that their might-claims are true at their assessment contexts in virtue of 
their information states being a certain way; that their taste-claims are true at their 
assessment context in virtue of their standards of taste being a certain way; etc. But 
speakers also recognize that these claims could be false at their interlocutors’ 
assessment contexts in virtue of their interlocutors having different information states, 
standards of taste, etc. (cf. Stephenson 2007, 508–11).  
This recognition need not by itself affect the claims that speakers are willing to 
make. In claiming that tempeh is tasty, even while recognizing that this claim may be 
false at your assessment context, I could hope—if it turns out to be so—to register the 
difference between our assessment contexts, to make your context more like my own, 
etc. What should affect a speaker’s willingness to make a claim, however, is the 
recognition that their own assessment contexts could very easily change, such that a 
claim true at their earlier context would be false at a later one. Given such a change, 
that claim would have to be retracted, given that the operative assessment context for 
evaluating one’s own claims is always the current one for a speaker (MacFarlane 
2014, chaps. 5.4, 5.7). 
The mere possibility of having to later retract a claim should not by itself prevent a 
speaker from making it. However, as MacFarlane suggests, a high likelihood that one 
will immediately have to do so should (2011, 161, fn. 11).60 And while one’s tastes 
are not likely to change in an instant, one’s information state is (especially in 
conversation, where information exchange is often the goal). Speakers should thus 
 
58 Information states play the former role, but they do not seem to play the latter. I can terminate 
interminable debate about whether it is plausible that p by saying, well look, it’s plausible for me. I 
cannot terminate interminable debate about whether it is possible that p by saying, well look, it’s 
possible for me. Information affects whether I assess a possibility claim to be true. It does not make 
that assessment so. 
59 Similar unquestioned presuppositions of epistemicity are to be found in other relativists, 
including Egan et al. (2005, 133) and Stephenson (2007, 487). 
60 It is worth noting that MacFarlane makes this suggestion, after having claimed that relativism 
avoids the problem of warrant, in an apparent concession to the fact that it might not so 
straightforwardly do so. 
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recognize a high likelihood that immediate retraction will be required for almost any 
might-claim they may make, and so should avoid making such claims, unless they 
presume that their claim is also true at their interlocutors’ assessment contexts. Yet 
given such a presumption, speakers could just as well have made a claim about their 
and their interlocutors’ joint information state. And it was precisely a problem of how 
speakers could typically have warrant for such a claim that relativism was trying—but 
seems equally unable—to avoid. 
This last claim will seem counterintuitive. But I am not claiming that relativism 
about every domain will face the same problems of warrant that contextualism about 
that domain may. Rather, I am making this claim only for allegedly epistemic modal 
claims. In this case, in my opinion, the problem of warrant arises from the assumption 
of epistemicity rather than from contextualism itself. The problem with relativism, as 
with cloudy contextualism, is not necessarily the general framework, but instead its fit 
with the specific data. 
Say, however, that you are unconvinced that the relativist solution to the problem 
of warrant is no solution at all. There would still be serious difficulties with it.  
Here is a first difficulty. Some might-claims seem unwarranted: e.g., the one made 
with (203) (the style of example and general line of criticism are due to Dietz 2008). 
 
(203) Mathematicians all agree that Fermat’s Last Theorem has been proved. But 
I don’t believe them. I can’t follow their proofs at all. That theorem might 
very well be false!  
 
Yet relative to the assessment context of its speaker, a so-called “ignorant assessor”, 
it would seem the might-claim made with (203) could both be true and justifiably 
believed to be so. Hence, the claim would be warranted. And yet it clearly does not 
seem to be so. 
MacFarlane’s response to this difficulty is to suggest that the relevant information 
state in a given assessment context need not always be the assessor’s (2011, 175–76). 
If, for example, the relevant state for the ignorant assessor’s context for (203) was the 
derided mathematicians’, then the claim made with (203) would not be warranted. 
This response may seem unprincipled, but MacFarlane contends that it is not. For 
what determines the relevant information state for an assessment context in any given 
case, he claims, are the features of that context (2011, 176–77). In particular, 
MacFarlane seems to suggest that the assessor’s interests in that context—whether 
simply “to guide her own inquiry” or instead to “determine whether [someone else] 
might be a trustworthy source of information”—are what determines the relevant 
information state (2011, 176–77). The former sort of interest, MacFarlane suggests, 
may make only the assessor’s information state relevant, while the latter may make 
others’ so.61 
 
61 MacFarlane’s suggestion has recently been formalized as sensitivity to the question under 
discussion, or QUD (cf. Beddor and Egan 2018). For these authors, as well as for MacFarlane and 
Dietz, the primary focus with ignorant assessors is their assessment of others’ modal claims, rather 
than their production of their own. This leads to slightly different issues from the issues of warrant I 
am considering here, but the general problems I have raised, and will raise, carry over. (They also carry 
over from MacFarlane to Beddor and Egan too.) 
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There are two problems with this suggestion. The first is that (203)’s speaker may 
have the sort of interests for which MacFarlane suggests only his own information 
state need be relevant in the assessment context. For example, he may continue on 
with (204). 
 
(204) I guess it’s time to crack open my algebra books and construct a counter-
proof! 
 
Perhaps MacFarlane would say that others’ information states could also be relevant 
for this inquiry-guiding interest too, but this brings us to the second, more general 
problem. For MacFarlane has not said how it is that an assessor’s interests determine 
the relevant information state for her assessment context. Is this determination 
subjective? Or is it objective, and something about which a speaker can be mistaken? 
Neither option is very promising. With the former, it is not clear why an ignorant 
assessor could not always maintain that it is her own information state that is relevant 
in her assessment context. With the latter, it is not clear how we would be justified in 
thinking that we know whose information state our interests determined to be relevant 
in our context. The former option leaves us with too many warranted claims, the latter 
with too few.62 
Here is a second difficulty. MacFarlane explains the retraction of a warranted 
claim in terms of its falsity at the speaker’s current state, not his prior one (cf. 
MacFarlane 2014, 256). Yet he also allows that retraction can sometimes be resisted 
despite a change in information state (2014, 258–60). MacFarlane does not give an 
example of what such resistance would look like, but from the context it seems that a 
response like (205) would be a good candidate. 
 
(205) I stand by my claim. That concierge might have been a spy. 
 
Now it is not clear to me that (205) should be understood as a refusal to retract, but it 
is also not clear that MacFarlane has any other option. For he does not want to 
interpret the claim made with the second sentence as an implicit epistemic 
counterfactual (2014, 253). And it is not clear for MacFarlane how a non-epistemic 
counterfactual could be relevant to the speaker’s standing by her claim. Hence, 
MacFarlane is left to interpret (205) as being used to make a claim about the 
speaker’s past information state (2014, 258–60, 271–72), and as implying that the 
original might-claim was a pragmatically enriched claim about that same state too 
(2014, 258–60, 271–75). Retraction is resisted because that pragmatically-enriched 
claim was an assessment-invariant one.  
Such pragmatic enrichment is common, MacFarlane holds, and should not give us 
pause. I am less sure. There seems a fundamental difference between enrichment that 
merely changes the content of a claim and enrichment that changes whether a claim 
has an assessment-variant truth value or instead an assessment-invariant one. 
However, the point can be waived. For what should give us pause is that when a 
 
62 With this latter option, we might also just as well make an unmediated appeal to an objective 
relation and eliminate the relativization of truth to information-state-individuated assessment contexts 
altogether.  
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speaker can apparently resist retraction with (205), it seems that she could just as well 
have chosen to retract with a sentence like (206), something for which MacFarlane 
argues assessment-variant claims are required (2014, 260). 
 
(206) Ok, I guess I was wrong. That concierge can’t be a spy.  
 
If this is correct, then it will often be indeterminate whether a speaker has made an 
assessment-variant claim or rather an assessment-invariant one. But it is unsatisfying, 
to say the least, to have to posit such an indeterminacy in order to explain the mutual 
availability of both responses. At this point, the original explanation of warrant and 
retraction in terms of assessment-sensitivity begins to seem otiose and baroque. Better 
simply to hold that, with the first response, the speaker stands by the warrant for her 
claim but not its truth. But for the claim to have been warranted, without having been 
true, we require it to have had a content with non-epistemic truth conditions.63 
The source of these and other difficulties for relativists is their unchallenged 
presupposition of epistemicity, and the assumption it generates that the warrant for a 
claim that comes from an information state is to be explained in terms of the truth of 
the claim at that state. Without linking warrant to truth in this way, we can simply 
hold that a warranted claim is one that a speaker could reasonably (even if 
inaccurately) have believed to be true, while an unwarranted one she could only have 
unreasonably (even if accurately) believed to be so. We do not need to adopt a special 
theory of warrant that first relativizes the truth of might-claims to information-state-
individuated assessment contexts only to then allow variability not only in the 
information states that individuate an assessment context (MacFarlane 2014, 260–61) 
but also in the relativization of claims to assessment contexts at all (cf. MacFarlane 
2014, 258–60). 
 
4.4 Dissolving the puzzle on a non-epistemic analysis 
On a non-epistemic analysis of might, disagreement about what might be the case is 
in principle much the same as disagreement about what can happen. Both are 
disagreement about the possibilities and potentials there are, given the circumstances. 
What is required for disagreement about circumstantial modalities to be genuine? 
One thing that does not seem to be required is for those who disagree to have 
complete and accurate beliefs about the circumstances. In much the same way, 
complete and accurate beliefs about laws are not required for there to be genuine 
disagreement about what is legally permissible or obligatory, and complete and 
accurate beliefs about the composition of some domain are not required for there to 
be genuine disagreement about what is true of all or some or none of its members.  
 
63 Wright (2007, 272–75; 2008, 177–82), who is also skeptical of the explanation of warrant in 
terms of truth, wonders how you could ever move from a claim’s being warranted, given its speaker’s 
information state, to its being true at an assessment context individuated by that information state. 
What does truth at this original context buy us, he wonders, given that warranted claims often turn out 
untrue? The answer, if we accept truth-conditional dependence on information states, is that this 
assessment-sensitivity buys us the very warrant for those claims in the first place! The question is still 
on point, however, and suggests that we should simply reject such truth-conditional dependence. Truth 
at the original assessment context is an idle wheel. 
Chapter Four: Applying the Analysis to Modal Disagreement 
78 
 
Incomplete or inaccurate beliefs about any of these things will often be 
accompanied by correct de re beliefs—about what the propositions believed to be the 
circumstances or the laws leave open or close off, for example. But while these de re 
beliefs certainly help to explain why speakers make the claims they do, I see no 
reason to think that they provide the content or the intended truth conditions of those 
claims.64 Instead, when speakers recognize the inaccuracy or incompleteness of the 
relevant beliefs which formed the basis for their claim, it is perfectly natural for them 
to respond by retracting that claim, as in (207) or (208). 
 
(207) a.   [S1] John can win this morning’s race. 
b.  [S2] Actually, he got stoned last night.  
c.  [S1] Oh, I didn’t realize that. I guess I was wrong then. He can’t win. 
 
(208) a.   [S1] All the registered runners are here. 
b.  [S2] Actually, we had two more runners register just last night. 
c. [S1] Oh, I didn’t realize that. I guess I was wrong then. Not all the 
registered runners are here.  
 
Genuine disagreement is thus not threatened by speakers’ different information, I 
conclude. Yet it is threatened by speakers’ different intentions. Imagine, for example, 
that a young David Lewis utters (209) to his friends as he pores over an anatomy 
book, and that his parents, overhearing, interject with (210) (cf. Lewis 1976, 150). 
 
(209) I can speak Finnish, you know. 
(210) Don’t listen to him. He can’t. He quit taking lessons less than half a month 
in. 
 
Here there is no genuine disagreement. For Lewis had a specific type of 
circumstances in mind in making his modal claim. And he could make his intended 
meaning clear, and resolve the apparent disagreement, by uttering (211). 
 
(211) Given my anatomy, I can speak Finnish, or any human language for that 
matter. 
 
Genuine disagreement about a circumstantial modal claim requires agreement about 
the intended modal background (whether specific or generic). It does not require 
agreement about the modal base. 
Intentions are not always clear, whether from the context or to the speaker herself. 
Sometimes it may thus be difficult to tell whether disagreement is genuine or instead 
only apparent. Further difficulty may arise if intentions that are clear to a speaker 
appear to be in conflict with context (cf. Dowell 2011).65 There may then be meta-
 
64 Indeed, the results of thinking as much are distinctly bizarre. For example, in the case of the 
laws, the result would be that the only genuine disagreement is precisely the sort of interpretive 
disagreement for which we might think there may be no single correct answer. 
65 While discourse contexts do not determine unique sets of circumstances for contents of modal 
claims to be evaluated against (cf. Ch. 3.3.1), it is not implausible to think they constrain admissible 
ones (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2011).  
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level disagreement that masquerades as object-level disagreement. That said, I see no 
reason to think that the opacity of intentions threatens the possibility of genuine 
disagreement in every single case. Instead, in most cases where speakers have not 
referenced a specific type of circumstances in making a modal claim, it is safe to 
assume that they are talking about the possibilities and potentials left open by 
circumstances in general. This seems to be the locus of genuine disagreement.  
How could such disagreement ever be warranted, it might be wondered? For 
speakers could never be warranted in thinking that they know what all the 
circumstances are. Yet nor could speakers ever typically be warranted in thinking that 
they know what all the state’s laws are. But this does not prevent the possibility of 
warranted (and genuine) disagreement about what the state’s laws leave open. What 
is required for warrant in both cases is a reasonable, defeasible assumption that one 
knows the relevant laws and/or circumstances.66 This assumption will not always be 
reasonable, and speakers will not always have warrant for the relevant claims, as 
(212) and (213) show. 
 
(212) I can’t say whether Phelps can win. I know he’s been making a lot of visits 
to his doctor recently, but I don’t know what for.  
(213) I can’t say whether you can shoot pigeons during hunting season. I know 
it’s been legalized in Michigan, but with restrictions on who can obtain a 
license. 
 
Yet while a speaker should always concede that there may be relevant laws and 
circumstances that she is unaware of, generally for her claim to lack warrant she will 
need positive reason to think there are such. (Or she will need the possibility she 
implicitly recognizes to be explicitly raised; cf. Lewis 1976, 354–55; 1996, 559–67.) 
Sometimes there will be such reason, but not always, and so a speaker may often 
assume warrant by default. 
This account of warrant, it might be protested, is available to epistemic theorists 
just as well as to myself. For we could say that all that is required for warrant is a 
reasonable, defeasible assumption that the known laws and circumstances leave open 
a possibility, and that, while such an assumption may not always be reasonable, in 
general it will be. For generally a person will not have any reason to think she is in a 
worse position than everyone else, so that the known laws and circumstances are 
somehow unknown to her.  
This protestation rests on an equivocation (cf. also the previous discussions of 
Khoo 2015; Yanovich 2014). If by known, all that we mean is commonly known or 
publicly available, then, yes, there is no special problem of warrant. But there will 
also be many cases where disagreement is not genuine either, as with the responses in 
(214) and (215), where one of the interlocutors has privileged access to uncommon 
knowledge. 
 
(214) You can’t have known this, but I’m that concierge’s father. And I can 
assure you, he simply can’t be a spy. He’s far too trusting and naïve for that. 
 
66 Most laws and circumstances will be relevant for relatively few modal claims. 
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(215) You can’t have known this, but I’m Phelps’ doctor. And I can assure you, 
he simply can’t win a medal. His recent injury’s far too serious for that. 
 
If such privileged access does not seem to threaten genuine disagreement, as I think it 
does not, then we have to interpret known as meaning something like known by 
anyone (cf. MacFarlane 2011, 150–52) And here more is required for warrant than is 
required in the non-epistemic case. Instead of needing positive reason to think that my 
information is relevantly incomplete, I now need positive reason to think it complete. 
By incorporating reference to knowledge into my modal claim, I thus incur a higher 
justificatory burden, just as I do in choosing to utter (217) rather than (216). 
 
(216) That concierge is a spy. 
(217) I know that that concierge is a spy. 
 
I conclude, then, that while an epistemic analysis of might does not readily make 
sense of genuine and warranted disagreement about what might be the case, a non-
epistemic one can do so, and as readily as it makes sense of such disagreement about 
what can happen.67 
 
4.5 Truth-value judgments on a non-epistemic analysis 
4.5.1 Truth-value judgments and the evaluation matrix 
I have focused in this chapter on discourse-internal disagreement. However, there is 
also a sort of disagreement that is discourse-external, and that has created problems 
for standard epistemic analyses of might too. This is disagreement in truth-value 
judgments made outside of—but elicited by—a given discourse context (cf. Egan et 
al. 2005; Egan 2007; MacFarlane 2011; 2014). The basic problem is that such 
judgments can seem to conflict, while also all seeming appropriate. Following Knobe 
and Yalcin (2014), I will call this the problem of extra-contextual assessments.  
The problem can be illustrated with a case from DeRose (1991). John has 
symptoms indicative of cancer. Tests have been run which rule out that possibility. 
John’s wife, Jane, knows that the test results are available to his doctor, but she does 
not know yet what they are. In their separate discourse contexts, Jane and the doctor 
respectively utter (218) and (219), and we as theorists want to maintain that each has 
said something true. 
 
 
67 The two cases are not completely parallel, of course, for the possibilities that we express with 
might are not completely parallel to the potentials that we express with can either (cf. Chapters 6 and 
7). In particular, the progression of time and the accumulation of circumstances will affect what 
potentials there are, but it will rarely affect the status as a non-trivial possibility of a previously settled 
proposition. Additionally, relative to the total current circumstances, a settled proposition can only be a 
trivial possibility. Yet the total current circumstances are evidence of past potentials, not necessarily 
current ones, and so there is not the same threat of triviality here, especially insofar as potentials can 
exist unrealized. The atemporality and potential triviality of the possibilities expressed by might can 
make them seem less objective, and so can make disagreement about them seem less objective too. Yet 
this is no reason to think that genuine disagreement cannot occur. What is key is to recognize that 
speakers’ claims are generally to be interpreted as claims that a prejacent is a non-trivial possibility, 
given circumstances in general, and that disagreement centers on whether this is so. 
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(218) John might have cancer. 
(219) John can’t have cancer. 
 
From this starting point, imagine that a nurse reports to the doctor what Jane has said. 
The doctor responds by uttering (220), seemingly appropriately, we as theorists also 
want to maintain. 
 
(220) I know that Jane has different evidence than we do. And I know that her 
evidence is compatible with John’s being contagious. Still, what she has 
said is false. John cannot be contagious. 
 
Yet if Jane and the doctor have both said something true, then how could the doctor 
also appropriately say that what Jane has said is false? 
The answer to this question is simple. When a proposition is asserted, we judge the 
truth of the assertion by looking to the context in which it was made. We look to see 
whether the asserted proposition is true at the evaluation matrix determined either in 
or by that context. But not all truth-value judgments are about the assertion. Instead, 
some are judgments about the asserted proposition itself, and abstract away from the 
context in which it was asserted. This seems to be the explanation for the apparently 
(but not genuinely) conflicting truth-value judgments in (221) and (222). 
 
(221) [Context: King Leonidas addresses his compatriots at Thermopylae] 
The Athenian poets used to complain that no Spartan had ever contributed 
to the Panhellenic defense. Those poets said something true: no Spartan had 
done so. But today, thanks to your efforts, what they’ve said is now false. 
 
(222) Our suffragette forebears used to remonstrate that no woman had ever been 
elected to national office. Our forebears said something true. No woman 
ever had been elected. But today, in this historic year of women, what 
they’ve said is now false. Over fifty women have been elected! 
 
If I am correct, this is also the explanation for the apparently conflicting truth-value 
judgments in the modal case. Some are judgments of the assertion itself, while others 
are judgments of the asserted proposition that abstract away from the context in 
which it was asserted and evaluate it at the current context. 
Note that the crucial distinction in this explanation is between the assertion itself 
and the asserted proposition. It is not a distinction between different propositions that 
may be asserted in the use of a single sentence: for example, a sentence like (223). 
 
(223) I’m hungry. 
 
If John’s utterance of (223) is reported to Mary, then it is simply incoherent for her to 
respond with (224). 
 
(224) John said something true. But what he has said is false. For I’m not hungry. 
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Thus, the appearance of conflicting truth-value judgments seen in the cases above 
cannot be attributed to different propositions being asserted in the different uses of a 
sentence (cf. MacFarlane 2014, 8–11; MacFarlane cites Kölbel 2002, 39). Instead, it 
must be attributed to a difference between judgements about an assertion and about 
the asserted proposition. 
In the modal case, this explanation reinforces the conclusion from the previous 
chapter that the modal base should be removed, from the asserted proposition, to the 
evaluation matrix against which that proposition is evaluated. It is this removal that 
makes it possible for judgments about the truth of an assertion of a modal proposition 
at a given context to not automatically determine judgments about the truth of the 
asserted proposition at another. For the asserted proposition has no absolute truth 
value at the evaluation world. 
If we adopted an epistemic analysis of might, I do not see how we could avoid this 
conclusion about the modal base, given examples like the one above. For Jane’s claim 
clearly has a limited scope, and the doctor seems not to have misunderstood this 
scope either. Yet if both these things are true, and if Jane’s claim also included her 
evidence, or information state, as part of its content, then that content would have a 
uniform truth value at evaluation matrices within the actual world. Hence, either the 
claim made by Jane with (218), or the claim made by the doctor with (220), would 
have to be false. And neither seems to be so.  
For perspective, contrast the modal case with another case of context-sensitivity. 
Imagine that Jane and the doctor live in different towns, and that each makes a true 
claim about their own town by uttering (225) and (226) in their respective discourse 
contexts.  
 
(225) The local bars serve caviar. 
(226) The local bars do not serve caviar. 
 
If a nurse subsequently reports to the doctor what Jane has said, (227) does not seem 
at all appropriate for that doctor to utter, but instead evinces confusion or intentional 
obtuseness. 
 
(227) I know that Jane lives in a different town than I do. And I know that the 
local bars in her town serve caviar. Still, what she has said is false. The 
local bars do not serve caviar.  
 
There is a real problem for epistemic theorists in the contrast between the two cases, 
then, and the obvious solution is the relativist one of removing information states 
from the asserted proposition. 
The solution is obvious, I say, and yet it has also been strenuously resisted (cf. 
Wright 2007; von Fintel and Gillies 2008; 2011; Dowell 2011; Braun 2012; Yanovich 
2014). The reason is that relativists have paired the proposal to remove information 
states from the asserted proposition with a proposal that should be resisted. This is a 
proposal to relativize not just the truth of the asserted proposition, but also of the very 
assertion itself, to information-state-individuated evaluation matrices: i.e., to so-called 
assessment contexts (cf. Egan et al. 2005; Egan 2007; MacFarlane 2011; 2014; 
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Beddor and Egan 2018). The relativist proposal may seem counter-intuitive, given 
how I have presented and responded to the problem of extra-contextual assessments. 
And yet relativists have persistently (and maddeningly) conflated judgments about the 
truth of an asserted proposition with judgments about the truth of the assertion itself, 
as Beddor and Egan show in asking: 
 
How should assessors evaluate this sort of centered content for truth or falsity? 
Here is a natural first thought: when assessing an utterance u that expresses a 
set of centered worlds p, … (2018, 5; emphasis mine).68 
 
Given this conflation, and given the relativization to assessment contexts, 
relativists predict truth-value judgments of false whenever extra-contextual assessors’ 
information rules out the prejacent of a might-claim.69 Yet this prediction has been 
challenged, both from the armchair and by empirical studies (cf. Yalcin 2011; Knobe 
and Yalcin 2014; Khoo 2015). To make sense of unpredicted variability in extra-
contextual assessments, relativists have thus had to claim that the relevant 
information state for an assessment context is not necessarily the assessor’s own, but 
instead determined by something like his interests (cf. MacFarlane 2014). In the most 
recent version of this proposal, also claimed to be the most predictive, this 
determination is sensitive to the QUD in the assessment context, which can include 
whether the original speaker was warranted (or competent) in making her claim (cf. 
Beddor and Egan 2018, secs. 4.2-4.3). The result is that the literal truth of a speaker’s 
assertion at any given assessment context can depend on the assessor’s determining 
that assertion to have been warranted! 
Surely this is a reductio of the relativization of the truth values of assertions—
rather than just of asserted propositions—to assessment contexts. Better to say simply 
that the relevant truth value judgments track different questions than to add that the 
answers to those questions literally determine the relative truth value of a speaker’s 
assertion at an assessor’s context. And the former can be done, without the latter, if 
we distinguish an assertion’s truth at an assessment context from the truth of the 
asserted proposition at that context. Asserted propositions may have relative truth 
values; assertions of them need not. Extra-contextual assessments push us to remove 
the modal base from the asserted proposition. They do not push us to relativize the 
truth of that assertion itself to so-called assessment contexts. 
 
4.5.2 Binding and the evaluation matrix 
A circumstantial analysis of might, I have argued, should be accompanied by a 
removal of the modal base from content to the evaluation matrix. Yet Schaffer (2011) 
argues that the modal base, which he presumes to be epistemic, should be taken to be 
part of content (2011, 203–6). I respond to that argument here.  
 
68 Beddor and Egan are not alone. Cf. also Egan et al. (2005, 154) and Weatherson and Egan (2011, 
12–13). MacFarlane (2014) also tends toward conflation with his talk of propositions being true as 
used at one context and assessed from another. For is the assessment of the proposition or of its use? 
69 Cf. MacFarlane’s claim that “only a relativist semantics can explain why earlier epistemic modal 
claims are always evaluated in light of what we know now (at the time of assessment), even when we 
know much more than was known at the time the claim was made” (2011, 173). 
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Schaffer’s argument is based on what is sometimes called the binding criterion of 
Stanley (2000) (cf. Recanati 2002). The binding criterion is deployed to make sense 
of examples like (228), which are most naturally interpreted as being used to make 
claims about variable locations, as in (229), rather than as being used to make a claim 
about a constant location, as in (230). 
 
(228) No matter where I vacation, it rains. 
(229) No matter where I vacation, it rains there. 
(230) No matter where I vacation, it rains {in my hometown / in Chicago / etc.}. 
 
The co-variation of the vacationing and raining events in the claim made with (228), 
Stanley argues, is evidence for the existence of an implicit location variable in the 
logical form of the embedded sentence, (231), that is being bound in (228) by the 
higher-scoping quantifier.  
 
(231) It rains. 
 
And in general, the possibility of co-varying readings is supposed to provide evidence 
for the element that co-varies with the domain of quantification being the value of a 
variable, whether implicit or explicit, and so also being part of content rather than of 
the evaluation matrix (Stanley 2000, 410–14). This is the so-called binding criterion. 
Against this backdrop, Schaffer provides a number of examples in which a might-
sentence is embedded beneath a quantifier phrase, and in which it seems that there is 
co-variation of information states with the domain of quantification. These examples 
are given in (232)-(235).  
  
(232) Every boy has a father who might be a genius. [Schaffer’s (72)] 
(233) Anytime you are going for a walk, if it might be raining, you should bring 
an umbrella. [≈ Schaffer’s (70)] 
(234) Sometimes it is not the case that Billy [might] be guilty. [Schaffer’s (73)] 
(235) Usually if Billy might be the one who stole the cookies, then Suzy might be 
too. [Schaffer’s (74)] 
 
In (232), co-variation is supposed to be of different individuals and their information 
states. Every boy has a father who, as far as that boy knows, is a genius. In (233)-
(235), it is supposed to be of different times and an individual’s information states at 
those times. For example, anytime you are going for a walk, you should bring an 
umbrella if, as far as you know at that time, it is raining. Both cases of co-variation 
are supposed to provide evidence for the view that the logical form of a sentence like 
(236) has an implicit variable ranging over information states. It is the binding of this 
variable that is supposed to explain the apparent co-variation in the cases above. 
 
(236) John might be a genius. 
 
Schaffer’s argument leads to the conclusion that the value of an information state 
variable is part of the content of the claim made with (236). This runs counter to both 
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my claim about the relevant modal base (that it is circumstantial, not epistemic) and 
to my claim about its role (that it is part of the evaluation matrix, not of content). Yet 
I do not think this is problematic. For Schaffer relies on Stanley’s binding criterion in 
a surprisingly uncritical way (cf. Schaffer 2011, nn. 22, 41 for a somewhat cavalier 
dismissal of the very points of contention about this criterion). 
Stanley’s binding criterion is anything but uncontroversial. It has been criticized 
both for over-generating implicit variables in making sense of apparent co-variation 
(cf. Partee 1989; Cappelen and Lepore 2002; Recanati 2002; Sennet 2008), and for 
failing to account for other ways of making sense of this phenomenon too (in addition 
to the authors already cited, cf. Bach 2000; Neale 2000; Elbourne 2008). Both sorts of 
criticism are relevant here. 
Focus on the first criticism. We can indeed use (232) to communicate (237), as 
Schaffer suggests.  
 
(237) Every boy has a father who that boy thinks might be a genius. 
 
However, we can also use (238) to communicate (239) and (240) to communicate 
(241). 
 
(238) Every boy has a father who could be a star MLB pitcher.  
(239) Every boy has a father who that boy thinks could be a star MLB pitcher.  
(240) Every boy has a father who is the greatest person in the world. 
(241) Every boy has a father who that boy thinks is the greatest person in the 
world. 
 
In the case of could and greatest, however, it is clear we do not want to posit implicit 
variables ranging over information states to account for this fact. And the simplest 
hypothesis is that we should not do so for might either. The phenomena seem to be 
uniform, due to the every boy has a father who construction rather than to any of the 
specific terms occurring within its relative clause. How to account for these epistemic 
intrusions into the content of the claims made with (232), (238), and (240) need not 
concern us here.70 Presumably, some sort of pragmatic process is involved, but the 
main point is that nothing special need be said about might. Apparent co-variation of 
individuals and information states provides no evidence in this case for might having 
an implicit information state variable.  
The same holds for the might-sentence embedded in the conditional antecedent in 
(233). Conditionals are used to convey that some sort of connection holds between 
the antecedent and the consequent, one often implicitly mediated by knowledge. Thus 
what a conditional like (242)—with a non-epistemic modal in its antecedent—is used 
to communicate is likely to be (243). 
 
(242) If you can shoot pigeons, you should do so.  
(243) If you can shoot pigeons, and you know this, you should do so. 
 
The same could hold for (244) and (245). 
 
70 The term epistemic intrusion is due to Alexander Williams. 




(244) If it might be raining, you should bring an umbrella. 
(245) If it might be raining, and you know this, you should bring an umbrella. 
 
A conditional construction could itself result in an epistemic intrusion into meaning. 
In this case, at least, we need not posit an implicit variable ranging over information 
states for might any more than we need to do so for can. 
Turn now to the second criticism, and to examples like (234) and (235). Here the 
co-variation seems to be of circumstances, for circumstances incriminate individuals, 
not information states. With (234) we claim that sometimes the circumstances do not 
incriminate Billy, while with (235) we claim that when the circumstances incriminate 
Billy, they typically incriminate Suzy too. That said, while there is thus co-variation 
that could be attributed on my circumstantial view of might directly to the modal 
itself, it would be premature to think that the co-varying material had to be a part of 
content even when the might sentence was not embedded beneath a quantifier phrase. 
For, as Recanati (2004) has argued, we can view quantifier phrases as introducing not 
only the quantifier itself but also the variable that it binds (2004, 107–11). In that 
case, there would be no modal base variable in logical form when the might-sentence 
was unembedded, and so the claim made with such a sentence would not have the 
modal base as part of its content. And there are other possibilities too (for explanation 
of co-variation in terms of bound event variables, cf. Bach 2000; and for a general 
survey of the space of possibilities, cf. Elbourne 2008). 
Indeed, co-variation could even simply be attributed to intensional operators that 
manipulated the values of the evaluation parameters. Stanley himself considers this 
possibility of semantic binding “without the mediation of variables” (2000, 413, fn. 
24), but argues against it, at least in some cases, on the basis of the intuition that the 
relevant co-varying materials were “parts of the contents of propositions” rather than 
of “the entities relative to which the truth of propositions is evaluated” (2000, 413, fn. 
24). Now this intuition is more or less orthogonal to Stanley’s central concern, which 
is the division of labor between semantic and pragmatic processes in generating the 
intuitive truth conditions of a claim. However, it is not at all orthogonal to Schaffer’s, 
which is the division of labor between content and the evaluation matrix. Hence, the 
possibility of appeal to intensional operators is a real threat to Schaffer’s argument.71 
Are there cases of apparent co-variation that do require variables? Indeed, but here 
the facts tell against Schaffer. For, in the modal case, there is most definitely not the 
co-variation that we would expect if modals introduced modal base variables.  
The relevant cases involve so-called donkey anaphora, as in (246).  
 
 
71 For co-variation in the case of modals, whether with or without intensional operators, we would 
want to adopt a situation semantics (Barwise 1981; Barwise and Perry 1983; Kratzer 2019). On the 
view being considered now, we could then treat sometimes and usually as intensional operators that 
manipulated the value of the situation parameter, taking as their input a situation-variant content and 
yielding as their output a situation invariant-one. The claim made with (234) would then be true if 
sometimes the relevant situations did not incriminate Billy. And the claim made with (235) would be 
true if, usually when Billy was incriminated in a relevant situation, so was Suzy. In this way, we could 
account for covariation without having to posit the covarying material itself as antecedently being part 
of content.  
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(246) No vegan who owns a donkey beats it. 
 
These are cases of anaphora where neither term involved in the anaphoric dependency 
has scope with regard to the other (cf. Geach 1962), a fact represented in (247), with 
the brackets indicating scope and the subscripts anaphoric dependency. 
 
(247) [No [vegan [who [owns a donkeyi]]][beats iti]] 
 
How to account for this sort of anaphoric dependency has been a matter of intense 
research and debate since the advent in the early eighties of Discourse Representation 
Theory (Kamp 1981) and File Change Semantics (Heim 1983). I will have nothing to 
say about this debate. (For recent summaries, with references, cf. Geurts 2012; King 
and Lewis 2018.) The main point of concern is that, in anaphoric dependency without 
relative scope, it seems impossible for co-variation to be attributed to a quantifier 
phrase introducing both a quantifier and a variable, à la Recanati, or to an intensional 
operator manipulating the value of an evaluation parameter, à la Stanley. For the 
anaphoric dependency is not a scope-based one, as these mechanisms require. Instead, 
it seems that the anaphoric dependency must be attributed to variable(-like) elements 
that are somehow antecedently associated with the second term involved. 
Cases of so-called donkey anaphora are widely attested for any number of context-
sensitive terms, suggesting they are associated with implicit variable(-like) elements. 
Relevant classes of terms include (i) relational adjectives like local, foreign, and 
different, as in (248)-(250); (ii) temporal and locative adverbs, as in (251)-(252); and 
(iii) verbs like win, apply, and notice, as in (253)-(255), that are interpreted on their 
intransitive uses as having definite but null (or unpronounced) complements (cf., a.o., 
Fillmore 1986; Partee 1989; Condoravdi and Gawron 1996; Williams 2012). And 
there are other classes of context-sensitive terms that fall into this category too. 
 
(248) No man who visited his relatives for the holidays went to the local church. 
(249) Everyone who enters an established community at first has foreign customs. 
(250) Every beginning general who loses a battle switches to a different strategy 
in his second. [Partee’s (22d)] 
 
(251) Every man who stole a car abandoned it two hours later. [Partee’s (13a)] 
(252) Every man who stole a car abandoned it 50 miles away. [Partee’s (13b)] 
 
(253) Every man who put chips on 17 won. [Williams’ (8)] 
(254) Every boy who saw an ad for dish washers applied. [Williams’ (12b)] 
(255) Every man who shaves off his beard expects his wife to notice. [Partee’s 
(10c)] 
 
For all of the examples above, the most prominent readings are the ones that involve 
co-variation. For example, no man went to the church that was local to his relatives, 
not the church that was local to the speaker. Every man who stole a car abandoned it 
50 miles away from where he stole it, not 50 miles away from where the speaker is at. 
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And every boy who saw an ad for dish washers applied for that advertised job, not for 
the job for lawn-mowers that the speaker had advertised. 
Modals like might, however, are part of a class of context-sensitive terms that does 
not give rise to donkey anaphora. This is transparent if the relevant context-sensitivity 
is to information states. The claims made with (256) and (257) are clearly false, for 
example, even though they could be true in a community of self-deceived dog-owners 
if the possibilities co-varied with their information states (Alexander Williams, p.c.). 
 
(256) No dog with a doting owner might be ill-behaved. 
(257) Every dog with a doting owner might be the best behaved.  
 
Similarly, (258) and (260) do not have the co-varying readings indicated in (259) and 
(261). Each reflects the judgment of the speaker, not the contestants. 
 
(258) No entry submitted by an overconfident student is a possible finalist. ≠ 
(259) No entry submitted by an overconfident studenti is a possiblei finalist. 
 
(260) Every entry submitted by an underconfident student is plausible. ≠ 
(261) Every entry submitted by an underconfident studenti is plausiblei. 
 
Co-varying readings also seem to be unavailable if we assume that modals like might 
are sensitive to sets of circumstances, not information states, as I have argued that we 
should. For example, (262) does not have the obviously false reading that, relative to 
their flu-like symptoms, only some individuals might have the flu.  
 
(262) Only some individuals with flu-like symptoms might have the flu. 
 
And this lack of co-variation seems to hold for modals of all flavors, as can be seen 
from examples like (263) and (264). 
 
(263) No person who violates an idiotic set of rules does what he should. 
(264) No motivated athlete who’s received a poor training performs as well as he 
can. 
 
(263) does not have the likely tautologous reading that the rule-violators fail to do 
what they should according to the set of rules they violate. And (264) does not have 
the presumably false reading that motivated athletes fail to perform as well as they 
can given the limitations of the training they have received. 
The generalization thus seems to be that modals comprise a class of context-
sensitive terms that does not give rise to donkey anaphora, signifying that might is not 
an outlier in this regard. This in turn suggests that modals are not associated with 
implicit modal base variables, at least not of a familiar sort. As a result, the argument 
from binding is turned on its head. The modal base should be taken to be part of the 
evaluation matrix, not part of content, reinforcing the conclusion from Section 4.5.1 
and the proposal from Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1. 
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4.6 An objection to a non-epistemic analysis 
I have argued that what is required to make sense of genuine and warranted 
disagreement about what might be the case is much the same as what is required to 
make sense of such disagreement about what can happen. Once we have adopted a 
circumstantial analysis of might, the former turns out to be no more puzzling or 
unexpected than the latter. And this tells in favor of such an analysis.  
A key part of my argument in this chapter, however, has been that the so-called 
entrenchment data are not indicative of whether genuine disagreement has occurred. 
Instead, just as entrenchment in debates about what can happen suggests the exact 
opposite, so it could do the same in debates about what might be the case, provided 
that the seemingly parallel examples are interpreted in parallel ways. Yet it might be 
objected that this proviso cannot be met. For in (178), repeated here as (265), the 
speaker’s last claim is a counterfactual one.  
 
(265) Well look, I wasn’t saying that he would win. I was just saying that he 
could. And he could have won. 
 
Thus, if the examples are parallel, then the speaker’s last claim in (176), repeated here 
as (266), should also be interpreted counterfactually.  
 
(266) Well look, I wasn’t saying that he was a spy. I was just saying that he might 
be. And he might have been one. 
 
And a counterfactual interpretation of this claim, it might be objected, is implausible. 
For whatever a speaker does in uttering (266), she does not seem to be claiming that, 
if things had gone differently for the concierge, he might have become a spy. Her 
claim seems to be about her past evidence rather than about the concierge’s once-
open futures. And, if this is true, then perhaps the entrenchment data show exactly 
what they have been alleged to in the case of might, and so something like the cloudy 
contextualism of von Fintel and Gillies turns out to be required to make sense of its 
compatibility with the dismissal data. 
As a first response to this objection, I would simply deny that there could not be 
some sort of counterfactual interpretation of (266). For example, just as (179), 
repeated here as (267), makes explicit the counterfactual interpretation of (265), and 
is likewise acceptable as a continuation of the dialogue in (174), so the same holds for 
(268) with regard to (266) and (173), mutatis mutandis. 
 
(267) Ok, so Phelps can’t win. But he could have won if he hadn’t had plantar 
fasciitis. And I didn’t know that he did. 
(268) Ok, so that concierge can’t be a spy. But he might have been one if the 
vetting process here weren’t so rigorous. And I didn’t know that it was.  
 
This first response may seem insufficient, however, given examples like (269) in 
which the claim that the concierge might have been a spy also plays a role in action 
explanations (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2008, 87–88). 
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(269) Ok, so that concierge can’t be a spy. But he might have been one. And 
because he might have been one, I hid out of sight when he came by. 
 
The worry here is that the action explained seems to have been a sensible one, and yet 
it clearly would not be sensible for the speaker to have hidden because of a 
counterfactual possibility. The worry is legitimate but applies equally well to the 
action explanation in (270) (cf. also MacFarlane 2011, 169–73; 2014, 271–75). 
 
(270) Ok, so Phelps can’t win a medal. But he could have won one. And because 
he could have won one, I placed a massive bet on his doing so.  
 
What explains the speaker’s actions in both cases is not the counterfactual possibility 
itself, but instead the speaker’s belief that it was an actual one. How the speaker 
manages to successfully convey these explanations in uttering (269) or (270) is an 
interesting question,72 but not one that need make us think that either That concierge 
might have been a spy or Phelps could have won a medal is used to make a past 
epistemic possibility claim rather than a counterfactual one. 
Indeed, we can even turn the tables and move from defense to offense. For (271) is 
used to make a claim about a past epistemic state, and (272) provides a good 
explanation for why that state obtained.  
 
(271) It was plausible that that concierge was a spy.  
(272) But only because I didn’t know at the time about the hotel’s vetting process. 
 
Yet (272) does not provide a good explanation for the truth of the claim made with 
(273), even though it would do so if that claim were about a past epistemic 
possibility. Instead, the truth of the claim made with (273) seems to be best explained 
in much the same way that the truth of the counterfactual claim made with (274) is. 
 
(273) That concierge might have been a spy. 
(274) Phelps could have won. 
 
That is, the truth of these claims seem to be best explained by appeal to facts on the 
ground that, in the absence of acknowledged contravening facts, could have opened 
up the relevant possibilities. Such appeals are made, respectively, in (275) and (276). 
 
(275) But only because he moves so stealthily. 
(276) But only because he’s so damn talented. 
 
Thus, if I am correct, there is no obstacle to a counterfactual interpretation of both 
might have and could have in the entrenchment data, and so also no obstacle to 
interpreting the data in a parallel way either. Indeed, there may even be a requirement 
 
72 Stephenson (2007) proposes that because shifts the value of an information state parameter to the 
information state of the individual whose “conscious reasoning or rationale” explains the action 
undertaken (2007, 505–8). Yet this proposal would not work for action explanations involving modals 
like can that are not sensitive to information state parameters.  
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Legitimate disagreement about what might be the case seems possible, even between 
strangers. Yet on an epistemic analysis of might it is not easy to see how this could be 
so. For if we assume that the strangers are making claims about information states, 
either we have to hold that they are talking past each other, or that they are making 
claims for which they have no warrant. There is no evidence for the former, and 
indeed there is strong evidence to the contrary. It is also unintuitive to think that 
speakers’ might-claims are typically unwarranted. So proponents of epistemic 
analyses have had to adopt fairly radical revisions to the semantics and pragmatics for 
might-claims so as to account for warrant. We can avoid these revisions—which are 
fraught with difficulties and may not solve the problem of warrant anyway—if we 
simply adopt a circumstantial analysis of might. On a circumstantial analysis, it is no 
more difficult to explain how people with different evidence could have legitimate 
disagreement about what might be the case than it is to explain how people with 
different evidence could have legitimate disagreement about what can happen. In both 
cases, the disagreement is about the possibilities and potentials left open by the 
circumstances. Speakers naturally do not have all the same information when it 
comes to the circumstances, just as they do not have all the same information when it 
comes to the laws. But just as such differences of information do not threaten the 
possibility of legitimate disagreement about what the laws leave open, so they do not 
threaten the possibility of legitimate disagreement about what the circumstances do. 
The best explanation for how there can be legitimate disagreement about what might 
be the case is that might expresses possibility relative to the circumstances, not to an 
information state. 
 
73 For more on the relevant counterfactual interpretation of might have, cf. Chapter 7, Section 7.6.3. 
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To believe something might be the case … is not really to embrace any positive thesis 
about how the world is. Rather, it is a way of lacking information. 
~ Yalcin (2011, 310) 
 
5.1 A puzzle about belief reports 
Modals embedded beneath belief verbs seem to behave differently depending on the 
flavor of modality that they express. Take the deontic claim made with (277), for 
example, and the report made with (278) when (277) is embedded beneath a belief 
verb. 
 
(277) The president can declare war on his own. 
(278) Mary {believes/thinks} that the president can declare war on his own. 
 
For the claim made with (277) to be true, there needs to be a certain deontic 
possibility: the president’s declaring war on his own needs to be compatible with the 
relevant norms. Similarly, for the belief report made with (278) to be true, Mary 
needs to have a belief about a deontic possibility. She needs to believe that certain 
relevant norms are compatible with the president’s declaring war on his own. Now 
contrast this with apparently epistemic uses of modals. For the claim made with (279) 
to be true, it is alleged, there needs to be an epistemic possibility.  
 
(279) There might be landmines. 
 
However, for the belief report made with (280) to be true, Mary does not need to have 
a belief about such a possibility (Stephenson 2007). 
 
(280) Mary {believes/thinks} that there might be landmines.  
 
Mary does not need to believe that anyone’s information, whether her own or 
someone else’s, is compatible with there being landmines (cf. Section 5.2 below). 
This is puzzling. 
The most promising epistemic response to this puzzle has been to hold that 
embedded “epistemics” are anaphoric on, and so interpreted directly against, the 
information state determined by the attitude verb itself (Yalcin 2007; Hacquard 
2010). Just as the claim made with (279) is supposed to be true if and only if there 
being landmines is compatible with the information determined by the discourse 
context, so the claim made with (280) is supposed to be true if and only if there being 
landmines is compatible with the information determined by (and corresponding to) 
Mary’s beliefs. The attitude verb thus plays the same role for the embedded modal in 
(280) that the discourse context does for the unembedded modal in (279). As a result 
of this unique role, embedded “epistemics” turn out to be unlike other embedded 
modals: they modify the force of an attitude rather than contributing to its content. 
(280) indicates not that Mary believes some modal content to be true but instead that 
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she has some less-than-full-belief level of credence that the content of the modal’s 
complement, or its prejacent, is true. The attitude reported with (280) is thus 
something like suspicion, or weak belief, that there are landmines. 
In this chapter I argue against this anaphoric response to the apparent puzzle about 
belief reports and in favor of a response that dissolves the puzzle by adopting a 
circumstantial analysis of might. Given such an analysis, what we expect to report 
with (280) is not a belief that someone’s information leaves open the possibility that 
there are landmines, but instead a belief that circumstances do. And it is not at all 
implausible to think that this is exactly what we do report. Modals on my analysis 
thus behave in the uniform way we expect them to: when embedded beneath belief 
verbs, they are used to report beliefs about the same sort of modalities that they are 
used to make claims about when unembedded.  
This circumstantial response to the puzzle about belief reports is preferable, I 
argue, for both theoretical and empirical reasons. From a theoretical standpoint, it is 
preferable insofar as it does not require embedded “epistemics” to be interpreted 
idiosyncratically (and so also does not incur the incidental expenses that come in 
trying to make an idiosyncratic interpretation feasible). And from an empirical 
standpoint, it is preferable insofar as it readily makes sense of cases in which the 
report made with a sentence like (280) can be true even when the prejacent is not 
compatible with the content of the belief-holder’s beliefs (cf. Section 5.5.2 below). In 
contrast, anaphoric analyses must make exceptions that ultimately undermine their 
explanatory force in order to make sense of such cases.  
Here is the structure my argument will take. In Section 5.2, I show that what is 
reported with (280) need not be a belief about information, or what I will call a 
second-order sort of belief. This is in contrast to what most epistemic analyses 
predict, as I show in Section 5.3. In Section 5.4, I present the epistemic analysis that 
avoids this prediction, the anaphoric analysis. In Section 5.5, I then detail the 
theoretical and empirical challenges facing this analysis. In Section 5.6, I show how a 
non-epistemic analysis can be applied to belief reports while avoiding such problems. 
I conclude in Section 5.7 by responding to an objection that a non-epistemic analysis 
cannot account for data that an anaphoric analysis can (cf. Yalcin 2007; 2011). 
 
5.2 Belief reports without second-order commitments 
The belief reported with (280) need not be a second-order sort of belief. It need not be 
about information.74 First and foremost, the reported belief need not be about the 
information relevant in the speech situation, or global context (Egan et al. 2005; 
Stephenson 2007). Say that the cadets in officer training camp have been tasked 
independently with determining whether there are fake landmines planted in the 




74 What matters, of course, is information qua information. For on a de re reading of information, 
beliefs about information are just beliefs about propositions, and all beliefs are trivially beliefs about 
information. This reading cannot be the intended one for epistemic theorists, however, else modals like 
can would just as well be analyzed in informational terms too, which they are not. 
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(281) a.   [Cadet] There might be landmines. 
b.  [Sgt.] Interesting. Mary {believes/thinks} there might be landmines too.  
 
In this speech context, it is clear that the cadet’s information state is the relevant one. 
(The sergeant presumably knows where the fake landmines are.) Yet Mary, another 
cadet, need not have any beliefs about this other cadet’s information for the report 
made with ((281)b) to be true. Indeed, Mary need not have any beliefs about this 
other cadet at all. Hence, ((281)b) does not have to be used to report a belief about the 
information relevant in the global context. 
Sometimes it is claimed that might is sensitive, when embedded, to an information 
state provided by the local context: in this case, the information state of the subject of 
the belief verb (Egan et al. 2005; Stephenson 2007). Perhaps so. But, as observed in 
Yalcin (2007) and Hacquard (2010), ((281)b) need not be used to report a reflexive 
belief about the belief-holder’s information either. Say that Mary is prone to jump to 
quick conclusions, easily misled by planted evidence, and seemingly constitutionally 
incapable of following up on a lead, unless prompted by others. It would be entirely 
possible and perfectly coherent for Mary to sincerely utter ((281)a) and then to 
subsequently disavow having reflected on her own information.75 On the basis of her 
sincere utterance of ((281)a), we would normally take the report made with ((281)b) 
to be true. Yet that report could not be true in this scenario were ((281)b) used to 
report a second-order belief, for Mary would not have such a belief. Insofar as that 
report does seem true, even in this scenario, then ((281)b) need not be used to report a 
second-order belief.  
Here is a further piece of evidence. With the report made with (282), we incur 
commitments about the second-order capacities of non-human animals. 
 
(282) Fido {believes/thinks} that his information is compatible with there being a 
bone under the table. 
 
In contrast, as Yalcin (2007; 2011) notes, we do not incur such commitments with the 
report made with (283). 
 
(283) Fido {believes/thinks} there might be a bone under the table. 
 
So clearly, with belief report sentences with might in the complement, we are not 
required to report second-order beliefs. 
 
5.3 Epistemic analyses with second-order commitments 
5.3.1 Contextualists and relativists 
The predictions of most epistemic analyses of might contrast with the observations of 
the previous section. This is obvious for so-called contextualist theorists. Standardly, 
contextualists have taken the content of a bare might-sentence, or BMS, to include a 
 
75 Alexander Williams, p.c. Mary may be particularly unreflective, but she need not have 
misunderstood the meaning of might, or have used it inappropriately. She would instead be in the 
position many of us find ourselves in from time to time: namely, that of making a claim without having 
thought about whether our information supports it. 
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contextually-determined information state, regardless of whether that BMS occurs in 
a matrix clause or in an embedded one (cf. DeRose 1991; Papafragou 2006; Dowell 
2011; Schaffer 2011; Crabill 2013; Yanovich 2014).76 Contextualists thereby incur 
second-order commitments for belief report sentences embedding BMSs, unless more 
is said. Dowell makes this commitment explicit:  
 
[W]hich proposition the complement might Φ has as its content [in belief 
reports] is often determined at least in part by the [reported belief-holder’s] 
information …. [I]n the default case, one’s own modal beliefs are beliefs about 
what’s compatible with what one or one’s group knows (2011, 19; emphasis 
mine). 
 
Recently, more has been said. In particular, a non-standard contextualist account 
of might has been developed to avoid second-order commitments (Silk 2017). It does 
this by taking truth-conditional reference to information states to help determine 
content without itself being a part of content (Silk 2017, 1783). On Silk’s account, 
you will recall, reference to information states for epistemic modals, like reference to 
speakers for first-person pronouns, plays the role of a Kaplanian character: that is, a 
function from speech contexts to speech contents (Kaplan 1989). In the modal case, 
the content determined by the character is a set of propositions: the propositions that 
some particular information state comprises. What we report with a sentence like 
(284), on this account, is not a belief about information at all but instead “the belief 
that a certain set of propositions is compatible with the proposition b that the butler is 
the killer” (Silk 2017, 1783). 
 
(284) Alice thinks that the butler might be the killer. [Silk’s (11)] 
 
Silk’s account thus avoids the second-order commitments that standard 
contextualist accounts incur. However, there is also good reason for his account being 
non-standard. As Kratzer (1991) makes explicit, and as is already implicit in Kratzer 
(1977; 1981), logical relations between sets of propositions are not contingent while 
the contents of our modal beliefs and claims are (1991, 641–42). The conjunction of 
(284) and (285) describes a perfectly coherent set of beliefs for Alice to have, but it 
would not if Alice’s reported belief in (284) was about a non-contingent relation.  
 
(285) But she also thinks that, if only the butler had learned to control his temper, 
there wouldn’t even have to be this possibility. 
 
 
76 Recall that a BMS is a sentence, like (279), in which might occurs without being restricted by an 
epistemic modifier (e.g., a phrase like given what the cadets know). Some theorists hold it is not the 
content of a BMS, but instead of a claim made with a BMS, that includes a contextually-determined 
information state (cf. Bach 2011; Braun 2012; these authors also hold that the information state is 
determined in, but not by, context). Other theorists hold that discourse contexts need not determine 
unique evaluation contexts, and so hold that BMSs need not have unique contents in discourse contexts 
either (cf. von Fintel and Gillies 2011). These differences are unimportant for our purposes here. What 
matters is only that these theorists take the relevant implicit parts of contents to be information states. 
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To secure the contingency of modal beliefs and claims, we need the descriptions 
that contingently characterize sets of propositions—descriptions like the norms, the 
facts, our information—to not play the role of a Kaplanian character but instead be 
part of content. Yet if we take descriptions like our information to be part of content, 
we incur second-order commitments. Epistemic contextualists seem to have no good 
options.77 
A common alternative to contextualism is relativism. Relativists, you will recall, 
move information states from a contextually given aspect of the proposition 
expressed by a BMS to an aspect of the evaluation matrix relative to which that 
proposition is true or false (Egan et al. 2005; MacFarlane 2011; 2014). In moving 
information states from content, relativists correctly predict that BMSs embedded in 
belief reports will not be globally context-sensitive. (The relativist content of the 
reported belief does not need an information state to be supplied by context, after all.) 
That said, they still incur second-order commitments, as some relativists make 
explicit: 
 
a believes the [relativist] proposition b might be F … iff a believes it is 
consistent with what they know that b is F (Egan et al. 2005, 158). 
 
Other relativists are less explicit but hold that the content of a factive attitude report 
can be pragmatically enriched, when necessary to avoid presupposition failure, to 
include the attitude-holder’s information state, all without changing the sort of 
attitude reported (cf. MacFarlane 2014, 276–77; MacFarlane is responding to von 
Fintel and Gillies 2008). So relativists in general seem committed to the position that 
adopting an attitude toward the purportedly relativist content of a BMS is equivalent 
to having a second-order attitude. 
 
5.3.2 Expressivists 
In contrast to truth-conditional theories like contextualism and relativism, recall that 
expressivist theories do not take might to make the content of a speech act depend 
truth-conditionally on an information state (cf. Halliday 1970; Palmer 2001; 
Schnieder 2010). Instead, they take its function to be to modify the force of that act. 
With might, the prejacent is put forth with weak, non-assertoric commitment. This 
enables a speaker to express, without having to assert, a less-than-full-belief level of 
credence in the prejacent. 
Expressivists correctly predict that belief report sentences embedding BMSs need 
not be used to report beliefs about information states. For they do not take might to 
contribute any such state to content to begin with. However, it is not clear that they 
 
77 Some contextualists appeal to descriptions that can sometimes make it unclear whether they are 
epistemic contextualists. Yanovich (2014), for example, talks of believing, for the purposes of an 
investigation, that something might be so. Elsewhere, Yanovich makes clear, however, that to think 
that p might be so, “for the purposes of an investigation”, is to think that p is consistent with the facts 
relevant to the investigation that are either known or knowable (cf. Yanovich 2014, 76–77). And to 
have a belief about what is knowable is, undoubtedly, to have a second-order sort of belief.  
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can make sense of the attitude that a sentence like (280), repeated here as (286), is 
used to report, nor of how this differs from the attitude that a sentence like (287) is.78  
 
(286) Mary {believes/thinks} that there might be landmines.  
(287) Mary {believes/thinks} that there are landmines.  
 
One possibility is to hold that the embedded might modifies the force of the 
attitude, so that (9) is used to report a less-than-full belief while (287) is used to 
report a full one. In response, I would argue that the ability of a purely expressive 
term to modify attitudinal force seems, understandably, to be parasitic on its ability to 
modify speech act force. Take gee in (288), for example. 
 
(288) Mary {believes/thinks} that, gee, there are landmines. 
 
With the embedded gee, the speaker indicates an additional attitude of surprise on the 
part of Mary that she does not with (287). However, (288) also seems to involve some 
sort of coerced direct quotation. Apart from such coerced quotation, gee is not able to 
modify attitudinal force, as (289) shows. 
 
(289) a.   Tell me. Do you sincerely and fully believe that, gee, there are  
landmines? 
b.  You know, I’ve thought long and hard about the matter. And yes, I do 
sincerely and fully believe that, gee, there are landmines. 
 
In (289), the first gee involves a sort of projected speaker comment, and the second a 
sort of parroting. Neither changes the attitude that is the object of inquiry. The second 
speaker could have left out gee and still answered the first. This is what we should 
expect of purely expressive terms. To the extent that they can be used to modify 
attitudinal force, it is only because the attitude being reported had been expressed in a 
speech act, the force of which they had also been used to modify.  
Might’s ability to modify attitudes, however, does not seem to be parasitic in this 
way. In particular, (286), unlike (288), does not seem to involve coerced quotation. 
And might in (290), unlike gee in (289), does change the nature of the attitude that is 
the object of inquiry.  
 
(290) a.   Tell me. Do you sincerely and fully believe that there might be  
landmines? 
b.  You know, I’ve thought long and hard about the matter. And yes, I do 
sincerely and fully believe that there might be landmines. 
 
The second speaker in (290) could not have replaced might be with are and still have 
directly answered the first. 
 
78 For arguments from embedding against expressivist views, compare, among others, Papafragou 
(2006), Swanson (2011), Hacquard and Wellwood (2012), and Anand and Hacquard (2009; 2013). 
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Might, in summary, does not seem to act as an expressivist term when embedded.79 
To account for its effect in embedded contexts, we thus need might not to modify 
force but instead to help determine truth conditions. 
 
5.4 Avoiding second-order commitments via anaphora 
For epistemic contextualists and relativists, the relevant information state for a BMS 
embedded in a belief report sentence is determined by (and corresponds to) the beliefs 
or knowledge that the belief-holder believes she (or someone else) possesses. Some 
authors have recently proposed that we can avoid second-order commitments, while 
maintaining an epistemic analysis, if we instead take the relevant information state to 
be determined by (and correspond to) the belief-holder’s actual beliefs (Yalcin 2007; 
2011; Hacquard 2010; Anand and Hacquard 2009; 2013). 
To accomplish this, these authors take advantage of a standard formalization of 
both belief verbs and modals as quantifiers over possible worlds (cf. Hintikka 1962; 
Kratzer 1977). On a Hintikkan analysis of belief verbs, the claim made with (291) is 
true iff there are landmines in every world compatible with the content of Mary’s 
beliefs. And on a Kratzerian analysis of modals, the claim made with (292) is true iff 
there are landmines in some world compatible the content of the contextually relevant 
information state.  
 
(291) Mary believes that there are landmines. 
(292) There might be landmines.  
 
What authors like Yalcin and Hacquard do, given this common formalization, is to 
make an embedded epistemic modal anaphoric on the embedding belief verb, so that 
the set of worlds each quantifies over is the same, as in (293). (Let B stand for worlds 
compatible with the content of a belief-holder’s beliefs.) 
 
(293) ∀w ∈ B: ∃w′ ∈ B such that there are landmines in w′. 
 
For Yalcin, this anaphoric dependency is accomplished by having the belief verb 
reset the value of a special parameter that might is supposed to be relativized to 
(Yalcin 2007). For Hacquard, it is accomplished by having the verb introduce an 
event variable whose value provides, via a binding relation, the value of an event 
variable that modals now also introduce (Hacquard 2010).80 Either way, the result is 
the same. The modal quantifies over worlds compatible with the content of the belief-
holder’s actual beliefs, the worlds the belief verb also quantifies over. The result is to 
make the belief verb’s quantification vacuous, and so essentially to modify the force 
of the attitude, for (293) is just equivalent to (294).  
 
(294) ∃w′ ∈ B such that there are there are landmines in w′. 
 
79 To foreshadow somewhat, it also does not seem to modify attitudinal force. There is nothing odd 
with (290), despite adverbs like fully modifying force in ways incompatible with might’s alleged 
modification. 
80 Hacquard, it should be noted, has independent reasons for having modals introduce event 
variables and takes all modals to do so, not just modals that are allegedly interpreted epistemically. 




At the end of the day, for these authors, the claim we are thus supposed to be 
making with a belief report sentence embedding a BMS is that the prejacent is 
compatible with the content of the belief-holder’s beliefs. Alternatively, we are 
supposed to be claiming that, relative to the information state determined by the 
content of those beliefs, the prejacent is a possibility. And this would seem to be a 
way of saying that the prejacent is an epistemic possibility for the belief-holder.  
It is worth noting the essential role that anaphoric dependency plays on this 
analysis in allowing second-order commitments to be avoided (Yalcin 2007, 997; 
Hacquard 2010, 105). Stephenson (2007) had proposed that an embedding belief verb 
and an embedded epistemic modal could also quantify over the same set of worlds, 
without anaphora, if we assumed that believing that p required believing that one 
knew that p (2007, 502–3). On that assumption, the worlds compatible with the 
content of one’s beliefs would be the same as the worlds compatible with the content 
of one’s presumed knowledge, that is, of the content that one believed one knew. 
Stephenson’s interpretation of (286), namely, (295), would thus entail (296), Yalcin’s 
and Hacquard’s. 
 
(295) In all worlds w′ compatible with the content of Mary’s beliefs in w,  
it is the case that, in some world w′′ compatible with the content of Mary’s 
knowledge in w′, there are landmines in w′′. 
 
(296) In all worlds w′ compatible with the content of Mary’s beliefs in w,  
it is the case that, in some world w′′ compatible with the content of Mary’s 
beliefs in w, there are landmines in w′′.  
 
As a result of the alleged entailment, Stephenson, like Yalcin and Hacquard, would 
take the report made with a belief sentence embedding a BMS to be true iff the 
prejacent was compatible with the content of the reported belief-holder’s beliefs. 
However, what would be reported would also be a second-order sort of belief. The 
representation of Mary’s belief in (295) requires her to have a belief about 
information, as would any representation referencing her or anyone else’s information 
in the worlds w′ compatible with her beliefs. This is similar to the way that the belief 
represented in (297) would be a belief about laws, even if what Mary believed to be 
true was somehow coextensive with what she believed to be required.  
 
(297) In all worlds w′ compatible with the content of Mary’s beliefs in w,  
it is the case that, in some world w′′ compatible with the content of the laws 
in w′, there are landmines in w′′. 
 
To avoid second-order commitments, we need to avoid reference to any 
information state other than the one determined by the attitude verb. Thus, if we 
assume an embedded modal is interpreted relative to an information state, we require 
anaphoric dependency of the modal on the attitude verb itself.  




5.5 Challenges for an anaphoric analysis 
5.5.1 Theoretical challenges 
An anaphoric analysis makes epistemic interpretations of modal predicates 
idiosyncratic, unlike other interpretations of modals beneath belief verbs. As Yalcin 
writes of epistemic possibility modals, the beliefs they are used to report “do not 
correspond to a distinctive class of believed contents; rather, they correspond to a 
distinctive way of being doxastically related to a proposition” (2011, 309). On their 
non-epistemic interpretations, in contrast, modal predicates would contribute to the 
content of a belief. Indeed, even some epistemic modal predicates seem to do this: for 
example, terms like plausible and plausibly. While we do not incur any commitments 
about the second-order capacities of non-human animals with (298), on its allegedly 
epistemic interpretation, we do with (299). 
 
(298) Fido thinks there’s possibly a pill mixed in with his food. 
(299) Fido thinks there’s plausibly a pill mixed in with his food.  
 
Only some modal predicates interpreted epistemically, then, would fail to contribute 
to the content of a reported attitude and instead modify its force. This makes the 
apparently non-uniform behavior of embedded modal predicates more difficult to 
explain. It makes this behavior less explicable on independent conceptual grounds, as 
opposed to arbitrary lexical ones, than it otherwise would have been.  
Speaking of arbitrary lexical properties, belief verbs will also have to display them 
vis-à-vis other attitude and speech act verbs on anaphoric analyses. For, in some 
cases, a BMS occurring as a complement of an attitude or speech act verb seems to 
contribute to the content of the reported attitude or speech act, rather than to modify 
its force (Crabill 2013; Yanovich 2014). Take (300), for example. 
 
(300) John’s doctors have {reported/showed} that he might be contagious. 
 
On a natural interpretation of (300), what John’s doctors have done is to report, or to 
show, the world to be a certain way. That is, they have reported or shown a certain 
content to be true. Yet if this is correct, anaphoric analyses must explain why belief 
report sentences embedding BMSs are not used to report beliefs with these modal 
contents. (I presume that whatever can be the content of a report or demonstration can 
also be the content of a belief.) And here, it seems, the explanation could only be in 
terms of an arbitrary lexical property of attitude verbs like believe. We would thus 
have more or less the equivalent of a perfect storm. Attitude reports embedding BMSs 
could be used to report attitudes about modal contents. And belief reports embedding 
other epistemic modal sentences could be used to report beliefs about modal contents 
too. However, belief reports embedding BMSs would not be used to report beliefs 
about modal contents, presumably due to the combined arbitrary lexical properties of 
both believe and might. 
One possibility for anaphoric analyses is to offer an alternative interpretation of 
(300), and of other attitude and speech act reports for which we would naturally 
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appeal to modal contents. Yanovich, however, argues that this would not work in the 
case of (300).81 And it is not clear that it would work in other cases either.  
Take indirect speech reports, for example. On an anaphoric analysis, an epistemic 
possibility claim functions to express the compatibility of the speaker’s information 
state with the prejacent, and to coordinate on that same state of mind with one’s 
interlocutors (cf. Yalcin 2007; 2011). We could thus interpret an indirect speech 
report like (301) in light of either of these functions, as in (302) and (303) (cf. Anand 
and Hacquard 2009).  
 
(301) John’s doctors said that he might be contagious. 
(302) John’s doctors expressed the compatibility of their information state with 
John’s being contagious. 
(303) John’s doctors aimed to coordinate the compatibility of their and their 
interlocutors’ information states with John’s being contagious.  
 
Yet these interpretations yield the wrong results in a number of cases: for example, in 
cases in which possibility claims serve an evasive function, as in (304). 
 
(304) a.   [S1] Do you know whether John is contagious? 
b.  [S2] I do. 
c.  [S1] Is he? 
d.  [S2] He might be. 
 
In such cases of evident evasion, the report made with (301) would still be true—to 
see this, witness the coherence of (305)—but the reports made with (302) and (303) 
would not.  
 
(305) John’s doctors just said that he might be contagious. But they clearly know 
whether he is and just don’t want to tell me.  
 
The function of an epistemic possibility claim is sometimes formulated in terms of 
the common ground, however, instead of in terms of information states. A speaker, 
for example, is alleged to be “mak[ing] explicit that [the prejacent is] compatible with 
the common ground” (Yalcin 2007, 1010). On this formulation, it might seem that 
anaphoric analyses could predict the report made with (301) to be true, even in cases 
of evasion. In such cases, after all, the speaker is making explicit what is not in the 
common ground. Yet even this formulation will not suffice. For in some cases of 
evasion, the prejacent (or its negation) may be in the common ground, the speaker’s 
 
81 One possible anaphoric interpretation of (300) is (iii):  
 
(iii) The content of the doctors’ {report/demonstration} is compatible with the proposition that 
John is contagious.  
 
Yet if the doctors report simply that John is contagious, then the conditions in (iii) would be met for 
the report made with (300) to be true. However, the report made with (300) would be false in this case. 
More sophisticated interpretations Yanovich shows to be equally problematic (cf. Yanovich 2014, 
103–6). 
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purpose being not to withhold information but instead, as in (306), to avoid public 
commitment.  
 
(306) While it’s common knowledge that John is contagious, his doctors have 
steadfastly refused to say that he is. Instead, they say only that he might be. 
 
Hence, for indirect speech reports and reports of demonstrations, at least, it seems that 
an anaphoric analysis will not do. Instead, we require might to contribute to the 
content of the reported attitude or speech act in these cases. 
Indeed, even for belief reports the bare form of the anaphoric analysis will not do 
(cf. Yalcin 2011). This form does not require the subject of the belief verb to have 
entertained the prejacent: it only requires the prejacent be compatible with the content 
of her beliefs. But many propositions are thus compatible without ever having been 
entertained. Call such propositions bare epistemic possibilities, in contrast to live 
ones, propositions that have been entertained. Bare epistemic possibilities can explain 
actions, as in (307). 
 
(307) [Context: John is at the office party, despite being contagious. Colleagues 
avoid him, except for Mary, who is ignorant of his medical history.] 
 
a. Why is Mary talking to John? 
b. She doesn’t know that he’s contagious. 
 
In (307), the bare epistemic possibility that John is not contagious is what explains 
Mary’s actions. Without emphasis on know, Mary is not intentionally taking even a 
minor risk in talking to John. Contrast this with (308), where Mary is intentionally 
taking a health risk, and what explains her action is the live epistemic possibility that 
John is not contagious.  
 
(308) a.   Why is Mary talking to John? 
b. She thinks that he might not be contagious. 
 
((308)b) cannot be used to explain Mary’s actions in terms of a bare epistemic 
possibility. Mary must have entertained the prejacent in order for the claim made with 
((308)b) to be true. And to account for the fact that belief report sentences embedding 
BMSs cannot be used to report bare epistemic possibilities, Yalcin (2011) refines the 
anaphoric analysis, claiming that “[t]o count as believing ⋄φ, φ should be compatible 
with one’s beliefs; but in addition, one’s state of belief should also be sensitive to a 
question for which φ is an answer” (2011, 315–16). 
This requirement for question sensitivity makes sense of what would otherwise be 
an anomalous fact on the anaphoric analysis: namely, that we are often hesitant to 
make the report we do with a sentence like ((308)b) apart from its subject having 
uttered (309).  
 
(309) John might not be contagious.  
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Our best evidence that Mary is sensitive to the question whether John is contagious, 
after all, will often just be that she has made such an utterance. However, a question-
sensitivity requirement also complicates what appears to be an otherwise standard 
relation between utterances and belief reports. Normally we take the former to justify 
the latter in virtue of a sincere utterance requiring the speaker to believe the asserted 
content of that utterance. With the introduction of question sensitivity, however, we 
are forced to develop a parallel account of this relation for the case of BMSs.82 
One final challenge that arises from denying distinctive modal contents of belief 
for belief reports embedding BMSs is to explain relations of anaphora, reference, and 
inference without them (on inference, cf. Braun 2013; MacFarlane 2014, 277–79). 
Take (310), for example, in which belief contents would play all three roles.  
 
(310) a.   Sue believes that John might be contagious. Mary believes that too.  
b.  So the two believe the same thing. 
 
It is certainly possible to account for the validity of the inference and the success of 
the anaphoric reference without contents of belief. (We could simply appeal to states 
of mind in their place.) However, to account for these things in a compositional 
framework will be a challenge.  
One might have thought we could give an account in terms of bound variables 
ranging over information states, similar to the account we would give to explain the 
anaphora and inference in (311) when Sue and Mary have different fathers and so 
believe different propositions.83 
 
(311) a.   Sue believes that her father loves her. Mary believes that too.  
b.  So the two believe the same thing. 
 
Yet given an appeal to bound variables, we should also be able to report Sue and 
Mary as not believing the same thing, or not being in the same state of mind, given 
the differences in those variables’ values. We do this coherently with (312) as a 
continuation of (311). Yet (313), in contrast, is not a coherent continuation to (310). 
 
(312) Yet they also do not believe the same thing, for the two have different 
fathers.  




82 We must also explain why not all evidence of question sensitivity cum compatibility justifies a 
belief report. Mary’s saying that she does not know whether John is contagious, for example, provides 
just such evidence. And yet Mary could in some cases reasonably object to that utterance being the 
basis for the belief report made with ((308)b) (cf. Yanovich (2014, 96–97) for a similar example used 
to make a similar point). To respond to this sort of problem, Yalcin defines question-sensitivity as 
“being appropriately sensitive to information which speaks to a question” and holds that what counts 
as appropriate sensitivity may vary with the context (2011, 317; emphasis mine). Mary’s objection 
would thus reflect that she did not count as being appropriately sensitive in that context. This works, I 
guess, but further complicates a seemingly standard relation between utterances and belief reports 
83 Alexander Williams, p.c. 
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If we cannot appeal to bound variables, there seem to be two options. Either we 
take the noun-phrase complements of believe to be elliptical for the sentential 
complement (cf. Elbourne 2013). Or, instead, we take their semantic values in context 
to be some sort of entity that can combine with the semantic value of believe to 
determine the required state of mind. Yet this entity could not be a propositional 
content, for the prejacent certainly would not suffice and, by hypothesis, there is no 
appropriate modal content. Hence, we would have to complicate the semantic entry 
for believe or posit an ambiguity. None of these options seem promising. A simpler 
option is to appeal to distinctive modal contents of belief.  
To conclude: an anaphoric analysis faces several theoretical challenges. It requires 
might not to behave like other epistemic modals when embedded beneath belief 
verbs, and belief verbs not to behave like other attitude verbs when embedding might. 
In doing away with distinctive contents for modal beliefs, it also complicates an 
otherwise standard relation between utterances and belief reports, and struggles to 
make sense of anaphora and inference. None of these challenges may be decisive. But 
they are serious enough, in my opinion, that the anaphoric analysis should only be 
adopted as a measure of last resort. Only if it provides greater empirical coverage 
than all the other alternatives should it be adopted, that is. And yet, as we will see in 
the next section, its empirical coverage is also limited. 
 
5.5.2 Empirical challenges 
From an empirical standpoint, anaphoric analyses are obviously an improvement on 
other epistemic analyses. In most seemingly true utterances of belief reports 
embedding BMSs, the prejacent will be compatible with the content of the subject of 
the belief verb’s beliefs, even though in many cases she will not have second-order 
beliefs about its being so. Still, even anaphoric analyses are not entirely empirically 
adequate. For, in some cases, the relevant reports can be true even when the prejacent 
is not compatible with the content of the belief-holder’s beliefs.  
The first sort of case trades on the fact that not all of our beliefs have the same 
status. Some we may take to be foundational, and be unwilling to give up even if 
convinced that there is strong evidence that they could be false. Others, less 
foundational, we would give up as soon as we were so convinced. Presented with 
evidence of evil, for example, I may continue to believe that God is good. Presented 
with evidence that I am hallucinating, in contrast, I am unlikely to continue to believe 
that it is raining.  
Say I do believe that God is good, then, but take myself not to have completely 
firm grounding for this belief. It seems I could accurately be reported as believing 
that God is good, while also recognizing that he might not be so, or even, simply, as 
believing that God might not be good.84 Yet the proposition that God is not good is 
 
84 This especially so if I am attending to the fact that the grounding for my belief is not completely 
firm. Indeed, to claim to believe something, as opposed to claiming to know it, is often just to leave 
open the possibility that one could be wrong (and so to admit that the negation of what is believed is an 
epistemic possibility for oneself). This phenomenon is actually not infrequent. After game three of the 
2017 NBA Finals, for example, I say to my friends: “I think the Cavs are going to lose this series. Still, 
they might win” (Drew Harr, p.c.). My second assertion is sincere, and so a reflection of what I 
believe. I thus believe that the Cavs are going to lose, while also believing that they might win.  
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not compatible with the content of my belief that God is good, and so is not 
compatible with the content of my belief state as a whole. These reports should thus 
be false on an anaphoric analysis, when in fact they seem to be true. 
This first sort of case highlights that the subject matter of our beliefs matters. For 
more mundane matters, believing some proposition may—as a matter of practical 
rationality—rule out taking its negation to be a live possibility. Yet not all matters are 
mundane, and so believing a proposition may not always have this effect. Anaphoric 
analyses do not account for this fact. Instead, they encode into the semantics what 
seems to be a limited matter of practical rationality.  
In contrast to the first case, which involves a sort of uncertainty on the part of the 
belief-holder, the second sort of case involves no uncertainty at all. These are cases of 
what have been called exocentric belief reports (cf. Lasersohn 2005; Stephenson 
2007; Dowell 2011; Braun 2013; Yanovich 2014; Silk 2017). In “exocentric” reports, 
admittedly less common, it seems to be the information of someone other than the 
belief-holder that is relevant. (Reports in which the belief-holder’s information seems 
relevant have been called autocentric reports.) Here is an example of such a report. 
 
(314) [Context: Officer training camp. Fake landmines have been planted in 
certain fields. The sergeant, who knows which fields these are, is teaching 
her cadets to identify tell-tale signs of possible mining activity.] 
 
a. [Sgt.] Are you sure you want to charge? There might be landmines. 
b. [Cadet 1] Do you really think so? 
c. [Sgt.] Sure I do. Look at the terrain of that field. [Etc.]  
 
[A second cadet approaches]  
d. [Cadet 2] What’s going on? Why aren’t we charging? 
e. [Cadet 1] I’d ignored the possibility till now, but Sergeant thinks there 
might be landmines. 
f. [Cadet 2] Hmm, I think she’s right. We’d better proceed with caution. 
 
In the example above, the belief report seems fine even though it is clear to the cadets 
that the sergeant has not forgotten in which fields the fake landmines have been 
planted. It is thus clear that she knows whether the prejacent is true and so, very 
possibly, that it is not. But if the sergeant knows that the prejacent is not true, then the 
prejacent is not compatible with the content of her beliefs. Hence, on anaphoric 
analyses, the truth of the cadet’s report should be contingent on the truth of the 
prejacent, which it does not seem to be. 
Can anaphoric analyses account for these two sorts of cases? Indeed, they can. But 
the cure may be worse than what it cures. To account for a similar case involving a 
different attitude verb, for example, Yalcin appeals to a “tacit shift in the information 
parameter under the scope of [the verb]” (2007, 1013). The parameter shifts from the 
information state determined by (and corresponding to) the attitude verb itself to a 
salient information state about which the subject could have an attitude of that sort. 
That same appeal could be made for our cases. Its effect would be to make what is 
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reported a second-order belief. I do not think an appeal to tacit shifts should be made, 
however, here or elsewhere. Let me explain.  
The first difficulty with the appeal to a tacit shift is its commitment to the beliefs 
and other attitudes being reported being second-order ones. Here are three cases that 
suggest otherwise. 
Case One: Belief verbs. It is common knowledge among the sergeant and her 
cadets that the cadets have obtained a copy of her legend indicating which fields have 
fake landmines. It is also common knowledge that the field about to be charged does 
not. It is thus common knowledge that the sergeant does not believe that the beliefs of 
her cadets are compatible with there being landmines. Yet the belief report in (314) 
still seems true.  
Case Two: Verbs of reporting and demonstrating. If we accept Yanovich’s 
argument that there is no good anaphoric interpretation of (300), repeated here as 
(315), then a natural thought is to appeal to a tacit shift. 
 
(315) John’s doctors have {reported/showed} that he might be contagious. 
 
With a tacit shift, John’s doctors would be claimed to report or show a certain content 
to be true. And yet this content does not seem to involve an information state, as can 
be seen from the contrast between the alternative continuations in (316). 
 
[Context: John’s doctors have been trying to convince the hospital director to lift 
his quarantine. John’s partner reports back to his parents about their efforts.] 
 
(316) The director may lift the quarantine! John’s doctors have reported that, 
finally,  
a. It’s plausible that he’s not contagious. 
a′. He might not be contagious. 
 
With ((316)a), the facts about John’s case do not need to have changed for the 
doctors’ report to be true. For what the doctors report is a change in an information 
state. And while the latter sort of change may often be precipitated by the former, it is 
also possible without it. (The director, for example, may have a new assessment or 
new awareness of old facts.) With ((316)a′), however, the facts about John’s case do 
need to have changed for the report to be true. This suggests that the doctors have 
reported a content involving not an information state, but instead involving the facts 
themselves. 
Case Three: Verbs of uncertainty. In most true utterances of (317), Mary’s beliefs 
(and so also her knowledge) will be compatible with John’s being contagious 
(DeRose 1991). Yet anaphoric analyses make the opposite prediction, interpreting 
(317) as (318). 
 
(317) Mary doesn’t know whether John might be contagious.  
(318) Mary’s knowledge state is not compatible with John’s being contagious. 
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To avoid this result, Yalcin appeals to a tacit shift to a target information state: e.g., 
the state possessed by an epistemic authority (2007, 1013). Yet with this shift, we 
would incur commitments with (319) about the representational capacities of non-
human animals that in fact we do not. Contrary to what the anaphoric analysis leads 
us to predict, (320) commits us to more than (319) does. 
 
(319) Fido doesn’t know whether there might be an intruder downstairs. 
(320) Fido doesn’t know whether an intruder being downstairs is compatible with 
the target information state. 
 
A second difficulty with an appeal to a tacit shift is that that shift would have to be 
only selectively available. To see this, consider an example used to motivate the 
anaphoric analysis (Yalcin 2007). 
 
(321) Imagine that John is contagious and that he might not be. 
 
Yalcin claims that sentences like (321) are anomalous. The explanation of this 
anomaly, on an anaphoric analysis, is that we are making an incoherent request of our 
interlocutor. We are asking her to imagine that John is contagious while also making 
the content of her imaginings compatible with the proposition that he is not. Our 
request would not be incoherent, however, if a tacit shift were available. For we then 
would be requesting our interlocutor to imagine both that John is contagious and that, 
relative to someone or other’s information, it is possible that he is not. We could 
make such a request with (322), for example, in the context of the office party above. 
 
(322) Imagine that John is contagious and that Mary doesn’t know it. 
 
To explain the anomaly of (321), it is thus crucial that a tacit shift not be available. 
Yet the principles governing the selective availability of this shift are not obvious. 
They cannot be principles of charitable interpretation, for the charitable interpretation 
of (321) would have us favor a coherent request over an incoherent one. Nor can they 
just be principles of salience and relevance. For, out of context, the most salient and 
relevant information states are those of the (intended) subjects of the attitude verbs. 
And yet we do not interpret (317) as (323), nor (321) as (324). 
 
(323) Mary doesn’t know whether John’s being contagious is compatible with her 
information state. 
(324) Imagine that John is contagious and that you don’t know it.  
 
No immediately obvious principle governs the availability of the tact shift, then. Yet 
some principle needs to be given, lest anaphoric analyses lose all explanatory power, 
making the shift selectively available for their apparent counterexamples but, 
crucially, not for their central explananda.  
A third and final difficulty relates to the fundamentally different ways belief 
reports embedding BMSs would function with and without tacit shifts. In the former 
case, we would report a belief with a modal content. In the latter, more standard case, 
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we would report something like suspicion, or weak belief, that the modal’s prejacent 
is true. Yet it would be simpler and more uniform to say that, in all cases, we reported 
beliefs with modal contents, and that such beliefs were often, though not always, 
accompanied by weak belief in the prejacent. It would be simpler and more uniform, 
that is, to take the belief-holder’s weak belief to be a standard (but non-universal) 
implication drawn from belief reports embedding BMSs rather than to be the content 
of those reports in most (but not all) cases. The anaphoric analysis seems no more 
principled than if an expressivist who argued that we reported a belief-holder’s pro-
attitude toward an action with a report like (325) were then to claim, if presented with 
apparent counter-examples, that we could also report beliefs with moral contents 
whenever the required pro-attitude was lacking.  
 
(325) John thinks that it is good to care even for the contagious.  
 
The more principled response would seem to be that we always reported beliefs with 
moral contents with reports like (325), but that, in the vast majority of cases, those 
beliefs were also accompanied by certain related pro-attitudes. 
To conclude: without a tacit shift, an anaphoric analysis incorrectly predicts the 
claim made with a belief report sentence embedding a BMS to be false whenever the 
prejacent is not compatible with the content of the belief-holder’s beliefs. This tacit 
shift, optional in the case of belief verbs, would have to be obligatory for other 
attitude and speech act verbs: for example, for any for which might could only be 
analyzed as contributing to the content of the reported attitude or speech act. There 
would also have to be a third class of verbs, however, for which a tacit shift was 
unavailable: verbs like suppose and imagine. There is thus no general account to be 
given of attitude and speech act verbs, and there may be no principled one either. 
With a tacit shift, anaphoric analyses also predict us to be reporting second-order 
attitudes. Yet second-order attitudes are no more required with an alleged tacit shift 
than without one. Second-order attitudes are required for other epistemic modal 
predicates, however, regardless of whether the embedding attitude verb is one for 
which a tacit shift is supposed to be optional, obligatory, or unavailable.85  
An anaphoric analysis misses the forest for the trees. It explains the fact that might 
does not seem to contribute an information state to the content of a reported belief by 
taking it not to contribute to the content of that belief at all. All the while, it ignores 
the fact that might does seem to contribute to the content of other attitudes and speech 
acts, despite not seeming to contribute an information state in those cases either. And 
it also ignores the fact that there are epistemic modals that do contribute information 
states in all these cases. It is time to look for a more general analysis of the fact that 
we need not report second-order beliefs with belief report sentences embedding 
BMSs. 
 
85 Valentine Hacquard (p.c.) has suggested to me that certain attitudes may naturally tend toward 
being autocentric, whereas other attitudes may naturally tend toward being exocentric, and that this 
could provide the basis for a principled account of the availability and/or obligatoriness of the tacit 
shift for the different attitude verbs. This suggestion dovetails nicely with Anand and Hacquard (2009; 
2013)’s claim that the non-availability of “epistemic” readings for (semi-)modals under attitude verbs 
like want is due to the type of attitude reported. However, this suggestion does not make sense of the 
differences between might and plausible with regard to the alleged tacit shift. 




5.6 Belief reports on a non-epistemic analysis of might 
5.6.1 Avoiding second-order commitments 
Say that we accept a non-epistemic analysis of might and take (327) to provide the 
content of the claim made with (326).  
 
(326) There might be landmines. 
(327) Circumstances leave open the non-trivial possibility that there are 
landmines. 
 
We would then have a straightforward explanation for why a belief report sentence 
embedding (326) was not used to report a second-order belief. For to believe that 
circumstances leave open some possibility is not to have a belief about information. 
In much the same way, to believe that circumstances make it possible for something 
to happen is not to have a belief about information either. This is plausibly the sort of 
belief we express in a sincere utterance of (328). 
 
(328) John can jump ten feet.  
 
And just as we do not expect to report a second-order belief with a belief report 
sentence embedding (328), so on a non-epistemic analysis of might we should not 
expect to do so with a belief report sentence embedding (326) either. 
Does an individual who believes that John can jump ten feet need to explicitly 
believe that the circumstances make it possible for him to do so? No. Nor does an 
individual who believes that there might be landmines need to explicitly believe that 
the circumstances leave open the non-trivial possibility that there are. These are 
merely ways of glossing that the modal relation an individual has a belief about is a 
circumstantial one: it holds, or would hold, in virtue of circumstances being the way 
they are, rather than in virtue of the content of an information state being what it is. 
This is a distinction that individuals who hold modal beliefs can be implicitly aware 
of, even if they never explicitly formulate it as such.86 
Indeed, this distinction would seem to be one that we are aware of. Take (329), for 
example, in which causal explanations like those from Chapter 2 are included within 
the scope of a belief verb.  
 
(329) Norma believes that she might be the murderer. She also believes the only 
reason she might be … 
 
86 It would seem to matter, however, that we not gloss the modal belief as a de re one, whether 
about the circumstances themselves or about the propositions assumed to constitute the circumstances. 
For the beliefs one has about circumstances affect the beliefs one has about circumstantial modalities. 
But the former can include false beliefs, and so we could not take the latter to be de re beliefs about 
circumstances. But nor could we take them to be de re beliefs about propositions. If they were, 
learning that one had a false belief about the circumstances should not cause one to revise one’s modal 
beliefs. And yet it can have this effect. Learning that John’s training was as a rower and not, as I had 
mistakenly believed, as track and field athlete, I will not continue in my belief that John can jump ten 
feet but instead maintain only that he could have done so, had he trained as I’d believed.  
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a. ?is because her memory of that awful night is so spotty. 
a′.  is because her temper on that awful night was so uncontrollable.  
 
With ((329)a), unlike with ((329)a′), we report what seems to be an unreasonable 
belief for Norma to have. This makes sense if her belief that she might be the 
murderer is a belief about a circumstantial modal relation, not an epistemic one. If her 
belief was about an epistemic relation, we would expect ((329)a) to sound as 
reasonable as (330) does. 
 
(330) Norma believes that it’s plausible that she’s the murderer. She also believes 
the only reason it’s plausible is because her memory of that awful night is 
so spotty.  
 
The same distinction holds when it comes to modal beliefs for which the 
information of someone other than the belief-holder is supposed to be relevant. These 
“exocentric” beliefs seem not to be about epistemic relations, as ((331)a) would 
require, but instead about circumstantial ones, as ((331)a′) suggests. 
 
(331) I just spoke with the sergeant about our group’s progress. She agrees that 
there might be landmines. But she also thinks that’s only because …  
a. ?we haven’t heard back from our scouting party yet. 
a′.  the terrain is so pocked. 
 
If these “exocentric” beliefs were about epistemic relations, in contrast, we would 
expect ((331)a) to sound as reasonable as (332) does.  
 
(332) I just spoke with the sergeant about our group’s progress. She agrees that 
it’s plausible that there are landmines. But she also thinks that’s only 
because we haven’t heard back from our scouting party yet. 
 
What holds for belief verbs holds for other attitude verbs too, which is nice given 
the struggles of the anaphoric analysis to generalize across attitude verbs. Take (333). 
 
(333) John’s wife realized that he might be contagious. 
a. ?But she also realized it’s only because she didn’t ask him his diagnosis. 
a′.   But she also realized it’s only because he works in the worst hospital 
ward.  
 
The sort of content John’s wife adopts an attitude toward is apparently one whose 
truth she can realize is underwritten by non-epistemic facts, but not one whose truth 
she can realize is underwritten by epistemic ones. She apparently adopts an attitude 
toward a non-epistemic content, that is. This follows straightforwardly from a non-
epistemic analysis. 
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5.6.2 Making sense of uncertainty implications 
On an anaphoric analysis, believing ⋄p was identified with a state of mind similar to a 
specific sort of uncertainty about p.87 Yet recall from Section 5.5.2 that there were at 
least three different states of mind a belief-holder could be in with regard to the 
prejacent p when a true report was made with a belief report sentence embedding a 
BMS. 
 
State of Mind 1:  Uncertain whether p. Believes neither p nor ~p.  
State of Mind 2:  Uncertain whether p. Believes ~p. 
State of Mind 3:  Certain whether p. Believes ~p. 
 
For the anaphoric analysis, the second and third states of mind had to be 
accommodated by appeal to tacit shifts. In this section, I want to show how we can 
make sense of these different states of mind that accompany true belief reports if we 
appeal to beliefs with contents like (327). I also want to show how this appeal can 
make sense of the relative frequency with which these beliefs are accompanied by 
this first state of mind, with its specific sort of uncertainty. To do so, let me introduce 
a distinction between two types of modal beliefs.  
Our beliefs about circumstantial modalities are formed on the basis of our beliefs 
about the circumstances. Often we take, or intend to take, all of the latter into account 
in forming the former. In doing so, we form what we might call all-things-considered 
modal beliefs. Sometimes, however, we only take some of our beliefs about the 
circumstances into account, thus forming what we might call relative modal beliefs.  
For the most part, our relative beliefs will be expressed in explicitly relativized 
ways, as in (334) and (335) (cf. Lewis 1976, 150; Kratzer 1981, 303–6). 
 
(334) Given his symptoms, John might be contagious. Given his test results, he 
can’t. 
(335) Given his training, John can swim. Given his current state of inebriation, he 
can’t. 
 
Yet in some contexts we can drop the modifier restricting a modal sentence and 
express a relative belief by uttering just that bare modal sentence itself. We can do so 
in contexts in which some of our beliefs about the circumstances have been tabled, 
the strength of our evidence for these beliefs having been called into question. We 
can also do so in contexts in which it is clear that only a very specific type of 
circumstance is relevant, oftentimes instructional contexts. These are the two types of 
contexts that Section 5.5.2 made relevant. In what we might call the default context, 
however, the belief expressed in uttering a bare modal sentence will be an all-things-
considered one. This is what we expect given basic principles of informativeness. 
Cooperative speakers can ignore considerations they take to be relevant to some 
matter—for example, to the truth of the prejacent—but they are generally expected to 
 
87 While the compatibility of the content of one’s beliefs with p does not by itself require 
uncertainty, the addition of question-sensitivity, at least as defined by Yalcin (2011), seems to.  
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make this explicit.88 As such, we can expect beliefs expressed in sincere utterances of 
bare modal sentences to generally be all-things-considered ones.  
Given this distinction between all-things-considered and relative beliefs, let us 
return to our three states of mind and see how a person who believed that p was a 
non-trivial circumstantial possibility could be in any one of them. If this person’s 
belief was an all-things-considered one, she would be in our first state of mind. If she 
was in our second or third state of mind, her belief would be a relative one. A person 
who believed ~p could not form an all-things-considered belief that p was a non-
trivial circumstantial possibility. Instead, the belief she formed on the basis of all of 
her beliefs about the circumstances would have to be that p was trivially impossible. 
Hence, to be in our second or third state of mind requires that the belief that p is a 
non-trivial circumstantial possibility be a relative one. If someone held this relative 
belief as a result of questioning the strength of her evidence for her belief that ~p, she 
would be in our second state of mind. If she held it without such questioning, but 
instead as a result of attending to only a very specific type of circumstance, she would 
be in our third.89 
Turn now to the relative frequency with which a reported belief-holder is in our 
first state of mind. There seem to be two reasons for this. The first deals with the fact 
that modal beliefs, to borrow a phrase from Yanovich, are always “something positive 
[on] our theory” (2014, 104). They require entertaining and endorsing a specific 
content. Yet someone who believed ~p is unlikely to entertain whether p is a non-
trivial possibility. Or rather, she is unlikely to do so unless forced to attend either (i) 
to the strength of her evidence for believing ~p or (ii) to only a very specific type of 
circumstance. Someone attending to the question of whether p obtains, however, but 
who remained agnostic on the matter, would ipso facto be likely to entertain (and 
endorse) that there was this possibility. Hence, the belief that p is a non-trivial 
possibility is a belief that someone in our first state of mind is more likely to form.90 
An all-things-considered belief is also more likely to be expressed in an utterance 
of a BMS, and so also more likely to be (faithfully) reported with a belief report 
sentence embedding a BMS. Indeed, it may be even more difficult in the default 
context to report a relative belief with an embedded BMS than it is to express one 
with an unembedded one. For we need not just a context in which a relative belief can 
be transparently expressed, but also positive reason to believe that the reported belief-
holder has that sort of belief. Imagine, for example, that David Lewis utters (336) to 
make a point about relative modalities and context sensitivity (Lewis 1976, 150). 
 
(336) I can speak Finnish. My anatomy, unlike an ape’s, is of the right sort.  
 
88 Cf. Mandelkern (2017, 120–21) for a related point that speakers are generally expected to present 
their strongest evidence on a given matter.  
89 Yet I am not suggesting that these three states of mind are the only possible ones a belief-holder 
could be in when a true report was made with a belief report sentence embedding a BMS. In particular, 
a person could also believe p, rather than ~p. What we would then report would either be an all-things-
considered belief that p was a trivial possibility or a relative belief that p was a non-trivial one.  
90 Likely, but not necessarily guaranteed. For, as DeRose (1991) pointed out, and as Yalcin 
struggled to explain, someone non-committal on p could also remain non-committal on whether p was 
a possibility. They would do so, on my account, if they did not take themselves to be a competent 
judge of whether circumstances left open the non-trivial possibility that p. 




Lewis would thereby have expressed that he had the right anatomy to speak Finnish, 
even if not the right training. Still, if he subsequently uttered (337), it would be very 
difficult to hear him as reporting anything other than the default belief that he had the 
right training to do so. 
 
(337) My parents think that I can speak Finnish too.  
 
To hear him as reporting a relative belief of the sort he had just expressed, we would 
need reason to believe that his parents attended to the sorts of questions that interested 
him. Hence, it seems to be difficult to report relative modal beliefs of any sort with 
bare modal sentences embedded in belief reports, a second reason for the relative 
frequency with which a reported belief-holder is more likely to be in our first state of 
mind.  
 
5.6.3 Comparison to epistemic analyses  
To conclude my discussion of how a non-epistemic analysis of might can be applied 
to belief report sentences embedding BMSs, let me draw two comparisons. The first 
is to epistemic analyses in general, the second to anaphoric analyses in particular.  
On epistemic analyses, there is a fundamental divide between types of belief 
reports. For so-called autocentric reports, a belief-holder’s information is supposed to 
be relevant for the interpretation of an embedded BMS. For so-called exocentric 
reports, like those from Section 5.5.2, someone else’s is. I deny that a BMS is ever 
interpreted relative to an information state, however. Instead, for both reports, I hold 
that the beliefs reported are beliefs about what the circumstances leave open. The 
difference between these types of reports, on my analysis, is a difference in whether 
they report all-things-considered beliefs or relative ones. And this sort of difference, it 
turns out, is a general one, applying to other sorts of beliefs about circumstantial 
modalities to which an autocentric/exocentric divide could not apply. 
On anaphoric analyses, there is a further fundamental divide between types of 
belief reports. Autocentric ones report an attitude toward the prejacent. Exocentric 
ones report a belief with an epistemic modal content. This divide, as we have seen, is 
problematic in any number of ways. But these problems can be avoided if we take 
both sorts of reports to report beliefs with modal contents, and to differ only in 
whether those beliefs are all-things-considered or relative ones. With non-epistemic 
modal contents of belief we can make sense, without the troublesome tacit shift, of 
how might contributes to the contents of other reported attitudes and speech acts. We 
can correctly predict that it will not make an epistemic contribution in these cases any 
more than in the others, unlike plausible, which makes an epistemic contribution in 
all. We can avoid making unique appeal in the semantics for epistemic modals to 
question sensitivity. We can have attitudinal contents available for anaphora and 
inference. And we can make sense of the different states of mind of the subjects of 
“autocentric” and “exocentric” reports, while still taking both to have modal beliefs. I 
thus conclude that a non-epistemic analysis is preferable as a whole to an anaphoric 
one in explaining the lack of second-order commitments for belief report sentences 
embedding BMSs.  




5.7 An objection to a non-epistemic analysis 
On the non-epistemic analysis that I have developed, it is supposed to be possible to 
have the relative belief that p is a non-trivial possibility while also believing that ~p. 
A similar possibility is likely to hold for most other attitudes too. And yet, it might be 
objected, if there is this sort of possibility, then (338) and (339) should report and 
command possible (and possibly coherent) states of mind. 
 
(338) I believe that God is not good and that he might be good. 
(339) Imagine that John is not contagious and that he might be contagious. 
 
However, the objection continues, (338) and (339) seem anomalous, which is not 
predicted on my non-epistemic analysis. To explain the anomaly of (338) and (339), 
an anaphoric analysis is supposed to be necessary. Since that analysis takes the modal 
to be evaluated directly relative to the content of the information state determined by 
the attitude verb, we end up reporting or commanding an incoherent state of mind 
when embedding an “epistemic contradiction” like (340).  
 
(340) ~p and ⋄p 
 
For the prejacent’s negation is supposed to be added to the content of the information 
state, but the modal requires the prejacent to be compatible with that content too, and 
these are incompatible demands (Yalcin 2007; Anand and Hacquard 2013; for 
alternative accounts, cf. Schnieder 2010; Crabill 2013; Yanovich 2014). 
In response to this objection, I would remind readers that there are constraints on 
the expression of relative modality whenever the circumstances relative to which a 
prejacent is to be evaluated—i.e., its modal base (Kratzer 1981; 1991)—have not 
been explicitly specified. One plausible constraint is that an assertion of p results in p 
being added to the presumed circumstantial modal base for subsequent occurrences of 
matrix-clause modals, unless that assertion has somehow been waived or bracketed. 
Hence, if you wanted to express a coherent relative belief that ~p was a non-trivial 
possibility, you could not do so with a BMS once p had been asserted. Instead, you 
would be expressing the incoherent belief that, relative to circumstances that included 
p, ~p was a possibility.  
What holds for matrix clauses plausibly holds for embedded ones too. The 
occurrence of a sentence within an embedded clause results in the content of that 
sentence being added to the presumed circumstantial modal base for subsequent 
occurrences of modals within the clause. As such, embedded epistemic contradictions 
cannot be used to report (or command) coherent relative attitudes, but instead report 
(or command) incoherent ones. It is coherent to believe or imagine that some 
circumstances leave open the possibility that ~p, and also to believe or imagine that p. 
It is not coherent, however, to imagine that circumstances that include p leave open 
this possibility. 
What I am proposing as a solution to the apparent anomaly of embedded epistemic 
contradictions is thus in some ways very similar to what anaphoric analyses propose. 
The anomaly results from the content of the one conjunct being added to the modal 
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base for the other conjunct. However, I take this modal base to be circumstantial, not 
epistemic. I thus do not take there to be anything incoherent per se in believing that 
~p is a possibility while also believing that p. I take the incoherence to arise only 
from believing that ~p is a possibility relative to p.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
The observation that we do not report second-order beliefs with belief report 
sentences embedding BMSs has motivated the view that we instead report some other 
attitude like suspicion, or weak belief. This view, which proceeds from the 
assumption that might is to be interpreted epistemically, requires far-reaching 
complications to theories of attitude verbs and their interactions with modals. It also 
has not insignificant empirical limitations, the only potential solution to which would 
undermine the explanatory force of the view. These complications and limitations can 
be avoided. Both the illusion of an explanandum and the problems with the explanans 
are generated by the assumption of epistemicity. If we instead interpret might 
circumstantially—something we independently have reason to do—we would never 
expect the relevant belief report sentences to be used to report second-order beliefs at 
all. With this circumstantial interpretation of might, we maintain a standard view of 
the attitudes, and of attitude reports, and also provide greater (and more principled) 
empirical coverage of the relevant reports. The best explanation of the lack of second-
order commitments for belief report sentences embedding BMSs is that might is a 







Chapter Six: The Meaning Difference Between Might and Can 
 
 
Epistemic modality [expressed by might] and circumstantial modality [expressed by 
can] involve a different categorization of the facts. 
~ Kratzer (1981, 302) 
 
6.1 Two competing analyses 
In formal semantics, the standard analysis of the meaning difference between might 
and (non-deontic uses of) can is the Kratzerian one. On this analysis, both (341) and 
(342) express the compatibility of a common prejacent with a set of facts but differ in 
how those sets are characterized. 
 
(341) John might easily be a military man. 
(342) John can easily be a military man. 
 
For (341), the relevant facts are characterized in epistemic terms: as our evidence, or 
what we know. For (342), they are instead characterized simply as the circumstances 
(cf. Kratzer 1981, 302; 1991, 646; 2012, 33; 2013, 188–89). Now the entire argument 
of this dissertation is against an epistemic characterization of the relevant facts for 
might. In this final section of the dissertation, I thus want to do two things. 
My first aim is to call into question the adequacy of the Kratzerian analysis of the 
difference between (341) and (342) as a difference in epistemic versus circumstantial 
modality. I do this in the current chapter in two ways, having first demonstrated the 
basic continuity of Kratzer’s analysis from her earlier to her more recent work in 
Section 6.2.91 
First, in Section 6.3, I focus on a contrast between might and can that provides the 
intuitive motivation for the Kratzerian analysis. This contrast, I argue, turns out to not 
be well explained by that analysis at all. For the contrast extends to cases where the 
modality expressed by might is standardly assumed to be metaphysical, not epistemic. 
Further, there is a related contrast between might and can that points to the inverse of 
the Kratzerian analysis if given the same sort of explanation as the original one. Thus, 
even if a Kratzerian analysis is possible for the original contrast, it would not seem to 
be explanatory. Rather, there seems to be some other, underlying difference between 
the modalities expressed by might and can for which an epistemic/circumstantial 
distinction could provide only a partial, and redundant, explanation. 
Second, in Section 6.4, I focus on the Kratzerian non-ambiguity project that 
provides the theoretical motivation for her analysis of the difference between (341) 
and (342). This is the project of attempting to account for modal flexibility (or the 
ability of a single modal to be used to express multiple, distinct flavors of modality) 
without having to posit modal ambiguity (or multiple semantic entries for that modal). 
This project, I argue, is also ill-served by Kratzer’s assumption that the difference 
 
91 In essence, I show that while Kratzer’s analysis of how to generate the meaning difference has 
changed in well-known ways from her earlier to her more recent work—from contextually-provided 
conversational backgrounds to syntactically-provided modal anchors—her analysis of what this 
difference is seems to have remained the same. 
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between the modalities expressed by (341) and (342) is a difference in the intensional 
characterization of facts, or what I will sometimes call the intensional assumption. 
In Section 6.5, I conclude the chapter by revisiting the arguments for Kratzer’s 
non-ambiguity project. Abandoning the intensional assumption does not necessarily 
require abandoning this project; yet I will suggest that these arguments provide no 
compelling reason for adopting it either. This fact will be significant in the following 
chapter when, in response to the different temporal properties of might and can, I 
propose different semantic entries for the two: a proposition-level semantic entry for 
might and an event-level semantic entry for can (cf. Brennan 1993; Palmer 2001). 
My second aim in this final section of the dissertation is in fact just this: to provide 
an alternative to the Kratzerian analysis of the contrast between might and can. I do 
this formally in the following chapter, in the context of the argument that the different 
temporal properties of the two cannot be attributed to the epistemic/circumstantial 
distinction. Yet throughout this chapter I also informally develop this alternative too. 
The basic idea is that with might and can we attribute relative modal properties to 
different sorts of entities. With might, we attribute the relative property of being 
possibly true to a proposition. With can, we attribute the relative property of being 
able to develop in a certain way to an individual, location, situation, etc. (This 
property is often called a potential.) In attributing relative properties to these different 
sorts of entities, we express different sorts of relations, not just the same compatibility 
relation to different sorts of facts. And this relational difference makes sense not only 
of the Kratzerian contrast between might and can that provides the intuitive 
motivation for her analysis but also of the additional contrasts from Section 6.3 that 
Kratzer’s proposed fact-based difference does not. 
 
6.2 Kratzer’s analysis 
Kratzer’s analysis of modals has changed in important ways from her earlier work (cf. 
Kratzer 1981; 1991) to her more recent work (cf. Kratzer 2012; 2013). Yet I will 
argue in Section 6.2.1 that it has not changed in regard to the fundamental concern of 
this chapter: namely, the way in which might and can differ in meaning. In Section 
6.2.2, I then review the ways in which the analysis has changed and show that they 
affect only how that meaning difference is generated, not what it is. Yet Kratzerian 
exegesis is not my main aim in this chapter. Although I think that my interpretation of 
Kratzer’s recent work makes the best sense of various comments and commitments, I 
am also open to interpretations that see in it further support for my own contention 
that might is not epistemic, and that might and can thus do not differ along an 
epistemic/non-epistemic dimension either. In Section 6.2.3, in fact, I even argue that 
there is implicit in Kratzer a relational alternative to what I take to be her explicit 
fact-based analysis. Unfortunately, if I am correct, this alternative has so far remained 
implicit. 
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6.2.1 The continuity of Kratzer’s analysis 
From her earlier to her more recent work, Kratzer has displayed remarkable 
continuity on two points in her analysis of the difference between the modalities 
expressed by might and can, which she calls epistemic and circumstantial.92 
First, she continues to maintain that this is a difference in the categorization, or 
kind, of facts that these modalities involve. Reiterating the epigraph of this chapter, 
for example, Kratzer claims that, “semantically, [the two] modals differ with respect 
to the kinds of facts they depend on” (2012, 24). And this claim is reiterated again 
and again (cf. Kratzer 2012, 50, 51; for her older work, cf. Kratzer 1981, 302, 306; 
1991, 646). 
Second, she continues to use the same terms to describe this fact-based difference. 
In her early work, she often uses terms like evidence and circumstances to describe 
the different kinds of facts relevant for the two types of modalities (cf. Kratzer 1981, 
302; 1991, 644, 646). And in her more recent work she also uses these exact same 
terms. She writes, for example, that “the kind of facts that are targeted by the two 
types of modals are different in kind …: external or internal circumstances of people, 
things, or places … contrast with evidence of things (2012, 54; emphasis mine). And 
these terms are likewise reiterated again and again in her characterization of the 
alleged fact-based difference (cf. Kratzer 2012, 33; 2013, 188–89). 
There is thus fundamental continuity in Kratzer’s work in that part of her analysis 
which is the concern of this chapter. Yet it should be noted that while Kratzer talks 
interchangeably in developing this analysis of different kinds of facts, and of a 
different categorization of the facts, the latter is strictly speaking the more accurate 
description. For there is no kind of fact that is a piece of evidence per se, as Kratzer 
herself is aware. Indeed, Kratzer writes that “whatever exists in a world … should in 
principle qualify as potential evidence of things in that world” (2012, 53). As such, 
the relevant internal and external circumstances for a can-claim could very well turn 
out in some cases to be the same as the relevant evidence for a might-claim too. This 
is the lesson of Nauze (2008), and is demonstrated with cases like (343)-(344) and 
(345)-(346). 
 
(343) Given only his psychiatric profile, John might easily be a military man. 
(344) Given only his psychiatric profile, John can easily be a military man. 
 
(345) Given only his digital dexterity, John might easily be a professional pianist. 
(346) Given only his digital dexterity, John can easily be a professional pianist. 
 
 
92 Kratzer in fact defines circumstantial modality broadly, to encompass all non-epistemic 
modalities, including deontic ones. For Kratzer, these modalities differ amongst themselves, and many 
of them still further from epistemic modalities, in the value of what she calls their ordering source. 
However, for the non-deontic uses of can that concern us here—what Kratzer calls pure 
circumstantials—there is not necessarily this second source of variation (cf. Kratzer 1991, 646). 
Instead, pure circumstantials have what Kratzer calls an empty ordering source, and epistemics may 
too. Unless noted otherwise, I will generally restrict my attention in the following two chapters to such 
non-deontic uses of can and the “pure” circumstantial modalities expressed by them. Hence, it is 
appropriate to talk in terms of the difference between them and epistemic modalities on the Kratzerian 
analysis, even if this would not be appropriate for other sub-classes of circumstantial modalities. 
Chapter Six: The Meaning Difference Between Might and Can 
120 
 
Hence, it is not as though there are different kinds of facts which could be relevant for 
might- and can-claims but instead, on Kratzer’s analysis, different characterizations 
of what could sometimes turn out to be the same facts. 
 
6.2.2 The discontinuities in Kratzer’s analysis 
Despite the continuity of her fact-based analysis, there are important discontinuities in 
Kratzer’s work, and these have tended to obscure what has remained the same (cf., 
e.g., the discussion in Matthewson 2016). These relate to what Kratzer calls epistemic 
and circumstantial conversational backgrounds, which are supposed to be 
contextually-provided functions from possible worlds to propositions, respectively, 
that are either known in, or circumstances, of those worlds. But I will argue that these 
discontinuities do not affect the argument of the previous section. 
 
6.2.2.1 Conversational backgrounds 
In her early work, Kratzer had used epistemic and circumstantial conversational 
backgrounds to generate what she sometimes calls the modal base. This is the set of 
worlds that the modal quantifies over, testing to see whether its prejacent is true in all 
or some or none of them. And it is the same for Kratzer as the set of worlds verifying 
the value of the epistemic or circumstantial background (Kratzer 1981, 297; 1991, 
644).93 She also appealed to additional types of conversational backgrounds to 
function as what she calls ordering sources: that is, to induce an ordering on the 
worlds in the modal base based on their compliance with a given set (and type) of 
norms. These additional types of backgrounds Kratzer refers to as non-realistic. 
Unlike epistemic and circumstantial backgrounds, the propositions they assign to a 
world do not necessarily obtain in it. For the propositions they assign represent the 
content of a set (and type) of norms in that world, and what is normatively required is 
rarely the same as what is actually the case. 
Together with non-realistic ones, epistemic and circumstantial backgrounds helped 
to determine the modal flavor of a claim in Kratzer’s early work. However, mere 
differences in the set of worlds quantified over, or in how these worlds are ordered, 
do not themselves suffice to generate flavor differences. Indeed, it is flavor-internal 
differences of precisely this sort that help to explain how, for example, a deontic 
claim that is true in one context may be false in another. This may be due to changes 
in the relevant circumstances from one context to the other (in which case, there will 
be a change in the modal base) or instead to changes in the applicable norms (in 
which case, there will be a change in the ordering of the worlds in the modal base). 
 
93 von Fintel and Heim (2011) suggest that Kratzer uses the term modal base to refer to the 
conversational backgrounds themselves, not to the sets of accessible worlds determined in this way by 
their values (2011, 42). This seems right in some contexts. Yet Kratzer continues to use the term even 
when, as we will see, she no longer espouses conversational backgrounds. So for ease of exegesis, I 
will generally use the term modal base in this chapter to refer to the set of worlds that a modal 
quantifies over. However, the use suggested by von Fintel and Heim should also be kept in mind, 
especially when Kratzer is being quoted. Finally, over and above these two uses, there is the use of the 
term modal base that I have adopted throughout the rest of this work: namely, to refer to the value of a 
conversational background. In this chapter, I will avoid this third use, unless I explicitly note 
otherwise. 
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What determines the modal flavor of a claim is thus not the set of worlds quantified 
over, nor the ordering of the worlds, but instead the accessibility and ordering 
relations themselves. Modal flavor depends on whether the accessible worlds are 
epistemically or circumstantially accessible ones, on whether the ordering of those 
worlds is deontically or teleologically determined, etc. Modal flavor, in other words, 
depends in part in Kratzer’s early work on the type of conversational background 
used to determine the modal base: namely, whether it is epistemic or circumstantial. 
Two subsequent developments in the literature, however, led Kratzer to reconsider 
her use of epistemic and circumstantial conversational backgrounds. One was Nauze 
(2008)’s criticism of the attempt to derive the differences between modal flavors from 
differences in context. The other was Hacquard (2006; 2010)’s argument that an 
observed correlation between flavor and syntactic height could be accommodated 
within the Kratzerian framework. In response to these two developments, Kratzer 
claims that she had earlier made an “erroneous assumption that the two types of 
modals semantically select modal bases with distinctive semantic properties: 
circumstantial backgrounds … and epistemic backgrounds” (2012, 24). Instead of 
there being such semantically distinctive modal bases provided by context, Kratzer 
suggests that there are, at different heights in the syntactic tree, “different kinds of 
semantic objects from which modal bases can be systematically projected” (2012, 
55). Here she is following the lead of Hacquard, who calls these objects modal 
anchors.  
This, then, is the first major discontinuity in Kratzer’s work. Yet despite rejecting 
epistemic and circumstantial conversational backgrounds, everything that Kratzer has 
said so far is consistent with it still being the intensional characterization of facts that 
determines the type of the modal base, even if that modal base is now syntactically 
projected rather than semantically selected. Indeed, this would even seem to be 
Kratzer’s position. For she holds both (i) that such modal bases “target relevant 
bodies of facts in the evaluation world and track them via counterpart relations” and 
(ii) that the relevant facts differ in kind from might to can (2012, 54). Since the 
relevant facts are further said to differ in the exact same way as in in her early work 
(cf. Section 6.2.1), Kratzer would thus seem to still be committed to characterizing 
modal bases as epistemic or circumstantial, depending on how they are determined, 
even if she rejects the characterization of conversational backgrounds in these terms. 
This commitment, however, is easily obscured by Kratzer’s subsequent comments 
in response to Nauze’ criticism. “It now seems to me,” she continues, 
 
a hopeless enterprise to try to characterize formal objects like conversational 
backgrounds as “circumstantial” versus “epistemic.” Both types of backgrounds 
are functions that map possible worlds to sets of factual premises. What is it 
that would allow us to single out some of those functions as epistemic, but not 
circumstantial, or the other way round? (2012, 24). 
 
In fact, the enterprise is, in some ways, not nearly as hopeless as Kratzer makes it out 
to be. In giving a compositional semantics for phrases like given what we know and 
given the circumstances, for example, we will use functions that we characterize as 
epistemic but not circumstantial, and vice versa. Of course, the functions themselves 
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are not epistemic or circumstantial, but we can characterize them as such insofar as 
we use them to represent the meaning of a given phrase or lexical item. What is 
hopeless is thus not the attempt to characterize formal objects as epistemic or 
circumstantial, but instead the attempt to have context provide such characterizations. 
Context provides objects, not meanings (cf. Section 6.4.2, as well as Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.3). 
While Kratzer’s rejection of epistemically or circumstantially characterized 
conversational backgrounds may thus seem to imply a similar rejection for modal 
bases, in fact the opposite is true. Not only do Kratzer’s claims continue to commit 
her to characterizing modal bases as either epistemic or circumstantial, depending on 
how the modal anchors they are projected from are intensionally characterized, but so 
must any attempt to use syntactically provided modal anchors to generate the flavor 
difference between might and can maintain some such commitment. The facts 
provided by modal anchors may help to determine the modal base but, by themselves, 
they do not help to determine its type. For what if anchors for the two modals ever 
happened to provide the same set of facts, from which their modal bases were 
projected? And, more importantly, for the vast majority of modal anchors that provide 
different sets of facts, how do we distinguish flavor-internal differences in the modal 
bases projected from these sets from flavor-external ones?  
The answers to these questions come from the intensional characterization of the 
facts provided by the modal anchors. If the relevant internal circumstances of John 
are also our relevant evidence, then it is the intensional characterization of those facts 
as evidence that allows us to differentiate (343) from (344) on the Kratzerian 
analysis. This is also what allows us to distinguish flavor-internal differences (where 
the facts differ, but the characterizations remain relevantly the same) from flavor-
external ones (where the facts may be the same, but the characterizations differ). 
Now it may not be necessary to characterize the facts provided by the modal 
anchors in the way that Kratzer does: namely, in evidential versus non-evidential 
terms. Yet whatever characterization of facts is chosen, it must be general enough to 
ensure that the differences between (347) and (349), and between (348) and (350), 
count as flavor-internal, while those between (347) and (348), and between (349) and 
(350), count as flavor-external. 
 
(347) John might run four-minute miles. 
(348) John can run four-minute miles. 
 
(349) Mary might bench 125 pounds. 
(350) Mary can bench 125 pounds. 
 
And for this my guess is that Kratzer’s characterization is the only possible one.  
To conclude: a mere difference in the set of accessible worlds (or modal base) 
does not by itself generate a difference in modal flavor. Instead, we also need there to 
be a difference in the accessibility relation itself. Yet Kratzer does not change her 
view on what this difference is, though she does change her view on how the facts 
that determine it are provided, moving from context and conversational backgrounds 
in her early work to syntax and modal anchors in her more recent work. Despite this 
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change, it is still in both cases the intensional characterization of facts in evidential 
versus non-evidential terms that allows us to distinguish the flavor of modality 
expressed by might from the flavor expressed by can. 
 
6.2.2.2 Modes of domain projection 
Epistemic and circumstantial conversational backgrounds vary in whether their values 
are construed in contentful terms: for the former, they are; for the latter, they are not. 
In her recent work, Kratzer similarly claims that there are contentful and non-
contentful (or factual) modes of domain projection (cf. Kratzer 2013, 193–97). 
However, Kratzer claims that the distinction between these two modes of domain 
projection cross-cuts her earlier distinction between epistemic and circumstantial 
conversational backgrounds. This is the second apparent major discontinuity in 
Kratzer’s work, and it may seem, to those who are aware of it, to undermine the entire 
argument of the previous section. Obviously, I do not agree. But first let me explain 
what motivates the new distinction, and then let me relate it to the old one. 
To characterize a fact as a piece of evidence is to characterize it in a contentful 
way: namely, as the content of an evidential state. However, some facts are also 
themselves content-bearing, while others are not. The fact that I am feeling fit is a 
content-bearing piece of evidence that I am fit. The fact that I can run a four-minute 
mile is also a piece of evidence that I am fit, but not a content-bearing one. Focusing 
on content-bearing pieces of evidence used to support modal claims, Kratzer noted an 
interesting contrast. Whether a speaker can distance herself from the modal claim 
varies with the modifier used to specify that piece of evidence. For example, while 
(351) has no reading on which it is bad, with (352) there is such a reading (cf. Kratzer 
2012, 24–25, 33–35; cf. also Matthewson 2016, 538–41). 
 
(351) According to the rumor, Roger must have been elected chief. But he 
actually doesn’t have to have been. [≈ Matthewson’s (24)] 
(352) Given the rumor, Roger must have been elected chief. ?But he actually 
doesn’t have to have been. [≈ Matthewson’s (23)] 
 
To account for this contrast, Kratzer suggests that in the first case we are claiming, 
more or less, that the content of the rumor entails that Roger has been elected chief. 
Since we recognize that this content may well be false, we can subsequently distance 
ourselves from its alleged entailment. In the second case, however, we are supposed 
to be claiming that that the fact that the rumor exists entails that Roger has been 
elected. (Maybe a rumor with this content would only exist in a world where Roger 
had been elected chief.) And since we are claiming that one fact entails another, then 
we cannot subsequently distance ourselves from that second fact.94 This is Kratzer’s 
account of the contrast between (351) and (352), and it suggests that with content-
bearing pieces of evidence, like rumors, we have two distinct modes of domain 
projection: contentful and factual. Yet on Kratzer’s original analysis, evidence used to 
project a domain would always be used as the value of an epistemic conversational 
background, which would seem to entail an exclusively contentful mode of domain 
 
94 The reading on which (352) would be fine on this analysis, brought out by emphasis on the 
rumor, would be one in which we were making a claim about what the content of the rumor entailed. 
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projection. So the distinction between contentful and factual modes of domain 
projection seems to cross-cut the distinction between epistemic and circumstantial 
conversational backgrounds, a second major discontinuity in Kratzer’s work. 
I am not convinced that Kratzer’s account of her contrast is on the right track, as I 
will argue in Section 6.3.2.95 Assuming that it is, however, all that it really shows is 
that we may sometimes project a modal domain from the matrix content of an 
evidential state and sometimes from its embedded content. In this case, the matrix 
content of the evidential state could be that there is a rumor that Roger was elected 
chief, and the embedded content of that state would be that Roger was elected chief. 
Yet projection from either sort of content will be a contentful mode of projection.  
For no fact is a piece of evidence per se, just as no fact is a known fact per se. To 
characterize a fact in either of these ways is to characterize in a contentful way: as the 
content of an evidential or knowledge state. Hence, if we treat these characterizations 
as essential, as what differentiates one flavor of modality from another, for example, 
then we are already committed to a contentful mode of projection for any facts used 
to project (or determine) the modal base. The alleged distinction between factual and 
contentful modes of projection from a body of evidence is really a distinction 
between projection from its matrix and embedded contents. There is no discontinuity, 
then, in the move from epistemic conversational backgrounds to the allegedly factual 
mode of projection from bodies of evidence, or at least not when it comes to the 
meaning difference between might and can.96 
 
6.2.3 An implicit alternative to Kratzer’s explicit analysis 
My interpretation of the commitments and implications of Kratzer’s recent work is 
not standard. Indeed, many have seen in Kratzer’s work support for my own 
contention that might is not epistemic, and that might and can thus do not differ along 
an epistemic/non-epistemic dimension either. Of course, I would be glad for such 
support. But I do not think it is there. The intensional characterization as evidence of 
the facts used to determine the modal base plays the same critical, flavor-determining 
role in her early work (where those facts are provided as the value of a conversational 
background) as in her later work (where those facts are provided by a modal anchor). 
That said, I do think there is implicit in Kratzer a relational alternative to (what I take 
to be) her explicit fact-based analysis. Here are two examples of what I mean. 
First, in her early work, Kratzer writes: 
 
95 In fact, it should be noted that the content of content-bearing pieces of evidence like rumors and 
feelings, etc., would not be used to project domains on Kratzer’s original analysis but instead, 
functioning as the value of the ordering source, to restrict and order already projected domains. Why 
Kratzer does not attempt to account for the contrast between (351) and (352) in terms of her contrast 
between modal bases and ordering sources I am not completely certain. 
96 Perhaps it will seem there is an important discontinuity in the move from the known facts (the 
value of an epistemic conversational background) to the facts that constitute our evidence (the factual 
mode of projection from a body of evidence). Yet, for better or for worse, Kratzer seems to treat a fact 
as a piece of evidence if and only if it is a known fact. She writes, for example, that “the epistemic 
conversational background (‘in view of the available evidence’) determines for every world the set of 
worlds which are epistemically accessible from it” (Kratzer 1991, 644; emphasis mine). Kratzer may 
well be mistaken in her view of the relation between evidence and knowledge. But, given that view, 
her view of the type of modal base involved in both cases remains the same. 




If we use an epistemic modal [like might], we are interested in what else may or 
must be the case in our world, given everything we know already. And if we 
use a circumstantial modal [like can], we are interested in what can or must 
happen, given circumstances of a certain kind. … Epistemic modality and 
circumstantial modality involve a different categorization of the facts (1981, 
302; emphasis mine). 
 
Now what may or must be the case are propositions, and what can or must happen are 
events. Kratzer is thus implicitly appealing to the distinction between propositional 
and event modality that is explicit in Palmer (1979; 1986; 2001) and that can also be 
seen as the precursor for my proposal in this final section of the dissertation.97 For 
Kratzer is really concerned in the first case with the modal properties of propositions: 
that is, with whether, relatively speaking, they are possibly or necessarily true. And 
Kratzer is really concerned in the second with the modal properties of individuals, 
situations, locations, etc.: that is, with the potentials that determine what eventualities 
are possible or necessary for the future. However, Kratzer attempts to reduce the 
differences between the entities to which these properties are attributed to a difference 
in the characterization of the facts responsible for those properties. 
Kratzer does something very similar in her recent work, here even building into 
her characterization of the facts a description of this relational difference itself. 
 
The kind of facts that are targeted by the two types of modals are different in 
kind, though: external or internal circumstances of people, things, or places that 
determine their possible futures contrast with evidence of things implying or 
suggesting the presence of other facts in the past, present, or future (2012, 54; 
emphasis mine).  
 
Here Kratzer comes her closest to explicitly formulating the distinction between event 
and propositional modality: for possible futures comprise events and facts are just 
true propositions. But since the internal and external circumstances of things may 
sometimes be the same as our evidence, Kratzer’s attempt to build this distinction into 
her characterization of the facts does not suffice in this regard. 
Kratzer claims, in what has so far been this chapter’s theme, that “there is a subtle 
semantic difference between the two kinds of modals I grouped under the two 
headings. It is a difference in the kind of facts relied on” (2012, 51). Yet she adds that 
“the facts relied on seem to be different in a way that has proven difficult to 
 
97 In Palmer’s formulation, propositional modality concerns “[a] speaker’s attitude to the truth-
value or factual status of the proposition,” while event modality refers to “events that are not 
actualized, events that have not taken place but are merely potential” (2001, 8). These definitions can 
be generalized, both to bring them in line with my own proposal and to make them more empirically 
adequate. For example, propositional modality could involve the attribution of any modal property to a 
proposition. And with event modality, we could take the basic fact to be that the modal properties of 
individuals, situations, locations, etc., are specified with reference to events that need not be actualized, 
even though they sometimes are. This accommodates modal claims that entail that the relevant 
properties have been actualized on some occasions, or so-called actuality entailments (cf. Hacquard 
2009). 
Chapter Six: The Meaning Difference Between Might and Can 
126 
 
characterize in formal terms” (2012, 50). Now I think that Kratzer’s difficulties are 
due to it being not the facts themselves that differentiate the modals but instead the 
relations they express to those facts. Hence, Kratzer ends up having to try to build 
into her characterization of facts a description of this relational difference itself. But 
what motivates Kratzer to adopt a fact-based analysis in the first place? In the next 
two sections of this chapter, I address both the intuitive and the theoretical motivation 
for the fact-based analysis and show that neither is ultimately very well-served by it. 
 
6.3 On the intuitive motivation for Kratzer’s analysis 
6.3.1 Epistemic contradictions 
Say that we are admiring a neighbor’s garden, and that one of the relevant facts in the 
context is that there are no hydrangeas growing there. Then it seems that I will say 
something false if I utter (353), but not necessarily if I utter (354) (cf. Kratzer 1991, 
646). 
 
(353) Hydrangeas might be growing here. [≈ Kratzer’s (21b)] 
(354) Hydrangeas can grow here. [Kratzer’s (21a)] 
 
A similar contrast arises for possible with regard to finite and non-finite complements 
(cf. DeRose 1991, 601–5; Vetter 2013, 4–5). If one of the facts that is relevant in the 
context is that Frank does not run four-minute miles, then the claim made with (355) 
seems necessarily to be false, but the claim made with (356) seems as though it could 
possibly be true. 
 
(355) It is possible that Frank runs four-minute miles. [Vetter’s (1a)] 
(356) It is possible for Frank to run four-minute miles. [Vetter’s (1c)] 
 
This contrast in truth-value judgments carries over to cases where the proposition 
that we have assumed to be relevant in the context is instead asserted in conjunction 
with the modal proposition. While the conjunction in (357) seems anomalous—what 
Yalcin (2007) calls an epistemic contradiction—the conjunction in (358) does not.  
 
(357) #Frank doesn’t run four-minute miles anymore, but it’s possible that he 
does so. 
(358) Frank doesn’t run four-minute miles anymore, but it’s possible for him to 
do so. 
 
Similarly, while (359) seems anomalous, (360) does not.  
 
(359) #Hydrangeas aren’t growing here, but they might be growing here. 
(360) Hydrangeas aren’t growing here, but they can grow here. 
 
In sum, knowing or asserting that the content of might’s complement is false will 
generally have the effect of making a might-claim bad. Yet the same does not hold for 
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a can-claim, mutatis mutandis.98 With might, but not can, it seems possible for there 
to be a certain sort of contradictoriness involving the prejacent. 
The Kratzerian explanation for this contrast is that with might there is an epistemic 
characterization of the facts that determine the modal base, but with can there is not. 
Hence, we cannot ignore any of the known facts, or the available evidence, in making 
a might-claim, but we can, and do, in making a can-claim. Since it is a known fact 
that hydrangeas are not growing here, and since this known fact is incompatible with 
the proposition that they are, the might-claims above turn out to be false or 
contradictory. Yet since this known fact can be ignored for circumstantial modals, the 
can-claims are neither, at least not on this account (cf. Kratzer 1991, 646).  
This contrast between might and can when it comes to so-called epistemic 
contradictions provides the intuitive motivation for the Kratzerian analysis of the 
meaning difference between the two as an epistemic/non-epistemic one. Yet I will 
now show that we should really be talking more generally of modal contradictions, 
and that the best analysis of the meaning difference between might and can here 
cannot be in terms of an epistemic/non-epistemic divide. 
 
6.3.2 Modal contradictions 
The contrast between might and can from Section 6.3.1 is not limited to cases in 
which might is assumed to have an epistemic interpretation. Instead, it carries over to 
future-oriented cases, like (361), in which might’s interpretation is standardly 
assumed to be metaphysical, perhaps necessarily so (cf. Klecha 2016).99 
 
(361) #John might win tomorrow’s race, but he won’t. 
(362) John can win tomorrow’s race, but he won’t. 
 
In addition, there are also cases where it is not a might-claim that is anomalous in a 
conjunction, but instead a can-claim, as in (363)-(366).  
 
(363) ?John never hits the bullseye, but he can. 
(364) John never hits the bullseye, but he might. 
 
(365) ?These crops have never grown above six feet, but they can. 
(366) These crops have never grown above six feet, but they might. 
 
98 Assuming, that is, that the content of can’s complement can even be an object of knowledge or 
assertion in the first place. If the contrast between might and can has the same sort of explanation as 
the contrast with possible between its finite and non-finite complements, then this is not at all obvious. 
99 DeRose (1998) has argued that any apparently metaphysical reading of a future-oriented might is 
derived from its actual epistemic one. But the derivation is implausible. It requires the facts that 
determine the epistemic modal base to include the total laws and history, and whatever follows from 
them, in most cases not as known but instead merely as knowable, in some contextually relevant way. 
Further the motivation for the derivation is a desire to avoid positing an ambiguity between future- and 
present-oriented might, in conjunction with the belief that the badness of the examples in Section 6.3.1 
can only be attributed to might’s having an epistemic meaning. But this belief I have already shown to 
be false (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.4 and Chapter 5, Section 5.7). Hence, the desire to avoid an 
ambiguity can be satisfied in some other way: for example, by positing a single, circumstantial reading 
for both cases. 




Just as our evidence does not support the claim that hydrangeas might be growing 
here if we know that they are not, so it intuitively does not support the claim that John 
can hit the bullseye if we know that he never does (cf. also Thalberg 1972 for what 
constitutes evidence for an ability attribution). In both cases, however, our evidence 
may support the alternative modal claim. 
If this contrast in what our evidence supports has the same explanation as the 
contrast from Section 6.3.1, then we have to hold that with might we can ignore 
certain known facts that we cannot ignore with can: for example, the known fact that 
the crops have never grown above six feet, or that John never hits the bulls-eye. To 
explain the two contrasts, we would thus require both epistemic and non-epistemic 
characterizations of the relevant facts: both for might and for can. And this would 
suggest that the real difference between the two is not how the relevant facts are 
characterized. Instead, a further, underlying difference can make an epistemic 
characterization seem apt in some cases but not others. 
Much the same holds for the extension of Kratzer’s original contrast from might’s 
apparently epistemic uses to its apparently metaphysical ones. If both uses contrast 
with can in the same way, this suggests that something more fundamental, and 
common to both, is responsible for their contrast with can. 
Say, for example, that both uses of might attribute to a proposition the relative 
property of being possibly true. A proposition cannot have this property relative to its 
negation, with which it is trivially incompatible. Hence, adding the prejacent’s 
negation to the modal base—here understood as the set of facts relative to which the 
content of the modal claim is evaluated for truth—should result in contradictoriness 
independently of how the facts that the modal base comprises are characterized. Say, 
in contrast, that with can we attribute modal properties to individuals, etc. These 
modal properties, also known as potentials, are specified with reference to 
eventualities that need not be actualized. Hence, no contradictoriness should result 
from adding to the modal base the proposition that the relevant eventuality is not 
currently being actualized. And again, this is independently of any characterization of 
the facts that the modal base comprises. 
This sort of difference between the entities to which we attribute modal properties 
would also seem to explain the contrasts in (363)-(366). While the non-realization of 
a potential—a modal property of an individual, etc.—is no indication of its non-
existence, we also have no good basis for attributing one if the hypothesized potential 
has never been realized on any occasion on which it could have been. This explains 
why (363) and (365) are anomalous, even while (358) and (360) are not. Likewise, 
while a proposition p cannot possibly be true relative to a set of facts that includes its 
negation, a proposition p1 can possibly be true relative to a set of facts that includes 
~p2, ~p3, etc. That is, while the proposition that hydrangeas are growing here at t1 is 
incompatible with the proposition that they are not growing here at t1, the proposition 
that John has not hit the bulls-eye at t1, t2 … tn need not be incompatible with the 
proposition that he hits the bulls-eye at tn+1. And this explains why (364) and (366) 
are fine, even while (357) and (359) are not. 
Of course, more must be said to precisify this characterization of the difference 
between might and can in terms of the different sort of entities to which we attribute 
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modal properties. But the more that must be said cannot be that might and can differ 
in whether the relevant facts are characterized epistemically, at least not if we are to 
provide the same sort of explanation for the contrasts in this section as in the previous 
one. We could, perhaps, attempt to explain only the first contrast in terms of how the 
facts are characterized. But there is something unsatisfactory about this attempt, 
especially given that the first contrast does not have to be explained in this way. If we 
could attribute the two contrasts to the same underlying principle, it would be better 
to do so. And we can, if we hold that with might we are concerned with the relative 
modal properties of propositions, while with can we are concerned with potentials, 
which are the relative modal properties of individuals, locations, situations, etc. 
A different argument against the attempt to account for the meaning difference 
between might and can in epistemic and non-epistemic terms comes from a case 
where other allegedly epistemic modals show similarities to acknowledged non-
epistemics when it comes to modal contradictions. Recall Kratzer’s contrast between 
modifiers from Section 6.2.2.2, intended to motivate the distinction between 
contentful and factual modes of domain projection for allegedly epistemic modals. It 
turns out that this same sort of contrast arises with what she would take to be 
circumstantial modals, including deontic and teleological ones. While the normative 
(367) has no reading on which it is bad, for example, the normative (368) does. 
 
(367) According to the rumor, Roger must go to confession. But he actually 
doesn’t have to. 
(368) Given the rumor, Roger must go to confession. ?But he actually doesn’t 
have to. 
 
The simplest account of this contrast would hold that with (367) we are simply 
reporting the modal content of the rumor’s claim. And, as with any speech report, we 
are free to distance ourselves from the reported content, though not from the report 
itself, without fear of backtracking or contradiction. With (368) on its non-reportative 
reading, in contrast, we are saying that the fact that the rumor exists necessitates, 
whether deontically or more likely teleologically, that Roger go to confession. Maybe 
we believe the content of the rumor to be false. But given that the rumor even exists, 
and given the current political climate, if Roger wants to save his career, confession is 
the only way to go.100 And of course, once we ourselves have made this modal claim, 
contradiction or backtracking are the only way to distance ourselves from it. The 
contrast between (368) and (367) is simply the contrast between making a modal 
claim and reporting one. 
This account of the contrast between (367) and (368) makes no reference to the 
rumor as a piece of evidence. And the simplest account of the similarity between this 
contrast and the contrast between (351) and (352) is that no such reference is needed 
there either. With (351), for example, we could simply be reporting the modal content 
of the rumor’s claim. And with (352), on its non-reportative reading, we could be 
saying that the fact that the rumor exists entails that Roger has been elected chief. 
 
100 Alexander Williams has pointed out to me an alternative non-reportative reading: namely, that 
Roger must go to confession, given that the content of the rumor is true. This sort of reading is also 
available in the allegedly epistemic case from Section 6.2.2.2. 
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Maybe the content of the rumor has nothing to do with Roger directly. But given that 
a rumor with its content would only arise if certain policies had been enacted—and 
given that Roger was the only candidate who would enact those policies—then Roger 
must be the chief if that rumor exists. In the first case, we are reporting a modal 
claim; in the second, we are making one. And the distinction between reporting and 
claiming suffices to explain why we can distance ourselves in the one case from the 
modal content without contradiction or backtracking but cannot do so in the other. 
We do not need to reference content-bearing pieces of evidence from which either 
“factual” or “contentful” modes of domain projection are alleged to be possible. And, 
since it would be simpler and more uniform not to do so, I would also suggest that we 
should not.101 
When it comes to modal contradictions, then, both the similarities and the 
contrasts between allegedly epistemic modals and acknowledged non-epistemic ones 
suggest that the meaning difference between the two does not depend on an epistemic 
versus non-epistemic characterization of the relevant facts used to determine the 
modal base.  
 
6.4 On the theoretical motivation for Kratzer’s analysis 
The contrast from Section 6.3.1 provides the intuitive motivation for the Kratzerian 
analysis of the meaning difference between might and can. Yet on closer inspection, 
there is also something remarkably unintuitive about that analysis. Kratzer claims, for 
example, that we sometimes “have to neglect certain facts [in making a can-claim], 
although we might be aware of them” (1981, 303). But there is no intuitive sense in 
which we have to ignore or neglect the known fact that hydrangeas are not growing 
here in order to claim that they can. For this claim seems to involve the attribution of 
a potential, and potentials exist independently of their realization. Hence, it is not at 
all intuitive that (or why) we should have to ignore the known fact that a potential is 
not being realized in order to say that it exists, contrary to what Kratzer implies. 
Why then does Kratzer claim that we sometimes must ignore known facts when 
making can-claims? In Section 6.4.1, I am going to argue that Kratzer’s claim is 
about what is required from a formal standpoint, not an intuitive one. Yet the formal 
requirement is not absolute. Instead, it depends on formal choices that I argue in 
Section 6.4.2 are motivated by, though ultimately untenable with, the Kratzerian non-
ambiguity project. In Section 6.4.3, I conclude by showing how that project fares 
without the intensional assumption that it motivates. 
 
6.4.1 The formal framework 
The possible worlds framework provides a useful way to label the different flavors of 
modality expressed by might and can. We can say that the former quantifies over 
alethically accessible worlds, for example, and the latter over dynamically accessible 
ones.102 Yet the framework itself does not commit us to any particular analysis of 
 
101 My guess is that Kratzer does not consider the alternative presented here because she is working 
under the assumption, argued against in the previous chapter, that “epistemics” do not contribute to the 
embedded content of attitude and indirect speech reports.  
102 In discussing the general possible worlds framework, not just Kratzer’s specific implementation 
of it, I will adopt standard practice and use terms like accessible worlds and accessibility relation 
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what makes one world alethically but not dynamically accessible, or vice versa. 
Instead, accessibility relations are black boxes, placeholders for analyses. Now it is 
possible that the various types of accessibility relations will all have the same sort of 
analysis: that there will be a single template, with variables to be filled in, that will 
suffice to generate these types and, correspondingly, their modal flavors. It is equally 
possible, however, that various accessibility relations and modal flavors will require 
their own separate analyses. The possible worlds framework is compatible with either 
view. 
Kratzer, it should be clear, adopts the template view of accessibility relations. She 
holds that what makes a world accessible in one but not another way is if it 
instantiates a set of propositions characterized in one but not the other way. She also 
holds, for all the different types of accessibility relations, that they place the same sort 
of constraint on accessible worlds: namely, that a proposition be true in all or some of 
those worlds, depending on the force of the modal. 
This template view has ramifications for how Kratzer models claims about 
potentials, or what she calls pure circumstantials. The potential for hydrangeas to 
grow here, for example, will be modeled by having it be true of at least one of the 
accessible worlds that hydrangeas are growing here. And these accessible worlds will 
just be ones that instantiate some relevant set of facts. Given these choices, a problem 
arises if one of the relevant facts is that hydrangeas are not growing here. For all the 
accessible worlds will instantiate that fact, and so at none of those worlds will it be 
true that hydrangeas are growing here, which is what the attribution of the potential 
requires. Hence, the relevant facts need to exclude that hydrangeas are not growing 
here. From a formal standpoint, we need somehow to be able to “ignore” this known 
fact when making the can-claims above.103 
For Kratzer, the way to formally ignore the known fact that hydrangeas are not 
growing here is to look for some way of characterizing the facts that ensures that it 
does not count as relevant. Yet while she rules out the epistemic characterization that 
would not have this effect, she struggles to provide a positive characterization that 
would. In her early work, she speaks vaguely of “circumstances of a certain kind” and 
of “certain sorts of facts” (1981, 302; 1991, 646). In recent work, she is sometimes 
more specific, speaking, for example, of “internal and external circumstances of 
people, things, [and] places that determine their possible futures” (2012, 54). Yet it is 
not clear that the second half of this description does not beg the question. And it is 
not clear that the first half, by itself, would allow us to formally ignore precisely those 
circumstances that we need to. (If I am sitting, for example, but can also stand, do my 
relevant internal and external circumstances include that I am sitting?) 
 
slightly differently from how I have so far. For example, I will speak of deontically accessible worlds 
rather than deontically-ordered, circumstantially-accessible ones. My reasons for doing so will soon 
become clear. 
103 A alternative response to modeling potentials in this way is to hold that attributions of potentials 
are claims about what is true at some accessible world at some future point (cf. Thomas 2014; 
Rullmann and Matthewson 2018). Then the fact that hydrangeas are not currently growing here does 
not have to be ignored but can instead be held constant across all accessible worlds. I address this 
view, which supposedly helps explain the temporal interpretation of modals, in the following chapter. 
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My point here, however, is not to catalog any difficulties that Kratzer may or may 
not have in formally ignoring known facts. Instead, it is to show there are alternatives 
to the template view, and so alternative ways to formally ignore known facts too.  
To help see this, consider the difference between the modal base as defined in the 
rest of the dissertation and as Kratzer has defined it. The first, ModalBase1, is the set 
of facts relative to which the content of the modal claim is evaluated for truth. The 
second, ModalBase2, is the set of worlds that the modal quantifies over. Now Kratzer 
has assumed there is a straightforward relation between ModalBase1 and ModalBase2. 
ModalBase1 determines a set of worlds—namely, the set of worlds which verify all of 
its members—and this is identical to ModalBase2. Yet maybe we should not adopt a 
single mechanism for moving from ModalBase1 (the set of facts relative to which we 
evaluate the content of a modal claim for truth) to ModalBase2 (the set of worlds that 
we formally use to model the truth conditions for that claim). After all, insofar as the 
non-realization of a potential is no indication of its non-existence, it seems it could be 
true that hydrangeas can grow here, even relative to the fact that they are not. If so, 
then maybe instead of trying to formally ignore known facts by utilizing a single 
mechanism for moving from ModalBase1 to ModalBase2, while appealing to different 
characterizations of the facts, we could instead attempt to do so by utilizing different 
mechanisms while appealing to the same intensional characterizations (or eschewing 
such characterizations altogether).  
A different possibility is to allow modals to place different sorts of constraints on 
different sorts of accessible worlds. With alethically accessible worlds, for example, 
we could assume the traditional constraint: that a specific proposition be true at some 
or all of those worlds. With dynamically accessible worlds, however, we could 
perhaps instead require that a specific sort of event occur at some or all of them. Now 
obviously, if an event occurs at a possible world, there will be a corresponding 
proposition that is true of that world. Yet the event constraint is crucially more 
general than the propositional one. While the latter involves the temporal structure of 
the world, the former need not. And this could be one possible way to formally ignore 
known facts. If it is true in all accessible worlds that hydrangeas are not growing here, 
there could still be hydrangea-growing events in those worlds. An event constraint on 
possible worlds, as opposed to a propositional one, thus provides another way to 
formally ignore known facts: i.e., to ensure that they do not have unintended formal 
consequences. 
There are likely to still be other ways to formally ignore known facts as necessary. 
What is most important, however, is to recognize that this necessity is merely formal. 
It is not conceptual. And even within the possible worlds framework there are formal 
choices available to us. There is no necessity, and no a priori reason either, to adopt 
the template view of accessibility relations. It is thus part of a substantive analysis 
within that framework to do so, and to hold, as Kratzer does, that the intensional 
characterization of propositions and facts is what differentiates one modal flavor from 
another.104 In this following section, I will thus explore why I think it is that Kratzer 
 
104 Or rather, it is part of a substantive analysis provided that the intensional characterizations are 
not question-begging ones. For example, if we hold that can requires compatibility with the relevant 
facts that bear on the existence of a potential, and might with those that bear on the truth of a 
proposition, then we will have begged the question whether they express (i) the same relationship to 
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adopts the template view. And I will argue that her reason for doing so is ultimately 
ill-served by her intensional assumption. 
 
6.4.2 The intensional assumption 
Kratzer’s reason for making the intensional assumption relates to her attempt to 
account for the phenomenon of modal flexibility, or the ability of a single modal to be 
used to express multiple flavors of modality (Kratzer 1977). This phenomenon turns 
out to be fairly widespread, both across languages and language groups (cf. Hacquard 
2010). Yet Kratzer notes that with the template view of accessibility relations we can 
avoid encoding a modal’s flavor into its semantic entry, and so can avoid having to 
posit multiple semantic entries for the multiple flavors of modality that flexible 
modals can be used to express. To avoid such ambiguity, all that is required is that the 
variable positions in the template for accessibility relations be able to be filled in 
either by context or by syntax (cf., respectively, Kratzer 1981; 1991; and Kratzer 
2012; 2013). And a natural way for context and syntax to do this is to make available 
intensionally characterized sets of propositions, the differences in characterization 
generating the different types of accessibility relations. 
The intensional assumption is thus natural given Kratzer’s non-ambiguity project. 
Yet whether it is also required for that project is another matter. If so, the project 
should be abandoned, independently of any argument in this dissertation (cf. Nauze 
2008; Viebahn and Vetter 2016). And if not, then the intensional assumption should 
be, so that Kratzer’s project itself does not have to. Let me explain. 
Kratzer, as already seen from Section 6.2.2.1, proposes two models for generating 
different types of accessibility relations and modal flavors.105 The first relies on 
context alone (Kratzer 1981; 1991). Different types of accessibility relations are 
generated by combinations of different types of conversational backgrounds (i.e., by 
contextually-provided functions from possible worlds to sets of propositions). One of 
these conversational backgrounds will determine the Kratzerian modal base, and the 
other will function as an ordering source for the worlds in that base. The second 
model supplements context with syntax (cf. Hacquard 2006; Kratzer 2012; 2013). 
Adapting the work of Hacquard, Kratzer no longer uses conversational backgrounds 
to generate modal bases. Instead, she relies on an alleged difference in the syntactic 
height of modals, and in the semantic objects available at those heights, to do so. This 
difference had always been correlated with her different types of modal bases, and so 
presumably could replace the different types of backgrounds previously used to 
generate them. In combination with the different types of conversational backgrounds 
functioning as ordering sources, this height difference is now supposed to generate 
the different types of accessibility relations and modal flavors (2012, 49–55). 
 
facts characterized in different ways or instead (ii) different relationships to potentially the same set of 
facts. Kratzer’s characterizations do not generally seem to be question-begging in this way. However, 
they are also incomplete, as pointed out earlier, and it is not immediately clear how to complete them 
without begging the question either. 
105 In this section, I will again follow standard practice and use terms like accessibility relation in a 
broader sense than the Kratzerian one used in Section 6.2.2.1. A change in how the latter sort of 
relation is generated will thus imply a change in how the former is, but not necessarily vice versa. 
Chapter Six: The Meaning Difference Between Might and Can 
134 
 
Now the first of these two models Kratzer rejects because she ultimately rejects 
her earlier distinction between the relevant conversational backgrounds used to 
generate modal bases: namely, circumstantial and epistemic backgrounds (cf. Nauze 
2008). These are supposed to differ in whether their values are propositions construed 
as the circumstances or instead as the content of a knowledge state. However, no 
proposition construed as a circumstance could not also, in principle (even if not in 
practice), be construed as the content of a knowledge state, and vice versa. Kratzer 
concludes from this fact that the distinction between types of conversational 
backgrounds must be rejected, nothing allowing us “to single out some . . . functions 
as epistemic, but not circumstantial, or the other way around” (2012, 24). The 
functions themselves are not antecedently of either type, and so by themselves they 
do not allow us to differentiate modal flavors either. If we have already done the 
latter, then we can label such a function and use it to represent that flavor. But we 
cannot hope to go in the opposite direction (for further discussion, cf. Chapter 3, 
Section 3.3.3). 
Kratzer does not reject her distinction between types of conversational 
backgrounds functioning as ordering sources, but she should by this same reasoning 
(Nauze 2008).106 Deontic and bouletic conversational backgrounds, for example, are 
supposed to differ in whether their values are propositions construed as the content of 
a body of laws or instead of a body of desires. However, no proposition construed as 
the content of the law—e.g., no murder occurs—could not also, in principle (even if 
not in practice), be construed as the content of a desire. And vice versa. Hence, if we 
cannot appeal to different types of conversational backgrounds to determine different 
types of modal bases, neither can we appeal to different types of conversational 
backgrounds to induce different types of orderings on the worlds in those bases. 
Conversational backgrounds can play no role in determining the type of accessibility 
relation (and so in determining modal flavor), whether they are supposed to have 
generated the modal base or to have induced an ordering on it. Kratzer’s second 
model should thus also be rejected alongside her first.  
Problematically for Kratzer, however, only for modal flavors differentiated in 
terms of her modal bases is there evidence of different syntactic heights (cf. Hacquard 
2010). For modal flavors differentiated exclusively in terms of her ordering sources—
deontic and bouletic flavors, for example—there is none. Some authors have even 
proposed instead that for specific modal flavors there may be flavor-internal height 
differences (cf. Brennan 1993 on ought-to-be vs. ought-to-do deontics), while others 
have proposed more general flavor-internal height differences correlated with modal 
force (cf. Cinque 1999 on possibility vs. necessity modals).  
If these authors are correct, then there are two problems facing us if we attempt to 
rely on syntax alone to generate different types of accessibility relations. First, we 
will require relevantly different types of semantic objects at the same syntactic height 
for any modal flavors not differentiated height-wise. Second, we will sometimes 
 
106 Nauze (2008)’s observations about the conversational backgrounds used to determine modal 
bases are often cited in support of rejecting the distinction between epistemic and circumstantial 
backgrounds (cf. Kratzer 2012; Matthewson 2016). Oddly enough, his equivalent observations about 
conversational backgrounds functioning as ordering sources are never addressed, as far as I can tell. 
But the observations point to the same conclusion. If we accept this conclusion in the one case, we 
need some argument for why we should not accept it in the other. I have seen none given. 
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require relevantly the same types of semantic objects at different heights to 
accommodate any flavor-internal height differences.107 Kratzer’s second model thus 
cannot be easily revised to generate all the different types of accessibility relations, 
and hence modal flavors, that we require. This suggests that something has gone 
wrong. 
What has gone wrong is that while context may provide sets of propositions, or the 
values of conversational backgrounds, it does not intensionally characterize them 
(Nauze 2008). Hence, if this is what differentiates one type of accessibility relation 
and modal flavor from another, it will have to be provided by a modal’s semantic 
entry, multiple entries being posited for modals used to express multiple flavors of 
modality. That said, once we have hardwired a modal’s flavor into its semantic entry, 
there is no longer any reason to adopt the template view of accessibility relations or to 
think that all flavor differences must be differences in intensional characterization of 
the sort that Kratzer assumed she required for her non-ambiguity project to succeed.  
The intensional assumption may be motivated by the Kratzerian non-ambiguity 
project, then, but it turns out to be incompatible with it. Whether we give up on the 
project of accounting for modal flexibility without positing modal ambiguity, or 
instead attempt to make it work without the intensional assumption, either way the 
result is the same. We should simply give up on the intensional assumption itself. 
Instead of holding that might and can differ with regard to the facts that they express 
modal relations to, we should consider the distinct possibility that they differ in the 
relations they express to those facts. 
 
6.4.3 Non-ambiguity without the intensional assumption 
Despite his criticism of its reliance on intensionally characterized conversational 
backgrounds, Nauze seems to suggest that Kratzer’s non-ambiguity project may still 
be viable. In advocating an ambiguity framework, for example, Nauze writes that 
“obviously we need within such a framework a way to resolve the ambiguity,” and he 
continues by claiming that “this ambiguity is often resolved by context” (2008, 153–
54). Yet this is not a theoretical disadvantage of his framework compared to the non-
ambiguity one, Nauze avers. Instead, he takes his argument to have shown precisely 
that, even within the Kratzerian framework, “a new contextual parameter [over and 
above conversational backgrounds] is needed to determine the [flavor] of modality 
involved in a particular utterance” (2008, 157–58). And Nauze asserts that this “same 
parameter could be used in [an ambiguity] framework … for the same purpose” 
(2008, 158). Nauze thus seems to be conceding that the non-ambiguity project can be 
made to work, just not in its standardly assumed form. 
Unfortunately, Nauze obscures what is at stake in choosing between ambiguity and 
non-ambiguity frameworks with these comments. Context simply does not play the 
same role in these two theories, and there is no contextual parameter that is needed 
for the ambiguity framework. To suggest that there is is equivalent to suggesting that 
there is a contextual parameter for the numeric subscripts that we use to represent the 
different senses of a word like bank. When an ambiguous word like bank is used, 
various contextual pressures may well lead us to prefer one sense over another. But 
 
107 An additional concern is whether we should hope to rely on a single or instead multiple 
syntactically-provided objects to generate different types of accessibility relations. 
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this is not a matter of accessing an underspecified semantic entry, for which context 
somehow supplies the relevant missing numeric subscript. Rather, it is a matter of 
accessing one fully specified semantic entry, which we represent with a subscript, as 
opposed to another. This is in contrast to what happens when we interpret a third-
person pronoun like he in context. Here there is a single, underspecified semantic 
entry for which context does need to supply the referent. And the choice between 
ambiguity and non-ambiguity frameworks for flexible modals is the choice between 
interpreting such modals as analogous to bank or instead as analogous to a pronoun 
like he. Contrary to what Nauze suggests, there is not some contextual parameter to 
be used for the same flavor-specifying purposes in the two frameworks. 
I am, on the whole, thus somewhat less sanguine than Nauze about the prospects 
of the Kratzerian non-ambiguity project without the intensional assumption. In fact, 
as far as I can tell, the best hope for that project is to abandon the template view of 
accessibility relations, and the search for appropriate objects to fill into that template 
to generate the flavor differences. Instead, we should hold that different sorts of 
accessibility relations could sometimes have fundamentally different sorts of 
analyses: that is, that modal flavors could involve different sorts of modal relations, 
not just the same modal relations to different sorts of propositions. Doing so, we 
could then posit a semantic entry, specified for force, with a variable ranging directly 
over these different sorts of accessibility relations themselves (rather than over 
entities intended to generate them). This would be analogous to what Recanati (2001) 
proposes for possessive phrases like John’s car, where he suggests that there may be 
a free variable over the various relations that John may bear to this car (e.g., John 
may own the car, or have placed a bet on it, or be its designer, or have a particular 
fondness for it, etc.) (cf. Recanati 2001, 85; for a response, cf. Bach 2001, 39). Just as 
these relations will have fundamentally different sorts of analyses—and not a 
template, with variables to be filled in by context, that is capable of generating them 
one and all—so the same could hold for accessibility relations within the possible 
worlds framework. 
Whether we should adopt a Recanati-style variable over accessibility relations is 
not the concern of this chapter, however. If the non-ambiguity project is compatible 
with my fundamental contention that might and can express fundamentally different 
sorts of relations, and not just the same relation to fundamentally different sorts of 
facts, then whether to do so depends on the strength of the arguments for the non-
ambiguity project itself. Now I am not convinced the standard arguments for this 
project are all that compelling, as I will argue in the next section. However, the most 
important conclusion of this section is that the template view of accessibility relations 
and the intensional assumption, though initially motivated by Kratzer’s non-
ambiguity project, ultimately do not serve that project well. Any investment we have 
in this project should thus not lead us to favor a fact-based analysis of the difference 
between might and can over a relational one. Very likely, it should lead us to do quite 
the opposite. 
 
6.5 Revisiting the arguments for Kratzer’s non-ambiguity project 
Kratzer’s non-ambiguity project is not my primary concern in this chapter. That said, 
this project has been the driving force in the formal semantics for natural language 
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modals since its inception. Hence, it is worth addressing this project directly to see 
how well-motivated it is on the whole. I do this in the following sections, evaluating 
the individual arguments that have been offered on its behalf. 
 
6.5.1 The explosion of meanings argument 
In a recent paper, Viebahn and Vetter (2016) catalogue the arguments for Kratzer’s 
non-ambiguity project. One of these they call the explosion-of-meanings argument 
(the term is due to Schaffer 2011). This is the argument from Kratzer (1977) that once 
we begin to multiply modal meanings to account for modal flexibility, there is no 
natural point at which to cease doing so before implausibly many have been posited. 
We might, for example, want to hold that there is a mustdeontic which occurs in 
(369), and a mustepistemic which occurs in (370). 
 
(369) All Maori children must learn the names of their ancestors. [Kratzer’s (2)] 
(370) The ancestors of the Maoris must have arrived from Tahiti. [Kratzer’s (3)] 
 
However, (369) could be used to make a claim about regional social customs or 
instead about national laws. So we should really posit a mustdeontic-social-customs and a 
mustdeontic-national-laws, and specify which it is that occurs in (369). And so on. Once we 
have started on this road, there is no natural terminus, no non-arbitrary stopping point. 
Or so the argument goes. 
Since it is implausible to think that a speaker will have to have access to so many 
meanings to be able to interpret a modal claim, however, Kratzer proposes her now-
famous alternative. She argues that what is common to the meaning of the sub-types 
of deontic must can be isolated by making explicit in just what regard they differ, via 
in view of phrases like those in (371) and (372). 
 
(371) In view of the Maori social customs, all Maori children must learn the 
names of their ancestors. 
(372) In view of the laws of New Zealand, all Maori children must learn the 
names of their ancestors. 
 
That is, we can posit a single deontic must with a meaning deficiency to be filled in 
by the contextually relevant norms. But then, Kratzer continues, we can do the same 
not just within the different flavors of modality, but also between them. We can 
isolate what is common to the epistemic and deontic readings of (373), for example, 
by the use of in view of phrases, like those in (374) and (375), that again supposedly 
specify the only regard in which the two readings differ. 
 
(373) John must hate his enemies. 
(374) In view of what is known, John must hate his enemies. 
(375) In view of his party’s bylaws, John must hate his enemies.  
 
Kratzer concludes from this that there is just a single, neutral must that needs its 
meaning deficiency to be supplied by some contextually relevant entity: a body of 
evidence, a collection of norms, etc.  
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What is crucial to this first argument is the assumption that there is no principled 
distinction to be drawn between flavor-internal and flavor-external differences in 
apparent meaning. But this assumption is not well-founded. For example, while (376) 
can be used to report beliefs about deontic necessities relative to different norms, 
(377) cannot be used to report both a belief about a deontic necessity and a belief 
about an epistemic one.108 
 
(376) The village leaders think that all Maori children must learn the names of 
their ancestors, and so do the national legislators. 
(377) The village leaders think that all Maori children must learn the names of 
their ancestors, and so do the anthropologists. 
 
This would suggest that while flavor-internal differences may be contextual, and not a 
part of content, flavor-external ones may be lexicalized. Indeed, while an appropriate 
paraphrase of (369) in both (371) and (372) is (378), for (374) and (375) different 
paraphrases of (373) are appropriate: namely, (379) and (380). 
 
(378) It must come about that all Maori children learn the names of their 
ancestors. 
(379) It must be true that John hates his enemies. 
(380) It must come about that John hates his enemies.  
 
It is thus plausible that X’s value in the in view of X phrases exhausts the meaning 
differences between (371) and (372) without its also doing so for (374) and (375). As 
Palmer (1979) would put things, (374) and (379) could involve “the modality of 
propositions”, while (375) and (380) involve “the modality of events” (1979, 35).  
Now it may be possible, as Palmer suggests, to “argue that [the modality] of 
propositions and [the modality] of events can be subsumed under a more general 
notion of [modality]” (1979, 35). But if the two modalities in (379) and (380) are to 
be subsumed, this will require factoring out some further difference between the two 
that may be reflected in, but is certainly not exhausted by, the difference between a 
body of evidence and a collection of norms. Thus, if we do try to subsume the two 
modalities within a single semantic entry, we will have to posit distinct contextual 
parameters to account for the flavor-internal differences and the flavor-external ones, 
as Nauze suggests. And this is consistent with there being a principled distinction 
between the two, such that positing an ambiguity to account for the latter need not 
lead us to do the same for the former. We do not face the prospect of an explosion of 
meanings if we encode modal flavor directly into a semantic entry instead of having a 
parameter for flavor-external differences or Recanati-style variables over accessibility 
relations (cf. also Viebahn and Vetter 2016). 
 
6.5.2 The common kernel of meaning argument 
The second argument that Viebahn and Vetter consider they call the common-kernel-
of-meaning argument (a term due to Kratzer 1977). This argument, also from Kratzer 
 
108 This style of example is due to Alexander Williams, p.c. 
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(1977), closely relates to the first. It is that there is “kernel of meaning which seems 
to stay invariable whenever the verb must is used” (1977, 341). And this kernel of 
meaning should be represented in a single semantic entry, the argument goes, with all 
that is variable being made the value of a contextual parameter (or parameters). 
Viebahn and Vetter’s response to this argument is that it fails to distinguish 
polysemy (a form of ambiguity in which there are distinct but related meanings) from 
context-sensitivity (a case in which a single, underspecified meaning can be used in 
different contexts to refer to different things). Viebahn and Vetter use adjectives like 
healthy and long to illustrate this distinction. Healthy, for example, may be used in 
different contexts to refer to different sorts of individuals, depending on the relevant 
reference class in those contexts. (John may be considered healthy for a hospital 
worker but not for a member of the general public.) However, it may also be used to 
refer to different sorts of entities altogether: to diets, lifestyles, or environments. The 
former is arguably a case of context-sensitivity: of a single meaning underspecified 
with regard to a reference class, which has to be supplied by context. The latter is 
arguably a case of polysemy: of related but distinct meanings, some of which are 
even defined in terms of the others. (A healthy diet, for example, is defined in terms 
of its conduciveness to being, or to becoming, a healthy individual.)  
Now the correct analysis of polysemy is a matter of much dispute, and it is not my 
intent to enter into that debate here (cf. Nunberg 1979; Pustejovsky and Boguraev 
1996; Ravin and Leacock 2000; Asher 2011; Pietroski 2005; 2018). What matters for 
our purposes is that not all commonalities of meaning need be represented by a 
common, context-sensitive meaning. Of course, we could, if we wanted, posit a 
single, doubly-underspecified meaning for a term like healthy: e.g., relating to a well-
functioning individual, via some relation R and relative to some reference class C. 
Yet we could also just as well posit multiple, distinct meanings that specify this 
relation R while leaving the reference class C unspecified. In fact, given that the 
possible values of R will be highly constrained, while the possible values of C will 
not, this second route is likely to be the better one. Likely what we are dealing with is 
a constrained class of distinct but related meanings, rather than a single, 
underspecified meaning admitting only a highly constrained range of contextual 
values (cf. Viebahn and Vetter 2016, 8). 
Something similar holds for other terms too, including nouns, like observation, 
that demonstrate what is known as the product/process ambiguity. Observation, for 
example, can be used to refer either to the process of observing or to its product, and 
there is obviously a kernel of meaning common to both these uses. For each noun like 
observation, then, we could try to abstract away the differences between process and 
product and to represent their commonalities via individualized, context-sensitive 
meanings. Yet there is also no especially good reason to hold that there must be a 
process/product parameter for which the context supplies one of two possible values 
whenever one of these nouns is used. In fact, it seems we do better to appeal to the 
distinct but related meanings that we can already easily specify rather than to factor 
out the differences between the two as the value of so highly constrained a parameter.  
As with healthy and observation, so with must, at least when it comes to the modal 
flavors. Must could have meanings that are fully specified for flavor, even if they are 
underspecified in other, flavor-internal ways. This, in fact, is the entire argument of 
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Viebahn and Vetter (2016). The common kernel of meaning displayed when a modal 
like must is used to make claims of different flavors does not require there to be a 
context-sensitive meaning common to those flavors. 
 
6.5.3 The cross-linguistic argument 
The third and final argument that Viebahn and Vetter consider they call the cross-
linguistic argument. Attributed to Hacquard (2010), this is the argument that modal 
flexibility is a widespread, cross-linguistic phenomenon, contrary to what we expect 
if flexible modals have multiple meanings. Why, after all, should “the same lexical 
accident be found in language after language?” (Hacquard 2010, 80).  
Yet while it would be a lexical accident for the riverside/financial institution 
ambiguity evidenced with bank to occur in language after language, it would not be 
so for the process/product ambiguity evidenced with observation. Such a cross-
linguistic phenomenon would presumably instead reveal something about how we 
conceptualize the world, as it could in the modal case too. Hacquard, in fact, is aware 
of this possibility, citing the same authors as Viebahn and Vetter do in response to her 
rhetorical question about lexical accidents (cf., a.o., Sweetser 1990; Traugott 1989). 
However, Viebahn and Vetter have not completely represented Hacquard’s concern.  
Hacquard not only emphasizes that modal flexibility is a cross-linguistically 
systematic phenomenon, but also claims that certain flavors expressed with flexible 
modals correlate just as systematically with height in the syntactic tree. Hacquard is 
thus more than willing to grant of Sweetser’s proposal that it can explain why what 
she calls epistemic and root (or non-epistemic) flavors of modality “share a common 
form” (2010, 91). But crucially, she maintains, this proposal also “leaves unexplained 
why roots and epistemics systematically end up with the scopal properties they do” 
(2010, 91). 
Here, I think, Hacquard is wrong. In fact, in the following chapter I will propose 
semantic entries for the different flavors of modality that would directly result in their 
having different scopal properties. For now, consider again the noun observation. 
Depending on if it is used to describe the process of observing, as in (381), or instead 
the product of such a process, as in (382), it may take complements of different sorts.  
 
(381) John’s observation of the man playing the violin calmed him. 
(382) John’s observation that the man was playing Liszt enraged him. 
 
Yet there is a principled reason for this, insofar as what is observed in a process sense 
will be an ongoing event or state of affairs, while what is observed in a product sense 
will be a proposition. Given the relation between process and product, there is no real 
mystery for observation taking different sorts of complements depending on the sense 
in which it is used. We can posit an ambiguity in this case that is not only systematic 
and understandable but also results in different complement types being associated 
with different resolutions of the ambiguity. 
The same could hold for modals like must, I would argue, if they can also be used 
to describe either the modality of propositions or the modality of events. There will 
no doubt be a close relation between these modalities that explains their being 
expressed with a common form. But if this common linguistic form does indeed take 
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different sorts of complements and occur at different sorts of heights, depending on 
the sense of the modal, this could well be attributed to the different nature of event 
and propositional modality. Apparent correlation between modal flavor and syntactic 
height could point as naturally to different semantic entries for the modal flavors as to 
a common, context-sensitive semantic entry that abstracts away from flavor.  
I thus conclude that none of the arguments for the non-ambiguity project compel 
us to adopt it. If there are ever phenomena that seem to require us to abandon this 
project, as we will see in the following chapter, we should not be afraid to do so. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
On the standard analysis, might and can differ in whether they express compatibility 
with an epistemically characterized set of facts, in the case of might, or instead a non-
epistemically characterized one, in the case of can. This analysis is incompatible with 
the argument of this dissertation that might does not have an epistemic interpretation. 
However, I have argued that the motivations for this analysis turn out to be ill-served 
by it. This analysis does not make good sense of the contrasting behavior of might 
and can when it comes to modal contradictions, the initial intuitive motivation for the 
analysis. Nor does it turn out to be compatible with the Kratzerian non-ambiguity 
project, its initial theoretical motivation. There is thus no obstacle to rejecting the 
standard analysis of the difference between might and can and accepting the argument 
of the previous chapters that might is never interpreted epistemically. 
.  
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Modals with a circumstantial modal base are restricted to future [temporal orientation]; 
epistemic modals are free to have any [temporal orientation] (past, present, or future). 
 
~ Rullmann and Matthewson (2018, 283) 
 
7.1 Aspectual differences between might and can 
Might and can differ not only in their meaning—the topic of the previous chapter—
but also, apparently, in their temporal properties. Might, for example, freely accepts 
progressive and perfect complements, as (383) shows. And yet, as (384) shows, can 
does not do the same (cf. Jenkins 1972; as cited in Ney 1978, 38). 
 
(383) John might {speak/be speaking/have spoken} French. 
(384) John can {speak/#be speaking/#have spoken} French. 
 
Now the standard analysis of this difference, like the standard analysis of the previous 
chapter, is in terms of the difference between epistemic and circumstantial modality 
(cf. Matthewson 2012; Rullmann and Matthewson 2018; Thomas 2014; 2017; Klecha 
2016). In this concluding chapter, I thus again have two aims. 
First, I want to show that the standard analysis is likewise problematic in this case, 
independently of any argument that might expresses non-epistemic modality. Second, 
I want to show how a better account of the data in (383) and (384) provides the tools 
we need to formalize the proposal from the previous chapter about how might and can 
differ in meaning if not along the epistemic/non-epistemic dimension. Here is the 
structure my argument in this chapter will take. 
In Section 7.2, I develop the standard analysis, which accounts for the restrictions 
on can in (384) in terms of temporal orientation. As defined by Condoravdi (2002), 
this is the evaluation time of the prejacent relative to the modal’s own evaluation 
time. The progressive and the perfect seem to enforce present and past orientation, 
respectively, yet it has been argued that future orientation is obligatory, not only for 
the so-called pure circumstantial modalities that concern us here, but also for all 
circumstantial modalities (cf. Werner 2006). Whether for semantic reasons or for 
pragmatic ones, circumstantial modal bases are claimed to generally be incompatible 
with present and past orientation (for the stronger claim, cf. Klecha 2016; Rullmann 
and Matthewson 2018; for the weaker claim, cf. Thomas 2014; 2017; Matthewson 
2012).109 Present and past orientation, as signaled by the progressive and the perfect, 
are thus indicators of epistemic modality. 
In Section 7.3, I then argue that this analysis fails on all accounts. First, with the 
appropriate staging, can will accept progressive and perfect complements, even on its 
pure circumstantial readings. Second, bare complements cannot always be analyzed 
 
109 In this chapter, I will be using the term modal base in yet a third way, more common amongst 
the authors with whom I will be engaging here: namely, to refer to functions to relevant sets of facts, 
rather than to those sets themselves (as in Chapters 3, 4, and 5), or to the sets of worlds determined by 
them (as in Chapter 6). Unless explicitly noted otherwise, I avoid these other two uses here. 
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as being future-oriented, neither for pure circumstantials, nor for other circumstantial 
modalities either. Third, obligatory future orientation could not plausibly be attributed 
to features of the modal base anyway. An alternative analysis is thus required. 
In Sections 7.4 and 7.5, I develop my alternative to the standard analysis. I argue 
that can introduces its own event variable, and that it is used to attribute modal states 
(cf. Homer 2010).110 These are actual states of individuals, locations, situations, etc., 
but ones that can only be specified with reference to eventualities in possible worlds 
other than the actual one. Might differs from can in that it is not used to attribute such 
states and so does not introduce its own event variable either. Instead, it is used 
simply to assert that some proposition is possibly true, relative to some set of facts. 
Might is an instance of what I will call a proposition-level modal, can an instance of 
what I will call an event-level one.  
This difference between might and can helps to explain why the former but not the 
latter freely accepts the whole range of aspectual morphology. For the role of aspect 
is to relate an event description to a reference time, thereby helping to determine a so-
called temporal proposition (or predicate of times). Since might is used to attribute 
modal properties to propositions, it thus makes sense that it would freely accept the 
whole range of aspectual morphology. Yet for the event descriptions used to specify 
modal states, there is often no need to impose the particular relations to particular 
reference times that the progressive or the perfect would. Only when there is the need 
to describe the potential to do two things either simultaneously or sequentially, for 
example, will it make sense to use the progressive or the perfect. And this explains 
why can, unlike might, does not freely accept either. 
On a traditional view that also posits two levels of modal auxiliaries, modals are 
distinguished first and foremost in terms of the semantic type of their complement. 
For example, on their so-called root interpretations, modals are generally supposed to 
combine with predicates of events, and to yield the same, while on their non-root 
interpretations they are supposed to combine with (temporal) propositions, again to 
yield the same (cf. Brennan 1993, 2–5; Hacquard 2009, 292–93; a.o.).111 On this view, 
modals have fundamentally the same semantic entry, type-shifted as necessary. In 
contrast, on my view, modals have fundamentally different semantic entries, 
distinguished by their introduction (or non-introduction) of an event variable. As a 
result, while modals may have inputs of the same semantic type, their outputs will be 
of different ones. 
In Section 7.6, I discuss an implication of this view for the counterfactual readings 
of non-root modals, which Condoravdi attributed to aspect scoping above the modal. 
This explanation is unavailable to me, with my reinterpretation of non-root modals as 
proposition-level ones. For while event- and proposition-level modals do not differ in 
their ability to scope above aspect, on my account, they do differ in their ability to 
 
110 While Homer provides the inspiration for using event variables in this specific way, Hacquard 
(2006; 2010) provides the more general inspiration for using event variables with modals at all. 
111 The root/non-root distinction was originally the semantic distinction between non-epistemic and 
epistemic modality (cf. Hofmann 1966). However, a number of syntactic and distributional differences 
were noted between these semantic groupings, and Condoravdi (2002) then noted that non-root modals 
expressed not only allegedly epistemic but also presumably metaphysical modality. Condoravdi (2002) 
is also responsible for the view that the propositions that non-root modals combine with (and yield) are 
temporal ones. 
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scope below it. Yet I argue that we do better to attribute counterfactual readings to 
past tense on a modal than to aspect scoping above it. In making this argument, I thus 
enter into the debate about whether non-root modals scope above tense (cf. Hacquard 
2010; 2011; Rullmann and Matthewson 2018; a.o.). The plausibility of the view that 
they cannot, I maintain, is due solely to the misinterpretation of non-root modality as 
epistemic modality, when in fact the modality is propositional. 
Section 7.7 concludes the chapter, and the dissertation as a whole. 
 
7.2 Aspectual restrictions on can’s complements 
7.2.1 The standard analysis of the restrictions 
Temporal orientation, as defined by Condoravdi (2002), is the relative evaluation 
time of a modal’s prejacent. Progressive morphology seems to require that evaluation 
time to be simultaneous with the modal’s own evaluation time, or to impose what is 
called present orientation. Perfect morphology seems to require a backward-shifted 
evaluation time, or to impose past orientation. And since can, as we have seen, does 
not initially seem acceptable with complements in either of these forms, a natural first 
thought is that it requires a forward-shifted evaluation time, or future orientation.  
Future orientation, like past orientation, is generally represented with existential 
quantification over times. Sometimes this quantification is attributed to the modal 
base (cf. Klecha 2016), sometimes to the modal itself (cf. Condoravdi 2002; Werner 
2006), and sometimes to a covert aspectual operator scoping under the modal (cf. 
Kratzer 2011; Matthewson 2012; Rullmann and Matthewson 2018; Thomas 2014; 
2017). However the quantification is effected, the claim made with (385) can be 
glossed with (386), and given the generic logical form in (387), on the view that it has 
obligatory future orientation. 
 
(385) John can speak French. 
(386) At some future time in some world compatible with our present 
circumstances, John speaks French at that time in that world. 
(387) ⟦◇p⟧w,t,f = 1 iff ∃w′∃t′[w′ ∈ ∩f(w)(t) & t < t′ & ⟦p⟧¢(w′)(t′)]112 
 
This is the standard analysis of what the restrictions on can with regard to progressive 
and perfect morphology involve: namely, obligatory future orientation, or obligatory 
existential quantification over future times. 
 
7.2.2 The standard explanation(s) for the restrictions 
Why should modals like can, which clearly express circumstantially based modalities, 
require future orientation? Here a number of different answers are given by authors in 
the literature, though all ultimately in terms of the modal base. 
Some authors propose that circumstantial modal bases are totally realistic: they 
assign to a world-time pair the total circumstances of that world up to that time (cf. 
Werner 2006; Laca 2012). This proposal is combined with an interpretive principle—
Werner calls it the Disparity Principle—that requires the set of worlds determined by 
 
112 For the sake of simplicity, I will bracket in this chapter the question from Chapter 3, Section 
3.3.2 whether modal relations are best analyzed in terms of the prejacent’s truth at a possible world. 
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the value of the modal base to be diverse, or heterogenous, with regard to the 
prejacent’s truth value at its evaluation time. In essence, in that set of worlds, there 
should be both ones in which the prejacent is true at its own evaluation time and ones 
in which it is false. Analogues of the Disparity Principle are Condoravdi (2002)’s 
Diversity Condition and Thomas (2017)’s Modal Economy.113 
The basic idea behind these principles is to avoid the equivalence of modal and 
non-modal claims. Imagine, for example, that the world was deterministic. Then 
some event could happen if and only if it did happen, and if it did happen, then it also 
had to have happened. Non-epistemic possibility and necessity claims would thus be 
equivalent, in a deterministic world, to the claims made with their prejacent. Such 
equivalence makes the modals redundant, and interpretive principles like Werner’s 
are designed to avoid that redundancy. Combined with the assumptions that the world 
is indeterministic, and that circumstantial modal bases are totally realistic, principles 
like these require the so-called root interpretations of modals—all assumed to have 
circumstantial modal bases—to also have future orientation.114 For say the prejacent’s 
evaluation time was either simultaneous to, or backward-shifted from, the modal’s 
own evaluation time. Then whether that prejacent was true at that time would be just 
another one of the facts determined by the value of the modal base. Hence, diversity 
would be violated. 
Totally realistic modal bases have been criticized, both in their utilization by 
Werner for all root interpretations of modals (cf. Portner 2009, 234–35) and in their 
utilization by Condoravdi for non-root, counterfactual ones (cf. Abusch 2012). I will 
focus on Portner’s criticisms here. Portner points out that totally realistic modal bases 
make it difficult to account for some of the context-sensitivity of modal claims. 
Whether we agree with the claim made with (385), for example, may depend on 
whether our focus in context is on John’s having learned the language, or instead on 
his having suffered a stroke from which he may never fully recover. This difference 
in context seems to be a difference in the facts relative to which we evaluate John as 
having the potential, or ability, to speak French. That is, it seems to be a difference in 
the value of the circumstantial modal base. But this difference cannot be captured if 
we assume that circumstantial modal bases are all totally realistic ones.  
To account for this difference, Portner suggests that Werner could perhaps appeal 
to a difference in the value of the ordering source, a set of propositions used to order 
the worlds determined by the value of the modal base according to their compliance 
with certain ideals (cf. Kratzer 1981; 1991). Yet what matters in this case seems not 
to be any difference in the relevant ideals—for ability modals, these could perhaps be 
stereotypes—but instead a difference in the relevant facts. Anyhow, even if this is 
 
113 For skepticism that such principles should be stated in terms of the set of worlds determined by 
the value of the modal base, rather than in terms of the value of the modal base itself, cf. Chapter 3, 
Section 3.4.1. Condoravdi’s Diversity Condition, and her totally realistic modal bases, which she 
referred to as metaphysical, were not intended for the so-called root modalities expressed by can. In 
fact, she explicitly disavowed making claims about their temporal interpretation. Yet in an odd twist of 
intellectual history, her analysis of the apparently obligatory future orientation of certain non-root 
modalities expressed by might has played a key role in the analysis of root modalities as having such 
orientation too. For this history, cf. Abusch (2012), Thomas (2014), and Rullmann and Matthewson 
(2018), amongst others. 
114 For general criticism of relying on an assumption of indeterminism, cf. Abusch (2012, 282–83). 
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wrong, Klecha (2016) points out that cases where the ordering source has to be empty 
also create problems for reliance on totally realistic modal bases (2016, 33). 
In lieu of totally realistic modal bases, those who maintain that all non-epistemic 
interpretations of modals have obligatory future orientation have generally abandoned 
the attempt to explain why this should be so. Rullmann and Matthewson (2018), for 
example, write that “it is not our main purpose here to explain the correlation between 
nonfuture TO [i.e., temporal orientation] and epistemic interpretations. We simply 
assume … that some restriction along the lines of the [Diversity Condition] suffices 
to derive the modal flavor/TO restrictions” (2018, 301). And Klecha (2016), instead 
of relying on such a principle, simply hardwires future orientation into circumstantial 
modal bases, independent of their being totally realistic or not.115 
Some authors maintain, more conservatively, that only some of the non-epistemic 
interpretations expressed by modals like can have future orientation. These authors, 
as you might expect, have not abandoned attempts to explain why future orientation is 
favored for these interpretations. One of these explanations maintains Werner’s and 
Condoravdi’s general interpretive principle but limits its scope by abandoning the use 
of totally realistic modal bases (Thomas 2014). Another explanation converts that 
interpretive principle into a pragmatic preference but without necessarily limiting its 
scope (Matthewson 2012). I review each of these explanations in turn. 
Thomas suggests that we think of circumstantial modal bases as functions to the 
relevant facts, as opposed to the total ones. Crucially, what the relevant facts are will 
vary with the flavor of modality expressed. For the so-called priority modalities—
deontic, teleological, etc. (cf. Portner 2009)—these should not include the fact of the 
matter about the prejacent at the modal’s evaluation time. For a course of action does 
not cease to be impermissible or undesirable just because it is undertaken, nor does it 
cease to be required or desirable just because it is not. Hence, present orientation for 
the priority interpretations of modals is compatible with the idea motivating Werner’s 
and Condoravdi’s interpretive principles. And present orientation does indeed seem to 
be possible, as Thomas shows with (388) on its deontic interpretation.  
 
(388) Sam ought to be sleeping. [Thomas’ (69)] 
 
Things are supposed to differ for non-priority modalities, which Thomas calls pure 
circumstantials. Here Thomas suggests a principle of self-relevance is at work, so that 
the relevant facts must always include the facts of the matter about the prejacent’s 
truth up to, and at, the modal’s evaluation time (2014, 439–40). Given this principle, 
future orientation is required for pure circumstantials, which Thomas takes to include 
 
115 Oddly enough, he also writes the following: 
 
[S]ince the circumstances in a given world are fully settled up to evaluation time, it makes sense 
that circumstantial modal expressions would be restricted to the future, which is the only 
contingent part of a set of circumstantially accessible worlds. This is motivated by the Maxim 
of Manner, since a circumstantial modal embedding a proposition with a past time reference 
could always just be replaced with the bare proposition with no change in meaning (2016, 12). 
 
Yet this explanation presupposes the totally realistic view of circumstantial modal bases that Klecha 
eschews! 
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modals on their ability interpretations. And this requirement, Thomas argues, is borne 
out by the facts. 
Thomas does add as a caveat, however, that past-tensed ability modals seem to be 
compatible with present orientation, as in (389). 
 
(389) John was able to speak French to President Macron when he had to meet 
with him. 
 
Cases like (389) involve so-called actuality entailments. In this case, attributing to 
John the ability to speak French on a particular occasion is supposed to entail that he 
did speak French on that occasion.116 Hence, the prejacent’s evaluation time would 
seem to be concurrent with the modal’s, something we might expect for present-tense 
modals used to attribute abilities and potentials that are actively being realized too. 
Yet Thomas (2014), and then again Thomas (2017), simply saves for future research 
the problem that actuality entailments pose for his account of temporal orientation. 
Matthewson, in contrast to Thomas, takes actuality entailments to be a good reason 
to convert the general interpretive principle of Werner and Condoravdi into a mere 
pragmatic preference (2012, 14). Yet as far as I can tell she also takes it to have wider 
scope, including both Thomas’ pure circumstantials and Portner’s priority modals. 
For Matthewson argues that “circumstantial modals inherently give rise to actuality 
entailments, and that [these] are removed by prospective aspect”, which imparts 
future orientation (2012, 11; emphasis mine). Hacquard (2009), to whom Matthewson 
is responding, also argued that not just pure circumstantials, but also priority modals, 
give rise to such entailments. This wide scope for the pragmatic preference is further 
supported by Matthewson’s joint paper with Rullmann, already cited as an example 
of the view that future orientation is obligatory for all circumstantial modalities. And 
yet wide scope encounters precisely the sort of problems with deontic interpretations 
that Thomas sought to avoid. 
These, in sum, are some of the reasons given for why it is that circumstantially 
based modalities allegedly require or prefer future orientation. As is evident, there is 
disagreement not only about the extent to which future orientation is required—
whether for all flavors of circumstantial modality or only some—but also about the 
nature of this requirement itself: whether it is a general interpretive principle, a mere 
pragmatic preference, or even a hardwired component of the modal base. Despite this 
disagreement, there is widespread consensus that circumstantially based modalities 
are subject to certain temporal constraints best understood as constraints on temporal 
orientation, and due, in some way, to the modal base being circumstantial. And this is 
supposed to explain why perfect and progressive complements are unacceptable with 
modals, like can, that express such modalities (cf. Thomas 2014, 445–48). 
 
 
116 Such entailments are apparently both clearer and also uncancellable in languages, unlike 
English, that have perfective aspectual morphology; cf. Hacquard (2009). For competing accounts, cf. 
Mari and Martin (2007) and Homer (2010). I will have little new to contribute to this debate in this 
chapter. The account of modal-aspectual interactions that I will propose is compatible with Homer’s 
account. But I am unable to adjudicate the empirical debates between him and Hacquard about whether 
perfective aspect is sufficient for actuality entailments and whether such entailments arise with modal 
auxiliaries but not with other grammatical categories expressing modality (cf. Hacquard 2016, 48–49). 
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7.3 Against the standard analysis of can’s aspectual restrictions 
7.3.1 Progressive and perfect complements 
A first problem for the standard analysis of the aspectual restrictions on can in (384) 
is that can does not always reject complements in the progressive and perfect forms. 
While (390) is odd with its progressive morphology, for example, (391) is not. 
 
(390) #John can be juggling and unicycling. 
(391) John can be juggling and unicycling and still carry on a trenchant 
conversation about Kant. 
 
Similarly, while (392) is odd with its perfect morphology, (393) is not. 
 
(392) #John can have just sung the Ave Maria. 
(393) John can have just sung the Ave Maria, attended mass and confession, said 
five Hail Marys, and still launch into so vulgar and profane an outburst it 
would make even the most hardened sailor blush. 
 
This point extends beyond can to flexible modals like may. While the progressive 
morphology makes a deontic interpretation of (394) very difficult, this interpretation 
is readily accessible in (395), and may in fact be the only interpretation available. 
 
(394) The parishioners may be singing. 
(395) The parishioners may be singing as they enter the church but must be silent 
by the time they are seated. 
 
One possible response to these data is to note that the abilities and permissions 
attributed seem, in at least one sense, to be generic. They are not limited to a specific 
occurrence but instead are repeatable, in the case of the abilities, or ongoing, in the 
case of the permissions. And perhaps genericity itself imposes future orientation, 
somehow overriding the default past and present orientation imposed by the perfect 
and progressive. Or perhaps, as Thomas (2017) has suggested, genericity presents the 
exception to an otherwise obligatory correlation between circumstantially based 
modalities and future orientation.  
Perhaps so. But there are problems with this appeal to genericity. For example, the 
adjective in (396) lexically encodes deontic modality, has a progressive complement, 
and can only be understood as granting a specific, one-time permission for the current 
moment. 
 
(396) The children are allowed to currently be running. 
 
The modality would thus seem to have present temporal orientation, the prejacent’s 
evaluation time being simultaneous to the modal’s own evaluation time. Much the 
same holds for the semi-modal auxiliary have to in (397). 
 
(397) Bill knows the rules. He has to be doing the dishes right now. [≈ Klecha’s 
(12b)] 




Klecha (2016) has argued that (397) can only have an epistemic interpretation, not a 
deontic one, because of the present orientation imposed by the temporal adverb now. 
Yet (397) is perfectly fine as a response to (398), showing that Klecha is wrong to 
claim that a deontic interpretation is unavailable. 
 
(398) Is Bill required to be doing the dishes at this present moment? 
 
Modal adjectives and semi-auxiliaries with progressive complements can thus 
have present orientation even when they are used to attribute specific permissions and 
requirements. Future orientation is not obligatory, and so cannot explain why modal 
auxiliaries expressing these and other acknowledged types of circumstantial modality 
generally do not accept progressive and perfect complements. 
 
7.3.2 Bare complements 
An additional argument that future orientation is not obligatory for circumstantial 
modalities comes from modals with bare complements. While bare complements are 
compatible with either present or future orientation, it has been argued that only with 
future orientation can these modals be interpreted circumstantially (Werner 2006). 
(399), for example, is claimed on its deontic interpretation to only be able to describe 
the permissibility of a future state of affairs. 
 
(399) Jill may be seated. [Werner’s (3)] 
 
But this empirical claim is false. (399) is fine as a response to (400), especially with a 
sentence-initial yes, showing that it can also be used to describe the permissibility of a 
current, or ongoing, state of affairs. 
 
(400) Is Jill really allowed to currently be seated? The Queen is passing by. 
 
More interesting for our purposes here are so-called pure circumstantial readings, 
on which modals are used to attribute abilities and potentials. Unlike other readings, 
these have been claimed to differ from allegedly epistemic ones exclusively in terms 
of whether the modal base is circumstantial or epistemic (cf. Kratzer 1991, 645–46). 
Hence, if the pure circumstantial readings of modals with bare complements do have 
obligatory future orientation, and if this can be traced to features of their having a 
circumstantial modal base, we might legitimately wonder whether might-claims with 
past or present orientation must have epistemic modal bases rather than circumstantial 
ones. Yet I will argue that we can no more analyze pure circumstantial (or ability) 
readings of modals as having obligatory future orientation than we can deontic ones.  
An initial argument for this conclusion is inspired by Thomas’ difficulty with past-
tensed ability modals and their actuality entailments. These cases highlight the fact 
that many abilities and potentials that exist at the current moment can also be realized 
at the current moment. Hence, whenever we are attributing an ability or a potential, it 
seems we should allow for the possibility that it is currently being realized too, and so 
for the possibility of present orientation. Indeed, insofar as we can ever answer the 
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question whether something can happen by pointing out that that it is happening, we 
have to allow this possibility.117 For the present is not always indicative of the future, 
and abilities and potentials can often be ephemeral, perishing upon realization. Hence, 
insofar as our answer to the question what can happen is ever a good one, the original 
question cannot have had obligatory future orientation. 
A more developed argument comes from intuitive truth-value differences between 
the members of the two pairs below. In any context in which the claim made with 
(401) is true, it seems, the claim made with (402) will not be so.  
 
(401) By the end of this semester, John will be able to speak French. 
(402) John can speak French. 
 
Similarly, while the metaphysical claim made with (403) seems intuitively as though 
it could be true, the ability claim made with (404) would intuitively seem to be false. 
 
(403) My unborn grandson might climb Mount Everest. 
(404) My unborn grandson can climb Mount Everest. 
 
Yet these intuitive truth-value differences are hard to accommodate if we assume that 
modals on their ability readings have obligatory future orientation.  
Take the second pair. Say that we assume that modals on their metaphysical 
readings have totally realistic modal bases, while on their ability readings they have 
circumstantial modal bases that are not totally realistic. Then the value of the modal 
base for (404) would be a subset of the value of the modal base for (403). Hence, the 
set of worlds determined by the modal base for (404) would be a superset of the set of 
worlds determined by the modal base for (403). It should thus be easier for a modal 
claim with existential force like (404) to be true than for one like (403) to be so. 
Indeed, the truth of the latter should entail the truth of the former. For if the total 
current circumstances are compatible with the world developing in such a way that 
my unborn grandson climbs Mount Everest at some future time, then any subset of 
the total current circumstances should be compatible with that developmental 
possibility too. And yet the truth of (403) does not entail the truth of (404). 
Perhaps proponents of obligatory future orientation could appeal to a difference in 
the ordering source for modals on their metaphysical and ability readings. If (403), 
for example, had an empty ordering source, while (404) had a stereotypical one, then 
this could make the domain of quantification for (404) the smaller of the two. With 
(404), for example, we would look at worlds that developed in the stereotypical way, 
while with (403) we would look at worlds that developed in any way whatsoever. 
I am skeptical. In uttering (404), I seem to be attributing an ability to my unborn 
grandson, not commenting on what he does at some future time in some stereotypical 
world. And, as I have already alluded to, Kratzer (1991, 645–46) also suggests that 
modals used to attribute abilities and potentials—pure circumstantials, as she too calls 
them—have empty ordering sources. However, the point can be waived. For even if a 
difference in the ordering source explains why the truth of the claim made with (403) 
 
117 Thomas (2014, 442) also considers such cases, using them to distinguish pure circumstantials 
from priority modals, but does not draw the correct conclusion from them.  
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does not entail the truth of the claim made with (404), similar reasoning about the 
modal base applies to show that the truth of the claim made with (401) should entail 
the truth of the claim made with (402) on the view that ability modals have obligatory 
future orientation. And here there is no difference in the ordering source to appeal to. 
Intuitively, the ways in which the world can develop at some future time are a 
subset of the ways in which it can develop at the current time. The passage of time 
closes off possibilities, as proponents of future orientation and branching-time models 
of accessible worlds are apt to note (cf. Condoravdi 2002; Werner 2006). Hence, if at 
some future time, there is a possibility for the world to develop in such a way that 
John speaks French, then at the current time there should be that very same possibility 
too. Thus, the truth of the claim made with (401) should entail the truth of the claim 
made with (402), when in fact it seems to do the exact opposite. 
Perhaps proponents of obligatory future orientation could hold that we are wrong 
to think that the values of the modal bases for (402) and (404) are subsets of those for 
(401) and (403). For example, maybe the value of the modal base for (402) includes 
the fact that John has not had a course in French, whereas the value of the modal base 
for (401) would not. This would be to no avail, however. For the fact that John has 
not currently had a course in French is compatible with the world developing in such 
a way that he does take such a course, and so compatible with the world developing 
in such a way that he does speak French. To block this developmental possibility, we 
need the fact that John has not taken a course in French to be held constant 
throughout future time. This, in essence, amounts to a denial of future orientation. 
Perhaps future orientation could be salvaged if we held that it involved restricted 
quantification over future times, so that the claim made with (402) was a claim about 
what was possible for the near future. But there are obvious limitations to this 
response. The claim made with (402) does not become true until John has acquired a 
certain ability, no matter how near in the future he acquires it. This is how the modal 
claim made with (405) could be true at the start of the day even if that made with 
(406) only became true at the end. 
 
(405) Hurry over! My toddler might {finally} walk today. 
(406) Hurry over! My toddler can {finally} walk today. 
 
The view that ability claims have obligatory future orientation thus cannot readily 
explain why attributions of abilities and potentials to those who do not yet possess 
them are false.118 While abilities and potentials obviously have implications for how 
the future may develop, modeling these in terms of obligatory future orientation is the 
wrong way to proceed. Circumstantial modal claims with bare complements must, in 
some cases, be compatible with present orientation. 
 
 
118 Not readily. However, as already noted, Thomas (2017) has recently claimed that one important 
class of exceptions to the alleged correlation between circumstantial modal bases and future orientation 
involves the presence of covert generic operators. Such operators would likely be appealed to for (402) 
and could possibly also be appealed to for (404) and (406). Yet such operators could not be appealed to 
in the case of abilities that are complex but potentially also ephemeral: e.g., the ability to perform well 
Chopin’s Etude in G# minor. 
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7.3.3 Circumstantial modal bases 
Setting aside the empirical facts for the moment, there are also theoretical difficulties 
for the attempted explanations of aspectual restrictions on can’s complements. These 
restrictions could not plausibly be attributed to features of the modal base, not for 
priority modals, for the reason that Thomas points out, but also not for pure 
circumstantials, for much the same reason. Just as the truth-value of a proposition is 
not indicative of its deontic or teleological status, neither does the prejacent’s truth 
necessarily indicate the presence of an ability, nor its falsity the absence of a potential 
(cf. Thalberg 1972). Hence, the reasoning that suggests that Werner’s interpretive 
principle does not apply to priority modals suggests that it does not apply to ability 
modals either. 
An additional reason to think the temporal properties of ability modals cannot be 
attributed to the modal base is the fact that they remain unchanged in the presence of 
modifiers, which have been assumed to restrict the modal base’s value. There is no 
discernible difference in the temporal properties of (407) and the Kratzerian (408), for 
example. If the latter has future temporal orientation, then so does the former. 
 
(407) Given {only} the soil, hydrangeas can grow here. 
(408) Hydrangeas can grow here. 
 
However, the facts denoted by the modifier are exclusively facts about the soil. 
Hence, if the value of the modal base is restricted to these facts, it should exclude the 
fact of the matter about the prejacent’s truth value at the modal’s evaluation time, and 
so be compatible with present orientation. As a result, if both (407) and (408) are best 
glossed as having future orientation, this orientation would not seem to be due to 
features of the modal base. 
To summarize: the fact that can does not freely accept progressive and perfect 
complements has sometimes been taken as evidence that the modal claims it is used 
to make have obligatory future orientation, where this is attributed to the modal base 
for those claims being circumstantial, or non-epistemic. However, I have shown (i) 
that perfect and progressive complements sometimes are acceptable with can; (ii) that 
bare complements of can cannot always be analyzed in terms of future orientation 
anyway; and (iii) that future orientation cannot be attributed to the modal base’s being 
circumstantial either. We need a better explanation for why might and can differ in 
how freely they accept progressive and perfect complements than the standard one in 
terms of the difference between epistemic and non-epistemic modality. My aim in the 
next two sections is to provide just this. 
 
7.4 Rethinking the temporal interpretation of can 
7.4.1 Modal states 
Our starting point will be the difference between claims about possibilities and claims 
about potentials, observed above in (403) and (404). If there is a potential for my 
unborn grandson to develop the potential to climb Mount Everest, then it is true that 
he might climb Mount Everest. Yet it is not true, in the ordinary sense, that he can. 
One possible response to this fact is to hold that can imposes obligatory present 
orientation: that for it to be true that my unborn grandson can climb Mount Everest, 
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there must be some accessible world in which, at the current moment, he does climb 
Mount Everest. However, since my unborn grandson presumably does not exist at the 
current moment in any accessible world, this condition is not met, and so the can-
claim is false. In this way, we could hope to account for the fact that attributions of 
potentials and abilities are generally not true until those potentials and abilities have 
been acquired, even if the corresponding possibility claims are already true. 
A problem for this response is that sometimes the prejacent of a can-claim imposes 
temporal constraints incompatible with obligatory present orientation. With (409), for 
example, the event of John’s winning the race is presumably located wholly within 
the following day. 
 
(409) John can win the race tomorrow. 
 
We are not saying, that is, that in some accessible world John wins tomorrow’s race 
today, contrary to what obligatory present orientation would require. This can be seen 
even more clearly with an example like (410).  
 
(410) If the election were held tomorrow, there’s no way John could win. But he 
can win the November election.  
 
With (410), we are saying that John presently has the potential to win an election held 
in November, but not the potential to win one held tomorrow. The present potential in 
this case is for a specific future event, and the futurity of the event is what is key to 
the existence of that potential. 
A seemingly better response to the contrast between might and can, then, is to 
abandon the attempt to account for the truth of claims about potentials and abilities 
exclusively in terms of the possible truth of a proposition at some present or future 
time. We should instead recognize that potentials and abilities are also states of 
individuals, locations, situations, etc. (cf. Homer 2010 on deontic states). These states 
are modal ones, and so may indeed have to be specified in terms of the possible truth 
of a proposition at some present or future time. However, the possible truth of this 
proposition does not itself guarantee the existence of a potential or ability, as we have 
seen from the cases above. Modals states are just like any other state or eventuality: 
they must be represented by an event variable all their own. The event variable 
introduced by the modal’s complement, and used to represent the possible truth of a 
proposition, will not suffice. 
If potentials and abilities are indeed modal states, attributions of them will only be 
true when those states inhere in the actual world, much like attributions of non-modal 
states. For it to be true that John loves Mary, for example, he has to have actually 
transitioned to that state. It does not matter how close he is to doing so. Similarly, for 
it to be true that John can speak French, it does not matter how close he is to having 
that ability: he has to have actually reached that state transition. This is in contrast to 
its being true that John might speak French, or my toddler finally walk today. These 
cases do not require those same state transitions to have occurred; they merely require 
other state transitions to be possible. Can differs from might, then, insofar as what it 
is used to attribute seem to be modal states. 




7.4.2 Representing modal states 
In representing modal states, two basic requirements must be met. First, the terms 
used to denote these states must introduce event variables to represent them, whence 
the name event-level modals. Second, these variables must be related in some way to 
the event variables introduced by the modals’ complements. These requirements met, 
there is more than one way to proceed.  
Homer (2010), for example, has the event-level modal take a fully propositional 
complement and then use its event variable to generate the set of accessible worlds, 
all or some or none of whose members must verify that complement depending on the 
force of the modal. I approach things in a slightly different manner, treating event-
level modal constructions as analogous to causative and inchoative ones. When the 
modal introduces its event variable, it simultaneously performs existential closure on 
the open event variable of its complement, while also establishing a specific semantic 
relation between the two. 
Here is an example of what this would look like, using the lambda notation and 
assuming, for the moment, that event-level modals combine with simple predicates of 
events.119 (Following Hacquard (2010), I use 𝜀 to denote the type for eventualities.) 
 
(411) ⟦canability⟧w,t,f = 𝜆P<𝜀,st>.𝜆e.  
∃e′[ABILITY-TO(e)(e′)(w) & ∃w′[w′ ∈ ∩f(w)(t) & P(e′)(w′)]] 
 
What does it mean to say that an eventuality e in a world w is an ability to e′ in w′? 
This is simply one way of describing a modal state, a state that can only be described 
by reference to some potentially non-actualized eventuality. Perhaps we do better to 
avoid appeal to possible worlds altogether in the description of such states (cf. Vetter 
2013; or the semantics for modal objects in Moltmann 2018). However, the possible 
worlds framework is standard and ubiquitous. As long as we interpret it in a Kripkean 
fashion, rather than a Lewisian one, no difficulty arises in referencing an eventuality 
in another world to describe one in this (cf. Kripke 1980; Lewis 1986).  
I should make clear that I have no analysis of the metalanguage predicate ABILITY-
TO to offer in this chapter. Yet I do not think this is a problem. In analyzing causative 
or inchoative constructions, it is possible to argue that a second event variable is 
needed independent of any particular analysis of the metalanguage predicates CAUSE 
or BEGIN used to relate that variable to the first. The same holds here. What the 
argument of Sections 7.3.2 and 7.4.1 has shown, if I am correct, is that we cannot 
adequately represent the temporal properties of abilities through a relation between a 
modal’s own evaluation time and its prejacent’s. Instead of trying to encode these 
properties on an event variable representing what the ability is an ability for, we need 
to encode them on an event variable representing the ability itself. This argument for 
modal states does not require us to have developed a philosophical analysis of those 
states. Instead, just as we can rely on our pre-theoretical understanding of causes and 
beginnings in developing semantic analyses of causatives and inchoatives—or even 
treat causes and beginnings as unanalyzable primitives—so with abilities.  
 
119 Readers unfamiliar with the lambda-notation are directed to Gamut (1991, chaps. 4–5).  




7.4.3 Revisiting the representation of modal states 
In introducing a representational framework for event-level modals, I assumed for the 
sake of simplicity that they combined with simple predicates of events. In the case of 
modals with bare complements, this is initially plausible. However, modals like can 
admit not just bare complements but also, as we have seen, progressive and perfect 
ones. And aspectual complements are standardly assumed to be predicates of times, 
with some aspectual operators playing dual semantic roles: “[providing] existential 
quantification over the event described by the VP and [locating] its running time with 
respect to the time provided by tense” (Hacquard 2010, 97). On this view of aspect, 
there would not be any open event variables for the event-level modals to operate on. 
Hence, we could not convert our initially plausible entries for event-level modals with 
bare complements into equally plausible entries for modals with progressive and 
perfect ones. 
There are several possible ways to proceed at this point. One possibility is to 
rethink the semantics of aspectual operators, limiting them to one role and assigning 
the existential quantification over events to an independent operator (cf. Matthewson 
2012, 8). Another is to leave the semantics of aspectual operators intact, but either to 
adopt Homer’s method for modeling modal states mentioned above, or to hold that 
the apparently progressive and perfect complements of event-level modals are not, in 
fact, predicates of times but instead complex predicates of events.120 I adopt and 
develop the first possibility here, insofar as it seems to me to be part of the best 
overall picture of modal and aspectual operators and their interactions. 
Following Rullmann and Matthewson (2018), I assume that aspectual operators 
fall into one of two categories. Markers of inclusion aspect relate an eventuality’s run 
time to a reference time: imperfective aspect indicates that the run time of the event, 
sometimes also called its temporal trace, and denoted 𝜏(e), includes the reference 
time; perfective aspect indicates that the opposite inclusion relation holds. Markers of 
ordering aspect then order that reference time with respect to an evaluation time: 
perfect aspect indicates that the reference time wholly precedes the evaluation time; 
prospective aspect indicates that evaluation time wholly precedes reference time.121 
For Rullmann and Matthewson, both inclusion and ordering aspect are obligatory, 
though potentially covert, and there is a hierarchical relationship between the two that 
is also obligatory. Inclusion aspect performs the additional role of existential closure, 
converting a predicate of events into a predicate of times. Ordering aspect then takes 
that predicate of times as its input and yields a predicate of times as its output (2018, 
287). The obligatory nature of inclusion aspect makes sense to me, as does also the 
obligatory hierarchical relationship between it and ordering aspect. Later I will say 
more to defend these claims, and also to defend the claim that ordering aspect is not 
obligatory. For now, the important point is to recast the meaning of both types of 
 
120 On this view, terms like and still in (391) and (393) and as in (395) would combine with 
predicates of times (the part of the modal’s complement in the progressive or perfect form) and 
predicates of events (the part of the complement in the bare form) to yield complex predicates of 
events. 
121 Rullmann and Matthewson (2018) posit two additional ordering aspects, non-perfect and non-
prospective, which are complementary to perfect and prospective aspect. 
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aspectual operators once the former are no longer assigned the role of existential 
closure. I do this in (412)-(415), where i is used to denote the type for times. 
 
(412) ⟦PFV⟧w,t,f     = 𝜆P<𝜀,st>.𝜆t.𝜆e. [𝜏(e) ⊆ t & P(e)(w)] 
(413) ⟦IMPFV⟧w,t,f  = 𝜆P<𝜀,st>.𝜆t.𝜆e. [𝜏(e) ⊇ t & P(e)(w)] 
 
(414) ⟦PERF⟧w,t,f   = 𝜆P<i,<𝜀,st>>.𝜆t.𝜆e. ∃t′[t′ < t & P(e)(t′)(w)] 
(415) ⟦PROSP⟧w,t,f  = 𝜆P<i,<𝜀,st>>.𝜆t.𝜆e. ∃t′[t < t′ & P(e)(t′)(w)]122 
 
Given the entries in (412)-(415), the inclusion aspects now convert predicates of 
events into functions from times to predicates of events. In turn, the ordering aspects 
have such functions as both their inputs and their outputs. Converting our semantic 
entry for can from (411) into an entry that can accommodate aspectual complements 
is now a straightforward matter. We first need the event-level modal to existentially 
close the open time variable of its complement so that there is no conflict between the 
temporal information encoded on the modal’s own event variable and the temporal 
information encoded on that of its complement (as could happen in the case of (409), 
for example). We then want to optionally forward-shift the evaluation time for the 
complement to help represent the fact that abilities and potentials are never abilities 
and potentials for past events but instead for present or future ones, thereby also 
overcoming an important lacuna in the semantic entry in (411). The result is (416). 
 
(416) ⟦canability⟧w,t,f = 𝜆P<i,<𝜀,st>>.𝜆e.  
∃e′[ABILITY-TO(e)(e′)(w) & ∃w′∃t′[w′ ∈ ∩f(w)(t) & t ≤ t′ & P(e′)(t′)(w′)]]123 
 
7.4.4 Aspectual operators and aspectual morphology 
At this point, we have two semantic entries for event-level modals like can. Yet if we 
assume that the bare complements of modals, while not morphologically marked for 
aspect, are nonetheless semantically marked for at least inclusion aspect, then we can 
reduce our two entries to one. This is a simplifying assumption on multiple counts. 
First, if we maintain two entries for event-level modals, we will want to modify 
our first entry in (411) to account for the lacuna that (416) helped bring to light. In 
doing so, we will essentially have to build inclusion aspect into the meaning of the 
modal. But once we have built inclusion aspect into the meaning of the event-level 
modal, why not just hold that event-level modals always combine with complements 
already marked for inclusion aspect, albeit sometimes covertly so? 
 
122 The entry for the perfect operator in (414) is provisional. I will subsequently argue that we 
should adopt a view of the perfect as contributing the post-state of an eventuality (cf., a.o., Parsons 
1990; Kamp and Reyle 1993), an argument that provides further support for removing existential 
closure as one of the functions of inclusion aspect operators.  
123 Optional forward-shifting correctly ensures non-past orientation for modals with complements 
in the bare form. We do not interpret John can jump as saying that John has a present ability for a past 
jumping event, something that the entry in (411) did not rule out. However, it does not ensure non-past 
orientation for modals with perfect complements, which is good. For then the incoherent attribution to 
John of a present ability for a past event can be held responsible for the general anomaly of John can 
have jumped. (When the post-state view of the perfect is introduced, the details of this explanation will 
have to be reworked, but the broad outline will remain the same.) 
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Second, morphologically bare, perfect, and progressive sentences occur not only as 
complements of event-level modal auxiliaries but also of proposition-level ones. All 
of them can further occur as standalone sentences in matrix clauses. Hence, if we do 
not appeal to covert aspectual operators for bare sentences, we will require multiple 
semantic entries, not only for event-level modal auxiliaries, but also proposition-level 
ones.124 Further, since the role of inclusion aspect is to locate an eventuality within the 
temporal structure of the evaluation world, then something else will have to play this 
necessary role for matrix clauses if covert aspectual operators do not, presumably 
tense. Yet for tense to play this dual role we run a risk of redundancy or inconsistency 
whenever it co-occurs with overt aspect. That, or we have to posit multiple semantic 
entries, this time for each of the tense operators (past, present, etc.). 
Additionally, in English, certain restrictions on the types of eventualities described 
by bare present tense, matrix-clause sentences are best explained in terms of inclusion 
aspect. But if the different inclusion aspects play a role in explaining the absence or 
presence of these restrictions, then by far the simplest thing to do is to appeal directly 
to covert aspectual operators themselves. 
Here is an example of the restrictions I have in mind. (417) cannot be used to 
describe a current event of John’s running, unless what Ogihara (2007) calls the “live 
sports broadcaster” manner of speech is being used (cf. Bennett and Partee 1972). 
 
(417) John runs. 
 
Instead, (417) must be used to state that John’s running is a generic or habitual event. 
“Eventives” thus contrast with “statives”, which do occur freely in the simple present. 
(418), for example, is used to describe a current state of John’s being charming. And 
while this state may also be a habitual or generic one, if we are lucky, this is not what 
(418) describes, if the difference between (419) and (420) is any indication. 
 
(418) John is charming. 
(419) John is usually charming, but not now.  
(420) ?John is charming, but not now. 
 
The standard explanation for this contrast is that the English present tense denotes 
not an interval, but an instant, while eventives, unlike statives, describe situations that 
only hold at intervals (cf. Bennett and Partee 1972; Taylor 1977; Vlach 1981). To this 
explanation must also be added assumptions about default aspectual interpretations: 
perfective for eventives (Thomas 2014, 446), imperfective for statives (Rullmann and 
Matthewson 2018, 302). If the stative had a perfective interpretation, then the relevant 
situation would not only have to hold at the present instant but also to be wholly 
included within it. And while the transitions to and from a state may be instantaneous, 
it is highly unlikely that the two will occur at the same or simultaneous instants. On 
the other hand, if the eventive had an imperfective interpretation, then all that would 
be required would be for the present instant to be included within the interval at 
which the situation it described held. Default aspectual interpretations are responsible, 
then, for the fact that the stative must wholly include the present instant, which is 
 
124 But cf. Condoravdi (2002) for a creative alternative. 
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possible, while the eventive must be wholly included within it, which is not. And this 
explains why generic and habitual interpretations are generally the only available 
ones for eventives in the simple present tense in English.  
Yet what does it mean to say that bare eventives or bare statives receive a certain 
aspectual interpretation by default? Insofar as eventives and statives can co-occur 
with overt markers of their non-default inclusion aspect (cf., a.o., Hacquard 2009; 
Homer 2010), I assume we do not want to build their default aspectual interpretations 
into the verbal predicates themselves. And I do not see how we could derive both 
interpretations by building aspectual meaning into the simple present tense either. The 
best explanation for the default interpretations would thus seem to be that, whenever 
eventives and statives are not overtly marked for inclusion aspect, they co-occur with 
certain types of covert inclusion aspect operators by default. 
This argument for covert inclusion aspect operators provides a foil for an argument 
against such operators for ordering aspect. Rullmann and Matthewson propose that 
languages contain covert complements to their overt ordering aspects (2018, 287). In 
English, the perfect is the overt member of this pair, and the non-perfect the covert 
one. Yet if covert non-perfect aspectual operators were available, we would no longer 
predict the restriction on eventives in the simple present. For the non-perfect would 
optionally forward-shift the reference time from the present instant, thereby opening 
up the possibility for a future interval within which the relevant eventuality could be 
wholly included. The restriction against eventives in the simple present is thus prima 
facie evidence against covert non-perfect operators. 
In positing covert aspectual operators, it is important not to lose sight of our focus 
on aspectual morphology and, specifically, why progressive and perfect morphology 
are much less freely available under what I am now calling event-level modals. The 
explanation here is relatively straightforward. For event descriptions used to specify 
potentials, there is often simply no need to impose the particular relations to particular 
reference times that the progressive or the perfect would. Only when there is a need to 
describe the potential to do two things either simultaneously or sequentially does it 
make sense to use either. That said, the details of this explanation require a closer 
examination of the progressive and the perfect themselves. And this is best provided 
in the context of an exploration of the temporal properties of modals, like might, that 
do freely accept such forms. I turn to this topic now. 
 
7.5 Revisiting the temporal interpretation of might 
7.5.1 A puzzle about temporal orientation 
Unlike can, might freely accepts complements in the progressive and perfect forms, 
and seems intuitively to be compatible with the whole range of temporal orientations: 
past, present, and future. This might suggest that might places no constraints on its 
prejacent’s evaluation time. Yet matters are significantly more complicated than this. 
An initial puzzle arises with bare eventives, which occur freely as complements of 
modals like might, as in (421), but not so freely in the simple present tense, as we 
have seen. Assuming that might occurs in the simple present tense,125 it follows that it 
cannot simply pass down its evaluation time to its prejacent. And yet might occurs 
 
125 Something sometimes claimed to be obligatory; cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof (1975). 
Epistemic Might: A Non-Epistemic Analysis 
159 
 
freely with bare statives too, as in (422), suggesting that it cannot simply forward-
shift the evaluation time for the prejacent either. For while (421) describes a possible 
future event, (422), by default, describes a possible current state.  
 
(421) John might win {tomorrow}. 
(422) John might be charming. 
 
In her seminal analysis of the temporal properties of non-root modals like might, 
Condoravdi (2002) proposed that they extend, rather than shift, the evaluation time for 
the prejacent. They provide an interval during which the prejacent may obtain that 
starts with the modal’s own evaluation time and extends to the end of time (2002, 13). 
This allows for present orientation with bare statives, and future orientation with bare 
eventives. If we assume that perfect aspect simply back-shifts the evaluation time for 
the prejacent, then it also allows for past orientation too, as in (423). 
 
(423) The government might have re-established the embargo.  
 
With (423), on Condoravdi’s analysis, we require there to be some time prior to an 
interval stretching from the current time into infinity at which the government re-
established the embargo. 
Past orientation on her analysis, Condoravdi observes, is “from the perspective of 
the time of utterance, not some future time” (2002, 13). This is a direct result of the 
modal’s extending, rather than shifting, the evaluation time for the prejacent into the 
future. And it is just this observation that has led some authors to abandon that 
analysis. Klecha (2016) notes that in (424), for example, we in fact need the past 
orientation to be from the perspective of some future time, rather than from the 
perspective of the utterance time (call this the past-in-the-future reading of a might-
have sentence). 
 
(424) Don’t book your ticket to Cuba for next summer just yet. The government 
might have re-established the embargo (by then). [Klecha’s (69)] 
 
Klecha concludes from this fact that we need there to be “some element distinct from 
the modal itself which imparts the future-shifting” (2016, 31). Klecha attributes this 
to the modal base. Others have posited embedded implicit tenses (McCawley 1971). 
And still others have proposed that this distinct element is covert prospective aspect 
(Matthewson 2012; Rullmann and Matthewson 2018; Thomas 2014; 2017). 
Appeals to a distinct, future-shifting element do indeed solve the problem facing 
Condoravdi’s analysis. However, they also create problems of their own. If covert 
prospective aspect were available for non-modal sentences, as well as for modal ones, 
for example, then bare eventives should be able to occur freely in the simple present 
without having to be coerced into a generic or habitual reading. Yet generally they 
cannot. Hence, if we appeal to covert prospective aspect, we have to posit that it is 
available in modal contexts but, for some reason, not in non-modal ones. Appeals to 
the modal base are similarly unpromising. Klecha, for example, wants circumstantial 
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modal bases to impart future orientation.126 However, circumstantial modal bases, as 
we have seen, are also compatible with present orientation. And as for implicit tense, 
Condoravdi has provided a battery of arguments for why temporal orientation should 
not be accounted for in this way (the interested reader is directed to Condoravdi 2002, 
8–11). Hence, by accounting for future orientation via a distinct, future-shifting 
element, we avoid the problem facing Condoravdi only at a cost of creating new ones. 
How do we account for the future orientation of might with bare eventives then? In 
what follows, I will suggest that Condoravdi was right to attribute the introduction of 
futurity to the modal. Yet she was wrong about how that futurity was introduced, and 
also about the contribution of the perfect. 
 
7.5.2 Solving the puzzle about temporal orientation 
Condoravdi claims that, in the absence of perfect morphology, non-root modals “have 
a future orientation optionally with stative predicates and obligatorily with eventive 
predicates” (2002, 11). Yet this optional future orientation for statives, as Laca (2012) 
observes, is crucially linked to the presence of future-oriented adverbials (2012, 5–8; 
cf. also Condoravdi 2002, 13). Without the adverbial in (425), for example, the 
default interpretation for the bare stative in (426) is a present-oriented one.  
 
(425) John may be drunk by the time we arrive. [Laca’s (6c)] 
(426) John may be drunk. [Laca’s (6b)] 
 
Now Condoravdi did not really offer an analysis of why statives default to present 
orientation when future orientation is also available (cf. Copley 2008; cited in Laca 
2012). In contrast to eventives, she did require statives to merely overlap with the 
extended evaluation time afforded by a modal. Yet while this explains the possibility 
of present orientation, it does not explain the default to it. But Laca points out that 
bare statives, on their default imperfective interpretation, need to be anchored to a 
specific reference time that they include. In the absence of future-oriented adverbials, 
the only available anchors are the endpoints of the extended evaluation time provided 
by the modal, while the only plausible one is the initial endpoint: the present moment. 
This explanation for bare statives’ default orientation extends well to progressives, 
Laca notes. While these receive present orientation by default, with future-oriented 
adverbials they can receive future orientation too, as (427) shows. 
 
(427) John may be getting drunk {by the time we arrive}. [≈ Laca’s (7)] 
 
Yet this optional future orientation is not the default, for the progressive functions in 
part to “stativize” event predicates. That is, it converts a description of an event into a 
description of a corresponding state. Just like bare statives, progressives thus require 
an anchor for the reference time that they include. And, in the absence of a future-
oriented adverbial, the default anchor is the initial endpoint of the modal’s evaluation 
time.  
 
126 He even argues, in a twist of intellectual history, that what appear to be epistemic modals with 
future orientation are in fact circumstantial ones (cf. Klecha 2016, 34–37). 
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Could a similar explanation be given for why the past-in-the-future readings that 
are optional with perfect complements, as in (428), are likewise not the default there?  
 
(428) John may have gotten drunk {by the time we arrive}. [≈ Laca’s (8)] 
 
Indeed, Laca argues, it can. For we can view the perfect, like the progressive, as also 
stativizing a predicate, in this case contributing the post-state of an event. On this 
view, the perfect indicates not just that some event culminated at a time prior to the 
evaluation time but also that the state of that event’s having culminated, that event’s 
post-state, holds at the evaluation time (cf. Parsons 1990, 235).127 One possible 
semantic entry for the perfect on this view is given in (429), providing an additional 
reason not to have inclusion aspect close the event variable of its complement. 
 
(429) ⟦PERF⟧w,t,f   = 𝜆P<i,<𝜀,st>>.𝜆t.𝜆e.  
∃e′∃t′[POST-STATE(e)(e′)(t)(w) & t′ < t & P(e′)(t′)(w)] 
 
Now say that we take the evaluation time provided by the modal to be an interval 
stretching from the modal’s own evaluation time to the end of time, as Condoravdi 
does. Then a past-in-the-future reading would be impossible, since the relevant post-
state would always have to hold at the modal’s own evaluation time. However, say 
we have the modal optionally forward-shift its prejacent’s evaluation time, rather than 
extending it, much as Abusch (2012) proposes. Then the evaluation time for both the 
post-state, and the eventuality it was the post-state of, could be in the future of the 
modal’s own evaluation time, making past-in-the-future readings possible. However, 
the post-state, like any other stative, will need to be anchored to the specific reference 
time that it includes. And, in the absence of future-oriented adverbials, the only 
available anchor for this reference time will be the modal’s own evaluation time. And 
this explains why past-in-the-future readings, while possible, are not the default. 
On the view now being proposed, instead of appealing to past, present, and future 
orientation, we should, strictly speaking, appeal only to present and future orientation. 
The appearance of past orientation with the perfect is due to its describing a state that, 
while evaluated at or after the modal’s own evaluation time, is defined in terms of an 
event that is prior to that state. Hence, given the default case of present orientation for 
statives, the event is also prior to the modal’s own evaluation time, whence the 
appearance of past orientation (cf. Laca 2012, 8). 
The uniformity of statives, progressives, and perfects with regard to their default 
and optional orientations makes sense given Laca’s analysis of the progressive and 
the perfect as “stativizing” eventive predicates.128 What the pattern in (425)-(428) thus 
reveals is a basic fact about statives and their contrast with eventives. Statives have 
present orientation by default, while bare eventives have obligatory future orientation. 
Future orientation is obligatory for bare eventives insofar as they cannot hold at the 
modal’s own evaluation time, the present instant, and so require forward-shifting to 
 
127 In the case of statives, the culminating event for the perfect may be either the initial transition to 
the state or, more frequently, the final transition from it (cf. Kamp and Reyle 1993, 567–68). 
128 For the perfect, the term “stativize” is unfortunately misleading, insofar as the perfect, unlike the 
progressive, can occur with stative predicates.  
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an interval posterior to that time. And present orientation is the default for statives 
insofar as the modal’s own evaluation time provides the most natural anchor, 
sometimes the only one, for the reference time that they include. 
To summarize: the solution to our puzzle about the obligatory future orientation of 
bare eventives involves two changes to Condoravdi’s solution. The change from an 
extended evaluation time to an optionally forward-shifted one explains how future 
orientation is possible with perfect complements. And the post-state analysis, and the 
explanation for why statives do not generally forward shift, explains why present 
orientation is the default. Both changes turn out to be necessary. And we are now also 
in better position to return to our original puzzle about the differences between might 
and can with regard to how freely they accept perfect and progressive morphology.  
 
7.5.3 Aspectual morphology revisited 
On the standard analysis, might and can share the same basic semantic entry but 
differ in terms of their modal base: epistemic for might; circumstantial for can. On 
my analysis, in contrast, might and can share a circumstantial modal base but differ in 
their semantic entries. Can is an instance of an event-level modal: a modal that 
introduces its own event variable and corresponding modal state description. Might, 
on the other hand, is an instance of a proposition-level modal, defined negatively as a 
modal that does not introduce its own event variable and corresponding modal state 
description. On standard analyses, at least in possible world semantics, all modals are 
proposition-level ones. However, part of the argument of this chapter has been that 
the temporal properties of some modal claims cannot be accounted for exclusively in 
terms of relations between the modal’s and its prejacent’s evaluation times. We need 
also to introduce an additional event variable for the modal for temporal properties to 
be encoded on. That is, we need some modals to be event-level ones.  
Event-level modals are used to attribute modal states: these are modal properties of 
individuals, situations, locations, etc. In this, they contrast with proposition-level 
modals, which are used simply to attribute modal properties to propositions, including 
the property of being possibly true relative to a set of facts. 
How does the distinction between proposition- and event-level modals help make 
sense of why might but not can freely accepts progressive and perfect complements? 
Recall that both the perfect and the progressive function to stativize event predicates 
and to impose particular relations to particular reference times: relations, respectively, 
of sequentiality and simultaneity. When it comes to specifying propositions, these 
relations will be useful. By relating an event description to different reference times, 
they enable different propositions to be denoted. When it comes to specifying modal 
states, however, these relations are useful much less often. Any analysis of potentials, 
for example, should hold that the potential to perform some activity entails a potential 
to be in the state of performing that activity, or in the post-state of having performed 
it (the contributions, respectively, of the progressive and the perfect). As such, while 
modals used to attribute modal properties to propositions can be expected to freely 
accept progressive and perfect morphology, modals used to attribute modal states can 
be expected not to. In other words, we can expect proposition-level modals like might 
to freely accept such complements, but not event-level ones like can. 
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When event-level modals do accept progressive and perfect morphology, it will be 
because the temporal relations they impose are in some way useful. The progressive, 
for example, provides an interval within which other activities at a specific reference 
time can be included. And the perfect, with or without the post-state view, provides a 
time prior to which other activities may occur. Hence, if the potential to perform an 
activity simultaneous with (or prior to) other activities is relevant, we can expect the 
progressive (or the perfect) to be acceptable, just as in Section 7.3.1.129 
That said, there are other means available for indicating the potential to engage in 
activities simultaneously or sequentially, as (430) and (431) show, and so there may 
be additional factors at play when the progressive and the perfect are used. 
 
(430) John can juggle and unicycle even as he carries on a trenchant conversation 
about Kant.  
(431) John can sing the Ave Maria and then launch into a vulgar outburst.  
 
Pursuing these factors would take us too far afield here.130 For our purposes it suffices 
to note that we should not expect progressive and perfect complements of event-level 
modals to be acceptable outside of relatively restricted contexts. By appeal to modal 
states, we can thus explain the restrictions on progressive and perfect complements 
for can that cannot be explained in terms of temporal orientation and modal bases. 
 
7.5.4 A uniform semantics revisited 
To draw this section to a close, I would like to address an issue that I imagine will be 
at the forefront of readers’ minds: namely, that I seem to have abandoned Kratzer’s 
attempt to provide a uniform semantics for modals of different flavors, given my 
appeal to modal states and my distinguishing event-level modals from proposition-
level ones. And, despite the arguments of the previous chapter, this will no doubt 
seem to many to be a significant theoretical cost of this chapter’s proposal.  
This cost is not as significant as it seems. First, we can provide a schematic version 
of the semantic entry for the event-level modal in (416) to cover event-level modals 
in general, as in (432). 
 
(432) ⟦canflavor⟧w,t,f = 𝜆P<i,<𝜀,st>>.𝜆e. 
∃e′[MODAL-STATEflavor(e)(e′)(w) &  
∃w′∃t′[w′ ∈ ∩f(w)(t) & t ≤ t′ & P(e′)(t′)(w′)]] 
 
 
129 The same holds if a specific reference time itself is relevant (e.g., the present moment), though 
here differences between the modal flavors seem to come into play. For example, the combination of 
the progressive with the temporal adverb now can be used to denote permissions but seemingly not to 
denote abilities or potentials. I assume there is a pragmatic explanation for this fact. It is odd to suggest 
that someone has the potential to be in the state of performing an activity at the present moment, 
because this state requires the prior onset of that activity, something over which they now have no 
control (though they do have control over its current onset). In contrast, whether you are permitted to 
be in the state of performing an activity could be relevant to deciding whether you continue it.  
130 One possibility is that the state description carries a connotation of absorption or immersion that 
the event description does not. Hence, the progressive and the perfect perhaps serve to emphasize a 
contrast between activities that are unexpectedly able to be performed simultaneously or sequentially. 
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If we appeal to a Recanati-style variable over modal flavors (cf. the previous chapter), 
this would allow us to limit the expansion from one semantic entry to two. 
Second, given the argument for optional forward-shifting from Section 7.5.2, we 
can adopt (433) as our semantic entry for a proposition-level modal like might, to 
which an event-level modal like can would then more or less simply add the second 
line of (432) with its event variable and corresponding modal state description. 
 
(433) ⟦might⟧w,t,f = 𝜆P<i,<𝜀,st>>.𝜆t.	𝜆e. 
∃w′∃t′[w′ ∈ ∩f(w)(t) & t ≤ t′ & P(e)(t′)(w′)] 
 
This is an advantage of my representational framework for event-level modals over 
Homer’s, which requires a special accessibility relation for event-level modals, and so 
cannot grant them the same core meaning as proposition-level ones.131 
Adopting a modal state analysis may not actually require us to give up too much, 
then, by way of the Kratzerian non-ambiguity project. We may only have to posit two 
semantic entries for existential modals, one of which simply builds off the other. This 
is not a significant theoretical cost, and it seems more than justified by the expanded 
empirical coverage. 
 
7.6 The counterfactual readings of might 
7.6.1 An account in terms of aspect 
To this point, I have not said anything about the counterfactual readings of non-root 
modals, brought to prominence by Condoravdi (2002) with examples like (434). 
 
(434) At that point he might still have won the game, but in the end he didn’t. 
 
Previously, no one had connected these readings to the presumed epistemic readings 
of such modals. However, Condoravdi argued for a decompositional analysis of might 
have into independent modal and aspectual operators, and for attributing the readings 
to a scopal ambiguity: for the presumed epistemic readings of might have, the modal 
takes scope over the perfect; for the counterfactual readings, the scope is reversed. 
Evidence for Condoravdi’s view is supposed to come from examples like (435), in 
which the adverb still is replaced with already, and the counterfactual reading is no 
longer available.  
 
(435) He might have already won the game, #but in the end he didn’t. 
 
While still can take direct scope over a modal, but not a perfect, the opposite holds for 
already (cf. Condoravdi 2002, 18–19). And the apparent difference in availability of 
counterfactual readings with these adverbs is supposed to show that the relative scope 
 
131 My approach not only makes the similarities between the two types of modals more transparent 
but also potentially provides an explanation for the acquisition and historical development of the two, 
event-level modals (or roots) in both cases generally preceding proposition-level modals (or non-roots) 
(cf. Hacquard 2013; 2016; and the references cited therein). On my approach, this would be due to 
proposition-level modals being more generic and requiring abstraction away from the differences 
between the more specific event-level modals. But this topic is far beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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of the modal and aspectual operators for the two readings has been reversed, as in 
(436)-(437). 
 
(436) PERF > STILL > MOD         [counterfactual reading] 
(437) MOD > ALREADY > PERF  [“epistemic” reading] 
 
Now on the post-state analysis of the perfect that I have adopted, the reading that 
results for a non-root modal with a scope like (436) is incoherent, as the reader may 
attest for herself. Hence, Condoravdi’s analysis of the counterfactual readings of non-
root modals is not available to me. Yet this analysis seems to me to be independently 
problematic, and in ways that point to what I believe to be the correct analysis of the 
counterfactual readings that Condoravdi discussed (cf. also Abusch 2012; Laca 2012; 
Thomas 2017; Rullmann and Matthewson 2018).132 Let me explain. 
The first problem for Condoravdi’s analysis is an evidential one. The contrast 
between still and already that she presents is consistent with the modal and aspectual 
operators having the same relative scope in both the counterfactual and the non-
counterfactual readings, as in (438)-(439). 
 
(438) STILL > MOD > PERF         [counterfactual reading] 
(439) MOD > ALREADY > PERF  [“epistemic” reading] 
 
That is, while still may be unable to scope directly over perfect aspect, this does not 
mean that it cannot scope over a modal which does so. If the counterfactual reading is 
distinguished from the (presumed) epistemic one by its backward-shifted evaluation 
time, this backward-shifting could thus be due to something other than aspect taking 
scope over the modal. 
The second problem for Condoravdi’s analysis relates directly to the first. It turns 
out that already, like still, is compatible with counterfactual readings, as in (440). 
 
(440) At that point he might have already won the game. But in the end, 
incredibly, he went on to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. 
 
But the scope of the operators in (440) has to be as in (439). Of the six logically 
possible scope combinations for (440), the two with already scoping lowest are ruled 
out by its sortal restrictions against eventives (cf. Condoravdi 2002, 8–9); the two 
with already scoping directly over the modal have already been ruled out; and the one 
with already scoping highest, and directly over the perfect, is ruled out for conceptual 
reasons (cf. Condoravdi 2002, 23–24). Hence, the backward-shifting of the modal’s 
evaluation time must be due to something other than aspect scoping over the modal. 
 
132 For what it is worth, modal adjectives on their non-root interpretations do seem to be marked for 
aspect, as in It had been possible that John was the murderer. I assume that the morphological aspect 
in this case is not the realization of semantic aspect. However, there are other ways to make sense of 
this fact that, while requiring a fair amount of tinkering with the details of my proposals for event- and 
proposition-level modals, are nonetheless compatible both with that distinction and with its role in 
explaining the central phenomena of this chapter. Additionally, my argument against interpreting 
aspect as taking scope over modal auxiliaries like might is independent of whether it takes scope over 
proposition-level modal adjectives. 
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The third problem for Condoravdi’s analysis confirms as much. Condoravdi claims 
that the perfect taking scope over the modal, which she holds to be responsible for 
counterfactuality, is “possible only for modals that are in the so-called subjunctive 
form in English, such as might, would, should, ought to” (2002, 17). But the so-called 
subjunctive modals are just those modals that are, morphologically, the past tense 
forms of other modals (cf. Palmer 2001, 13–14). Hence, if the backward-shifting of 
the counterfactual readings seems to be possible only with the so-called subjunctive 
modals, a much simpler explanation for why this is so is that the morphological past 
tense is also indicative, in at least some cases, of a semantic past tense. There is no 
need to posit a scope-reversal mechanism that, for unknown reasons, is only available 
for morphologically past-tensed modals.133 
 
7.6.2 An account in terms of tense 
Condoravdi’s counterfactual readings are the result, in my view, of semantic past 
tense on the modal. It is well known that the use of the semantic past tense to describe 
a past state often generates a cancellable implicature that that state no longer obtains, 
as in (441). 
 
(441) In those days, John was quite charming. {As a matter of fact, he still is.} 
 
Something similar could hold for the counterfactual readings of modals. Here the past 
tense would describe a past possibility for there to be the post-state of some specified 
but as yet future event, as in (442). 
 
(442) Yesterday, John might still have finished his quilt in time for tomorrow’s 
fair. 
 
In using the past tense, we would imply that there is no longer the possibility for there 
to be this post-state, and so imply that the relevant event either will not, or did not, 
occur. This implication is cancellable, however, as (443) and (444) show. 
 
(443) Yesterday, John might still have finished his quilt in time for tomorrow’s 
fair. {As a matter of fact, he still might. He’ll just have to work non-stop 
now because of his tomfoolery yesterday.} 
 
(444) At that point, he might still have won the game. {As a matter of fact, he did 
go on to win, for what it’s worth. But it certainly wasn’t through any skill of 
his own after his bumbling at that point.} 
 
A tense- and implicature-based account of counterfactual readings is subject to two 
challenges. First is the argument that non-root modals scope above tense and are 
 
133 A similar criticism applies to Rullmann and Matthewson (2018). These authors propose a three-
way taxonomy of English modals that is completely silent on the fact that their Class-III modals are all 
morphologically past tense forms of their Class-I modals, while their sole Class-II modal, must, is the 
one modal in English that does not have a morphological past-tense. No wonder, then, that, for some 
occurrences of their Class-III modals with the perfect, they have to posit special, lexicalized forms. 
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“evaluated at the local now” (cf. Hacquard 2010, 88). Second is the argument that the 
implication of counterfactuality cannot be cancelled (cf. Portner 2009, 226–27). 
Start with the first challenge. The argument that non-root modals scope above 
tense derives its force from the view of such modals as epistemic. Epistemic states are 
like modal states—abilities, potentials, states of permission and obligation, etc.—in 
that they can change over time. However, while past tense on a flexible semi-modal 
auxiliary like have to in (445) can be used to describe a past obligation, it cannot be 
used to describe a past epistemic state (Hacquard 2010, 87–88).  
 
(445) Mary had to be home yesterday. [≈ Hacquard’s (12)]  
 
On its presumed epistemic reading, (445) instead provides evidence for the speaker’s 
current state about some past event, suggesting that the modal is scoping above tense. 
These facts are apparently even clearer in languages which are morphologically more 
transparent than English, and in which modals regularly inflect for tense and aspect 
(cf. Hacquard 2006; 2009; 2010 for French and Italian examples).  
Now I do not adopt an epistemic view of non-roots. Instead, non-roots differ from 
roots on my view in that the latter are used to attribute modal states, which are part of 
the temporal structure of the world, while the former are used to attribute oftentimes 
atemporal modal properties to propositions. Whether an already settled proposition is 
a non-trivial possibility, for example, will likely not change as the facts change over 
time.134 Given the general atemporality of proposition-level modality, it is no surprise 
that a flexible modal marked for past tense should generally receive an event-level 
reading whenever the past tense is interpreted as scoping above the modal. But this 
does not mean that semantic past tense is unavailable for proposition-level modals. 
In fact, the general exception to atemporality for proposition-level modals comes 
from propositions that have not yet been settled at the time of evaluation. As the facts 
change over time, and the space of possibilities decreases, so may the modal status of 
these propositions change too. Hence, for proposition-level modals, semantic past 
tense only makes sense in a specific range of cases: viz., those with future orientation. 
But these are precisely the cases on which counterfactual readings can occur too, as 
(446) shows.  
 
(446) At that point, it was possible that John would finish his quilt in time for the 
next day’s fair.  
 
That said, for modal auxiliaries in English, there is a significant additional obstacle 
to interpreting past tense as taking scope over a proposition-level modal. This is the 
fact that the morphological past tense on a modal auxiliary is not always the 
realization of the semantic past. Instead, in addition to remoteness in time, past 
morphology may also be used to indicate remoteness in logical space (Palmer 2001, 
 
134 Not likely, but not necessarily impossible either. For example, if we adopt the view that “murder 
will out”, then it might make sense to utter a sentence like (iv).  
 
(iv) Yesterday, {Raskolnikov/Bill Sikes} might have been innocent, given his disposition and 
actions. Today, he can’t be. 
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nn. 13–14; cf. also chs. 2.1.5, 3.2.3, 8). Or, as Palmer puts it, it may be used “to 
express greater tentativeness”, as in the second of the two responses to the question in 
(447). 
 
(447) Who can play the tuba for us at next week’s concert? 
a. John can. 
b. John could. 
 
Add to these two interpretations of the morphological past the post-state view of 
the perfect. And recall that, for statives in general, future orientation is not the default, 
but instead generally requires an anchor or a cue. Without that anchor or cue, we can 
expect present orientation to be the default. But since future orientation is required for 
semantic past tense on a proposition-level modal to make sense, a default to present 
orientation translates into a default interpretation of the morphological past tense on a 
proposition-level modal as indicating remoteness in logical space rather than in time. 
Hence, while semantic past on a proposition-level modal may be available in some 
cases, we should not expect it to be readily accessible.135 
Turn now from the availability of the semantic past to the cancellability of the 
counterfactuality implication. My judgments do not align with Portner’s, though I can 
grant that (444), a true counterfactual, is perhaps less acceptable than (443). Where 
judgments differ, little can be said. However, I think my tense-based account can help 
to make sense of Portner’s judgments. For recall that there is competition between the 
two available interpretations of the morphological past tense on a modal. A speaker 
who explicitly signals that she intends the semantic past, via her use of temporal 
frame adverbials, is thus likely to reinforce its general effect. She will likely make the 
implication of counterfactuality harder to cancel, that is, insofar as she explicitly 
signaled that she did not intend the alternative, default interpretation that would not 
have generated this same implicature. 
In fact, it has been argued that past tense does not always generate a counterfactual 
reading. In French, for example, the conditional mood has been claimed to also be 
required (cf. Laca 2012, 12–18; here Laca disagrees with Hacquard 2006, 77). Yet 
French is morphologically more transparent than English. If Laca’s claim is correct, 
this may thus provide indirect support for my contention that the competition in how 
the morphological past tense is interpreted in English plays a role in generating the 
counterfactual reading. Such cross-linguistic questions are matters for future research.  
 
 
135 Since bare eventives also impart future orientation, semantic past should be available for them 
too. In fact, back-shifting phrases like at that point do turn out to be compatible with morphologically 
past-tensed modals in cases where they are not compatible with their morphologically present-tensed 
counterparts, as (v) and (vi) show.  
 
(v) At that point, John {#may/might} still go on to win the race. Sadly, he didn’t. 
(vi) At that point, John {#can/could} still {go on to} win the race. Sadly, he didn’t. 
 
This suggests that maybe the morphological past is realizing the semantic past in these cases too, and is 
responsible for the implication of counterfactuality. In the case of a proposition-level modal like might, 
however, the periphrastic phrase go on to seems to be required for this to happen, something for which 
I have no account at the present moment. 
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7.6.3 A second sort of counterfactual reading 
As I begin to close my account of counterfactual readings, I want to address the use 
of might-have sentences in action explanations, as in (448) and (449). 
 
(448) That concierge is not a spy. But he might have been one. And that is why I 
hid when he came into sight.  
(449) John did not steal the vase. But he might have. And that is why I arrested 
him. 
 
Some have argued that such examples show there can be semantically past-tensed 
epistemic interpretations of modals, contrary to the received view (cf. von Fintel and 
Gillies 2008; Rullmann and Matthewson 2018). Yet in a previous chapter I suggested 
that the modal sentences in such examples should be interpreted counterfactually (cf. 
Chapter 4, Section 4.6). I am now in position to specify how this can be done. 
Unlike Condoravdi’s counterfactual readings of non-root modals, I do not think 
that the proposed counterfactual readings of (448) and (449) involve semantic past 
tense. Rather, they involve present tense and a slight but subtle change of topic from 
the preceding sentences that relates to the post-state view of the perfect. Now that the 
questions of whether the concierge is a spy, or whether John did steal the vase, are 
taken to be settled, the question is what would be compatible with the post-states of 
such eventualities. The post-state of the concierge’s being a spy, for example, might 
be compatible with his moving stealthily, which in fact he does. And the post-state of 
John’s stealing the vase might be compatible with his looking guilty, and with his 
fingerprints covering the hearth, which in fact they do.  
These facts are just the sort of facts that would have led us in the first place to 
believe and claim that maybe the concierge is a spy, and that maybe John did steal the 
vase, and so to act as we did, given such beliefs. Thus, their compatibility with the 
relevant post-states can appropriately be cited in an explanation of our actions, as in 
(448) and (449). 
In uttering (448) and (449), we know that the relevant eventualities have not 
obtained, and so neither have their post-states. But in changing the topic from (the 
possibility of) these eventualities to (the possibility of) their post-states, we are able to 
ignore these facts as we determine the value of the modal base. The change of topic is 
key to this ability. Without it, there is not this same ability, whence the incoherence of 
(450), unless the speaker is interpreted as having changed his mind.  
 
(450) That concierge is not currently a spy. #But he might currently be a spy. 
 
Facts that have been incorporated into the common ground, and so presumably also 
into the value of the modal base, cannot just be excluded again by fiat. However, the 
change of topic from the eventuality to its post-state allows for the exclusion of such 
facts. This exclusion, motivated by the assumption that the speaker does not intend to 
be making a trivially false claim, is responsible for generating the counterfactuality of 
the reading. 
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7.6.4 Counterfactual readings and modal bases 
The second sort of counterfactual reading that I have just introduced I will call a post-
state counterfactual, in contrast to Condoravdi’s open-future counterfactuals. From a 
semantic standpoint, the post-state counterfactual in (451) is indistinguishable on my 
view from the presumed epistemic reading of the same sentence in (452). 
 
(451) John did not steal the vase. But he might have stolen it. And that is why I 
arrested him. 
(452) I’m pretty sure John didn’t steal the vase. But he might have stolen it. 
 
There is no difference in lexical entry, no difference in scope, no difference in tense 
to distinguish the two. Importantly, there is also no difference in the type of modal 
base, in the traditional sense of that term. Rather, both have what would traditionally 
be called circumstantial modal bases, from the values of which certain facts must be 
excluded in order to ensure non-triviality.  
For the counterfactual reading, to be sure, the facts to be excluded from the value 
of the modal base will be facts that had previously been added. But this is a pragmatic 
difference, not a semantic one. The difference between the two readings is entirely in 
their pragmatic overtones and is dependent on the surrounding context. Or, as Laca 
nicely puts it, “the difference between the epistemic and the counterfactual construal 
hinges on the knowledge attributed to the speaker: counterfactuality arises under the 
further assumption that the speaker knows which way things went” (2012, 25). 
Unlike post-state counterfactuals (and presumed epistemic readings of non-roots), 
open-future counterfactuals (and presumed metaphysical readings) likely do not 
require facts to be excluded from the value of the modal base to ensure non-triviality. 
This has led authors like Condoravdi (2002) to propose that non-root modals with 
future orientation have one type of modal base, a metaphysical one, while non-root 
modals with present and apparently past orientation have another, an epistemic one. 
However, there is no reason to posit multiple modal bases here either. 
What unifies proposition-level modals for me, and distinguishes them from event-
level ones, is that they are all used to attribute modal properties to propositions, rather 
than to individuals, situations, locations, etc. In particular, non-root possibility modals 
fundamentally express the prejacent’s compatibility with the facts. To avoid claims 
about trivial compatibility, we must exclude any fact of the matter about a prejacent 
from the value of the modal base. If the world is not deterministic, this means we will 
have to adopt a strategy for interpreting present- (and what appear to be) past-oriented 
claims that we will not need for future-oriented ones. We can interpret future-oriented 
claims against the background of the total facts, whereas we cannot do the same for 
non-future-oriented ones. This difference in background reflects our knowledge of a 
fundamental difference in the structure of the future when compared to the past and 
the present, assuming the world is not deterministic. However, there is no reason to 
think that it should be encoded semantically as a difference in the type of modal base. 
Instead, it follows for free from completely pragmatic considerations. We can grant to 
all four readings of our proposition-level modals the same type of modal base, in the 
traditional sense of that term. 
 




7.7.1 Looking back 
Might appears to differ from can in accepting progressive and perfect complements. 
This difference has been attributed to the difference between epistemic possibility 
(allegedly expressed by might) and circumstantial possibility (allegedly expressed by 
can). While progressive and perfect morphology are supposed to orient possibilities 
to the present and the past, circumstantial possibilities are supposed to be oriented 
exclusively toward the future. Yet I have shown that can does accept progressive and 
perfect complements in some cases, and that acknowledged circumstantial modalities 
cannot always be analyzed as being oriented toward the future either. 
I then proposed that we account for the difference between can and might in how 
freely they accept progressive and perfect complements through a distinction between 
event- and proposition-level modals (for inspiration, cf. Brennan 1993; Palmer 2001; 
Hacquard 2009). These types of modals differ in whether they introduce their own 
event variables, and so also in whether they are used to attribute modal states (which 
are the modal properties of individuals, etc.) or instead to attribute modal properties 
to propositions. And the progressive and the perfect turn out to denote relations that 
are helpful in determining propositions, but not generally in describing modal states.  
A distinction between event- and proposition-level modals requires us to abandon 
the Kratzerian attempt to provide a uniform semantics across modal flavors. But the 
abandonment is not as significant as it seems. We may only have to move from one 
semantic entry to two, a theoretical cost justified by the expanded empirical coverage. 
Further research may also show the two semantic entries to play a role in the attested 
patterns of language acquisition and historical development of the modal flavors. 
The different temporal properties of might and can thus provide no reason to think 
that the former is distinguished from the latter in expressing epistemic possibility. In 
fact, they may well provide reason to think the distinction runs along some dimension 
other than the epistemic/non-epistemic one, as the previous chapter also suggested. 
This conclusion is reinforced in every chapter of the dissertation. When it comes to 
explaining the truth of modal claims (Chapter 2), to disagreeing with them (Chapter 
4), or to reporting attitudes expressed with them (Chapter 5), phenomena that would 
otherwise be anomalous make perfect sense if we assume that might does not have an 
epistemic meaning, and that the relative uncertainty that is implied with epistemic 
uses of might is implied only indirectly (Chapter 3). Might does not modify the force 
of a speaker’s commitment to the content of her speech act. Nor does it make that 
content truth-conditionally dependent on her or on anyone else’s information state. 
Rather, it makes that content truth-conditionally dependent on sets of circumstances. 
The uncertainty that is implied in an epistemic use of might is not a semantic function 
of the modal but instead a pragmatic function of making a cooperative modal claim. 
  
7.7.2 Looking forward 
To bring this dissertation to a close, let me point to three avenues for future research. 
First, my central argument in this dissertation has been that the type of possibility 
expressed by might is circumstantial, not epistemic. And just as many in the literature 
who have made the epistemic assumption have refrained from offering any particular 
analysis of epistemic possibility, so I have refrained in this dissertation from offering 
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any particular analysis of circumstantial possibility too (cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1). 
The central argument of the dissertation is independent of the details of such analyses. 
Yet in other work I have begun to develop an analysis of the circumstantial possibility 
relation (cf. Harr 2019), and this is research that needs to be continued. There are two 
central issues here.  
The first is that possibility, whether circumstantial or epistemic, likely cannot be 
analyzed exclusively in terms of compatibility with circumstances, or with contents of 
information states (cf. Bach 2011). Instead, as Kratzer (1981; 1991) proposes, and as 
(453) suggests, (im)possibility should likely be analyzed in terms of (in)compatibility 
with the conjunctions of such sets with sets of stereotypes or defaults. 
 
(453) [Context: John, who has a serious gambling addiction, is not to be found. A 
receipt for a bank withdrawal of 5000.00 USD is lying on the table.] 
 
a.   [S1] John might be at the Soaring Eagle Casino. 
b.  [S2] You’re wrong. He can’t be. The casino closed down months ago. 
c.  [S1] Yes, but last month it reopened for the evenings. So he might be.  
d. [S2] But they couldn’t maintain that schedule for even a week, and now 
they’ve closed down for good. So he can’t be. 
 
For (453), the relevant stereotype or default would be that casinos that close down do 
not reopen. Yet since institutions that close down sometimes do reopen, John’s being 
at the Soaring Eagle Casino is compatible with its having closed down months ago. 
However, there is an important sense in which it is not compatible with the relevant 
stereotype or default about such institutions. 
The second issue is how to represent this more expansive relation of compatibility. 
Kratzer does so in the possible worlds framework, taking circumstances to be the 
value of a function that determines the set of worlds quantified over, and stereotypes 
to be the value of a function that orders those worlds according to their compliance 
with the stereotypical course of events. In doing so, she represents stereotypes by 
means of propositions, which can be true or false of the worlds in the modal base. 
However, while this method works well for simple stereotypes, I argue that it does 
not work well for what I call complex stereotypes: stereotypes that characterize what 
happens when some other stereotype does not hold. To account for the differential 
effects of such stereotypes, I argue, we may need to appeal to the resources of default 
logic (cf. Reiter 1980; Horty 2012; 2014). And this argument brings us squarely back 
to questions about the role and adequacy of the possible worlds framework that I have 
so far for the most part avoided as tangential to my main argument in this dissertation 
(cf. Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2 and Chapter 7, Sections 7.2.1 and 7.4.2). 
A second avenue for future research concerns my distinguishing the possibilities 
expressed by might from the potentials expressed by can in terms of a distinction 
between proposition and event modality. Since might is used to express that some 
proposition is possibly true, its alethic flavor of modality can only be expressed by a 
proposition-level modal. And since can is used to express that some individual, etc., 
has the potential to develop in a certain way, or is in a certain modal state, its 
dynamic flavor of modality can only be expressed by an event-level modal.  
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Yet for other flavors of modality, it is an open question whether they are able to be 
expressed only by one or the other of these two levels of modals. Brennan (1993), for 
example, distinguished ought-to-be deontics from ought-to-do ones, which could 
correspond to a distinction between a proposition being said to be obligatory and an 
individual being said to be in a state of obligation. Hacquard (2006; 2009) further 
argued, on the basis of actuality entailments, that while the latter category of deontics 
occur within the scope of aspect, the former do not. If correct, this would follow 
straightforwardly from the different semantic types I assign to event- and proposition-
level modals. However, I leave it as a matter for future research whether these other 
modal flavors are in fact expressed by both. 
A third avenue for future research, perhaps the most interesting of all, is whether 
there are languages in which modal auxiliaries express epistemic flavors of modality, 
or in which flexible modals do. In English, if I am correct, there are no clear instances 
of either. What seemed on first analysis to be epistemic flavors, in such cases, turned 
out to be better analyzed as alethic flavors of circumstantial modality. Say that other 
languages also turn out to be like English. Why should this be so? Is this due to a 
grammatical constraint? Or is it due to a sort of conceptual constraint on polysemy? 
One possibility, at least for modal auxiliaries, is that they are of the wrong type to 
have an epistemic meaning. On this chapter’s proposal, their complements are not 
propositions, not even temporal ones, but epistemic meanings quite plausibly require 
propositional complements. If, cross-linguistically, modal auxiliaries never expressed 
epistemic flavors of modality, this proposal could make sense of that fact. But what 
about modal adjective like possible, which do take propositional complements? Are 
such modals ever flexible between epistemic and alethic flavors of modality? Or are 
they ever just flexible more generally between epistemic and non-epistemic flavors? 
If not, why not? These are interesting and puzzling questions that require additional 
research. Yet whatever these avenues of research turn up, remember this: 
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